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For the thing called invention  (in 
metre, for example) is always a 
self-imposed fetter of this kind. 
Dancing in chains to make that 
hard for themselves and then to 
spread a false notion that it is 
easy that is the trick that they 
wish to show us.  
F. Nietzsche (2011, §140) 
 
When you set out on the journey 
to Ithaca, pray that the road be 
g  
C. P. Cavafy (2007, p. 36) 
 
Having become a refugee and living apart from his parents from a very young age, my 
fa he , he  I a  g, ce e ai ed ha  ed ca i  i  e hi g b d  ca  
ake f  . E e  i ce I ha e ca ied h e d  i   hea  f hea . Put 
otherwise, this is something that I have taken for granted throughout my life. Taking 
things for granted (technically referred to, at least by some, as tacit knowledge, know-
how, implicit knowledge, habit etc.) is a habitual predisposition that permits certain 
possibilities to show up, while others remain unobserved in the shadows. Habitual 
predisposition is akin to chaining oneself to the inside of a Platonian cave and seeing 
certain shadows on the wall, while all the time being oblivious to what is happening 
beyond the cave in question. 
Growing up, and thanks largely to my engagement with Philosophy, I came to 
like the specific set of educational chains I had chosen. Why? Because I came to realise 
that I was wearing chains in the first place. As Seneca the Younger, the ancient Roman 
Stoic phil he , e a ked i  De b e i a e i ae , a e  h  studies philosophy 
adds centuries of wisdom to their own life. Internalizing and embodying the wisdom 
of the past (as far as possible), thus, enables one to be open to previously unnoticed 
possibilities for action. Perceiving more possibilities for action is a manifestation of a 
greater degree of freedom. This is because seeing more possibilities is tied to being 
able to notice other responses that are invisible to the chain bearers of established 
habits of thought and action.  
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I see my work as an attempt to expose, as far as possible, parts of the 
aforementioned chains to the light. I seek to show how we gradually come to bear the 
chains of habit and how the chains in turn become shackled to us, even in cases where 
we are seemingly less restricted by them  when we improvise. Realising the latter, 
however, I came to understand that the chains can in many cases be a blessing in 
disguise. For without them we lack an Archimedean point from which to be connected 
to the life-world. We can never be free of chains. However, becoming aware of our 
chains, we can, to borrow from Nietzsche, at least try to choose the chains we dance 
in. This has importance both for persons and organizations, or at least that is what I 
believe. To paraphrase William Irvine, a modern Stoic philosopher, most people are 
unhappy because they have chosen the wrong chains. Thus depending on what people 
or organizations value, they must be wary about which chains they seek to don.  
I cannot take all the credit for reaching my doctoral Ithaca. Many people have 
helped me on my educational Odyssey. Thus, I would like to thank my parents (Flora 
and Giorgos), sister (Maria) and grandparents (Yiannis and Maria; Demetris and 
Vasiliki) for building and maintaining a safe harbour from which to embark on my 
journey. My Odyssey would have been far poorer and perhaps, unlikely to have even 
occurred, without Professor Haridimos Tsoukas offering me a ticket. To him I would 
like to express my infinite gratitude for sparing his precious time to encourage me to 
plunge even deeper into the abyss f he i a c e a i a  a d eek e a d  
f  he g d ife . I d a  ike  ha k P fe  Jacky Swan for her equally 
precious time during which she patiently offered me her highly perceptive feedback 
on my writing and made me even more aware of borne chains. I am indebted to 
Professor Rodrigo Ribeiro who set aside time to discuss snippets from my data and 
Phenomenology. To Dr Emmanouil Gkeredakis, Dr Pedro Monteiro, as well as my 
colleagues Anastasia Allayioti, and Ahmed Maged Nofal I will always be greatly 
indebted for the intellectual stimulation and encouragement during both times of joy 
and despair. Moreover, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to all participants 
in this study for their trust in allowing me to observe, participate and write about their 
work-lives. Last but not least, I can safely say that without the support, encouragement 
and understanding of Ms Niki Paralimnitou, I would have found it far harder to cross 
the finish line of my Odyssey.  
To conclude, I would like to emphasize that all of the above deserve all the 




This thesis is submitted to the University of Warwick in support of my 
application for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. I certify that the thesis is 
solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work 
of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and 
any other person is clearly identified in it). It has been composed by myself and 
has not been submitted in any previous application for any degree.  
 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, 
provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced 
without the prior written consent of the author. 
 
I warrant that this authorization does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the 




Organizational improvisation refers to how members of organizations respond 
intentionally and creatively to situations with abysmal planning. This is an 
important skill to have because organizations are constantly faced with novel 
situations to which they often have very little time to respond. The thesis 
reviews the literature on organizational improvisation and organizes the 
literature in three perspectives. In turn this allows the study to identify that the 
hitherto research on improvisation has overlooked lived experience, emotions 
and values, as well as to note that accounts of improvisation are conceptualised, 
to a large degree, through stable, separable entities rather than through ongoing 
enmeshed processes. Seeking to pay particular attention to addressing the 
aforementioned limitations of the literature, this study attempts to answer the 
question of how improvisation is enacted and experienced. To do so the study 
synthesizes insights from phenomenology, practice theory and strands of 
ecological psychology and applies these insights to the interpretation of data 
collected using ethnographic techniques from an air traffic control unit. This 
study contributes to the literature by introducing and synthesizing new 
conceptual distinctions that better enable research to capture the ongoing, value-




CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
U e ec ed e e  cc   
because we create organizations that 
construct and enact expected events in 
he fi  ace.  (Weick & Sutcliffe, 
2015, p. 29) 
 
I fa  a  ga i ed c e  a e 
inherently open systems, and to the 
extent that organizational rules are 
intrinsically open-ended in their 
application, every problem has some 
degree of novelty.  (Tsoukas, 2005, p. 
85) 
 
1.1. Research Background 
Organizing is incessantly enacted and re-enacted on the background of 
a social world that is an open system. Organizing refers to the activities used to 
coordinate the actions of individuals towards achieving a common goal. The 
latter are heavily reliant on conventions (Gkeredakis, 2014), which establish the 
distinction between expected and unexpected occurrences (Weick & Sutcliffe, 
2015). An open system, at least in the social realm, refers to a setting in which 
its constituent elements (e.g. conventions) are prone to contingent variation 
(Tsoukas, 1998b, 1998a). Insofar as organizations rely on conventions and rules 
for organizing, they are prone to experience unexpected occurrences due to 
temporal asymmetry. Temporal asymmetry refers to the fact that conventions 
used for organizing are grounded on past experience (Tsoukas, 2009b). 
However, as encountered situations are prone to having new inimitable features, 
past experience may not be able to encompass situational uniqueness and 
novelty (Tsoukas, 2016; see also Hadjimichael, 2017).  
This is a frequent and well-evident occurrence throughout the history of 
organizations from antiquity until today. For example, in the Second Punic War, 
Hannibal, a Carthaginian general, surprised the Roman Republic by leading his 
army (including 37 elephants) across the Alps into Italy (Mahaney, Kapran, & 
Tricart, 2008, p. 225). A feat no other African general had ever attempted. In 
he H d ed  Yea  Wa , in a society dominated by the nobility and where the 
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role of women was much degraded, to the surprise of many, a teenage woman 
without a noble background, Joan of Arc, emerged as a leader of French armies 
in their fight against the English (Warner, 2013). In the Second World War, the 
Japanese realising the imminence of defeat decided to enact the kamikaze 
practice  Japanese pilots were urged to crash their fighter planes into American 
naval ships (Orbell & Morikawa, 2011). More recently, on 11 September 2001, 
in a mutation of the kamikaze practice, terrorists hijacked passenger airlines to 
crash into landmarks of the United States (Hoffman, 2002).  
Novel situations are also abundant in contemporary organizations. 
During the climb out of US Airways Flight 1549, on 15th January 2009, the 
ai c af  ck a f ck f bi d  ca i g he ai c af  e gi e   e a  e . 
Unable to steer the aircraft to an airport for an emergency landing, the pilots 
improvised by gliding the aircraft to a ditching (i.e., water landing) on the 
Hudson river near midtown Manhattan (Sullenberger, 2012). Everyone 
survived. More mundane examples of novelty include introducing new software 
to a work setting (Orlikowski, 1996), coping with unusual customer queries 
(Tsoukas & Vladimirou, 2001), coping with staff absences during a film 
shooting (Bechky & Okhuysen, 2011) and navigating a large ship while 
suffering an engineering breakdown (Hutchins, 1991). 
All the above, when first encountered, caused much surprise. Hence, the 
organizations or agents facing these novelties, in order to accomplish their 
objectives, had to, initially at least, creatively adapt their conventional 
responses to the situational uniqueness with little to no pre-meditation. The 
process through which the latter was accomplished is referred to as 
organizational improvisation. Cunha and colleagues (2017, p. 560) define 
ga i a i a  i i a i  a  the convergence of design and performance 
(extemporaneity), the creation of some degree of novel action (novelty), and the 
deliberateness of the design that is created during its own enactment 
(i e i a i ) . D e  he cia  ea  ag a ic  f da i , novelty is 
and will remain an inherent feature of human experience (Castoriadis, 2005b). 
Fi - i e e e , T ka  (2016, p. 145) ecifie , a e  he e ce i  b  
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he e i  h a  ife . As such, it is very important to understand the process 
(i.e., improvisation) through which agents are able to craft responses to the 
novel and unique. 
 
1.2 Organizational Improvisation in Organization Theory 
During the last three decades, organization theorists, as will be discussed in 
depth in the next chapter, have intensified their efforts to understand 
improvisation in organizations (see Baker & Nelson, 2005; Cunha, Cunha, & 
Kamoche, 1999; Tsoukas, 2011b). Organizational improvisation has been 
explored through theoretical studies (see Crossan, Cunha, Vera, & Cunha, 
2005; Kamoche, Cunha, & Cunha, 2003; Weick, 1998), as well as across a 
plethora of settings using large scale quantitative studies (Kyriakopoulos, 2011, 
e.g., Dutch food industry; Magni, Proserpio, Hoegl, & Provera, 2009, e.g., 
information system development; Vera & Crossan, 2005, e.g., municipality) 
and in-depth case studies (Batista, Clegg, Cunha, Giustiniano, & Rego, 2016, 
e.g., emergency room; Bechky & Okhuysen, 2011, e.g., SWAT teams and film 
crews; Weick, 1993b, e.g., firefighter units).  
Nevertheless, several scholars have noted some limitations of extant 
research. Specifically, in an extensive review of the literature, Hadida and 
colleagues (2015, p. 444) highlighted that there is only a small number of 
empirical studies on the phenomenon. In their seminal study Bechky and 
Okhuysen (2011, p. 239) underline that there is a lack of understanding of how 
organizations develop the responses to unexpected e e . Indeed, memory 
and knowledge are sometimes equated, causing considerable ambiguity about 
how and whether both contribute to the enactment of the phenomenon (see 
Moorman & Miner, 1998a, 1998b).  
More recently, it has been noted that the experience of agents 
improvising has been severely underexplored (Fisher & Barrett, 2019) and that 
accounts of improvisation tend to overlook the role of values (Visscher, 
He i k e d, & O Mahoney, 2018, p. 356) and emotions (Cunha et al., 2017, 
p. 567). Moreover, a fair number of studies use a disjunctive conceptualization 
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(i.e., explanations tend to be decontextualized and attribute explanations to 
number of distinct, yet interacting elements) (see Tsoukas, 2017).  As a result, 
accounts of improvisation seem to be rationalistic (Visscher et al., 2018, p. 356), 
which leads them to be, to a degree, alienated from common experience, thus 
failing to fully take into account tacit knowledge agents draw upon. 
 Furthermore, as will be seen in Chapter 2, at best, studies on 
organization improvisation utilise a weak-process  conceptualization. 
According to Langley and Tsoukas (2017, p. 3), the latter way of theorizing 
about organizational phenomena recognizes that phenomena consist of ongoing 
processes, but the processes are considered to be subsidiary to a stable entity. 
This is problematic because it underestimates the prevalence of novelty and 
improvisation in organizations, which several studies have pointed out (Batista 
et al., 2016; Feldman, 2000; Tsoukas, 2016; Tsoukas & Chia, 2002). 
To sum up, all the above pose the danger of underestimating the richness 
and nuances involved in the process of organizational improvisation, which in 
turn are likely to contribute to an impoverished understanding of the 
phenomenon. 
 
1.3. Purpose and Contributions of the Study 
The purpose of this study is to contribute to the literature on 
organizational improvisation by answering the question: How do agents enact 
and experience improvisation? The d  a e   he e ea ch e i  i  
attempt to pay particular attention to addressing the limitations identified above. 
As this is a broad research question, it should be noted that it will be further 
refined into more specific research questions by the end of Chapter 3. In 
parallel, it should be highlighted that the study will be explanatory in nature and 
will take the phenomenological experience of socially-embedded agents as the 
unit of analysis. By the latter I mean that my explanatory focus will not be 
strictly on individual experience, but rather on individual experience in relation 
to their sociomaterial environment. This is because individual and environment 
are entwined - responses to situations can only be enacted insofar as agents are 
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already immersed in an environment and can draw on their surroundings 
(Lamprou, 2017; Orlikowski & Scott, 2008). 
More specifically, by drawing on an ethnographically-informed 
investigation of an air traffic control (ATC) unit, this study hopes to make three 
contributions to the literature. First, particular attention will be paid to capturing 
how improvisational responses are developed. To be able to enact any action 
(including improvisation) necessarily relies on tacit knowledge (also often 
referred to as know-how and procedural knowledge) (Hadjimichael & Tsoukas, 
2019, p. 675). Tacit knowledge is the knowledge people draw upon in action, 
but are oftentimes unaware of and have difficulty articulating (ibid., p. 673). 
Due to the lack of understanding of how improvisation is enacted, the study will 
seek to theorize the role of tacit knowledge in improvisation processes. Second, 
the much neglected aspects of improvisation, namely, lived experience, 
emotions and values (or goods) of sociomaterially-embedded agents will be 
given a prominent position in the theorizing of the enactment of improvisation. 
Finally, I will attempt to offer a micro-focused explanation of the experience 
and the enactment of improvisation by utilising a conjunctive  account that 
has a strong process orientation. Tsoukas (2017, p. 132) defines conjunctive 
theorizing, as theorizing that pays specific attention to capturing performativity 
and establishing connections between different elements of human experience 
that are normally considered to be separate. A strong process  orientation is 
defined as viewing phenomena as continuously changing over time (Langley & 
Tsoukas, 2017). All the above are deemed important in order to develop an 
account of how improvisation is enacted and that is in intimate correspondence 
with everyday experience.  
More specifically, I build on the insight that over time immersion of 
agents in a practice allows the development of a non-perfect, but skilled 
understanding of what to do and how to respond during emergent situations in 
practice (i.e., tacit knowledge). This skilled understanding is then seen to allow 
practitioners to spontaneously perceive what is a normatively accepted and 
relevant response to situational exigencies. I argue that the spontaneous 
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perception of possibilities during practice is tantamount to perceiving 
situationally relevant affordances. The latter, however, is tempered by 
emotional responses and the perception of the implications of situations in 
relation to what is intrinsically held to be good by their practice. Drawing on 
my ethnographically informed study, I explore how the perception of relevant 
affordances in relation to emotional reactions, informs the nuanced 
understanding practitioners have and shapes their improvised responses to 
emerging situations. As my findings show, being solicited by affordances is 
what catalyses improvisation behaviour: if one uses something (an item itself, 
or performs an action to improvise), it is because the person could perceive its 
utility in the first place in relation to preserving the good of their practice. I then 
argue that depending on the exigencies of each situation, being solicitated by 
affordances gives rise to four improvisation practices (each will be described in 
detail in Chapter 5). The above theorization alludes to the three aimed 
contributions: (i) capturing the enactment of improvisation and (ii) the lived 
experience of improvisation in relation to values (or goods), both of which are 
underlined by (iii) a conjunctive and strong process theorization. 
 
1.4 Structure of the Study 
 So far, I have established, I hope, that improvisation is an important topic 
to be investigated and that there appear to be significant gaps in how we 
understand the experience and enactment of improvisation. In this section, I will 
outline the structure through which the present study seeks to complement 
current understandings of improvisation. 
 In Chapter 2, I critically present and discuss the existing literature on 
improvisation. I identify three perspectives in the literature. Each uses a 
different theoretical lens through which to picture improvisation. It is important 
to note, however, that each way of picturing highlights certain aspects of the 
phenomenon of interest, while it overlooks others (Morgan, 1997). Thus the 
goal of this chapter is to show how each way of picturing highlights certain 
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aspects of improvisation and then to illustrate which aspects are 
underexamined.  
 In Chapter 3, I draw on phenomenology, practice theory and strands of 
ecological psychology. Phenomenology was selected because it allows one to 
understand the experience of agents (Sa dbe g & Da A ba, 2009). Focus on 
agents experience while improvising has been neglected (Fisher & Barrett, 
2019). Practice theory was selected because it permits one to focus on the 
broader sociomaterial context in which an agent dwells (Nicolini, 2011; 
Nicolini, Mengis, & Swan, 2012). Focus on the sociomaterial environment for 
understanding improvisation is important because agents can only respond to 
situations insofar as they draw upon their surroundings (see Lamprou, 2017). 
Agents do not improvise in a vacuum. Finally, ecological psychology was 
selected because it allows one to understand the perception of agents in relation 
to their environment (Gibson, 2015a). In other words, it allows one to see that 
e ce a  e e ie ce i  ied  e  ci a e ia  e i e . The 
combination of the three will allow Chapter 3 to lay the groundwork for an 
alternative way of picturing improvisation that sheds light on the aspects that 
have been hitherto overlooked. I am mindful that even this way of picturing 
neglects certain aspects. However, as the development of a panoptic view of 
our world is an impossibility (Harré, 1985; Nagel, 1986), it should suffice that 
the groundwork for the new way of picturing attempts to complement existing 
views on improvisation (Morgan, 1997).  
 In Chapter 4, I outline the research methodology used to empirically 
investigate the phenomenon of interest. Specifically I outline why I chose the 
qualitative paradigm and more specifically the use of ethnographic techniques. 
I then explain why the setting of ATC was chosen to empirically investigate 
improvisation. After this I explain how the data was collected and then 
analysed.  
 In Chapter 5, I present my findings from the empirical investigation. I 
begin by offering a general background of the research setting. This is then 
followed by an account of how improvisation unfolds in this setting by drawing 
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on various episodes of documented improvisation, extracts from interviews and 
observations. The findings are presented using a thematic conceptual scheme 
that emerged during the analysis. 
 In Chapter 6, I discuss my findings and relate them to the existing 
literature. The purpose of doing so is to clearly outline a new conceptualization 
of how improvisation is enacted and to illustrate how the latter offers original 
contributions to the extant literature and practice. I then consider the limitations 
of this study and following this, I propose directions for future research. Finally, 









CHAPTER 2:IMPROVISATION - A CRITICAL REVIEW OF 
THE LITERATURE 
 
First-time events are not exception 
b  he e i  h a  ife.  
(Tsoukas, 2016, p. 145) 
 
I d   hi k e eed a e a a e 
ecology of mind, distinct from the 
ecology of energy flows and 
a e ia  e cha ge .  (Ingold, 
2002, p. 19) 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to review the literature that is relevant to how 
members of organizations improvise in response to unexpected occurrences. By 
doing so I will seek to sketch out the different perspectives on this phenomenon, 
how each perspective conceptualises this phenomenon, where each perspective 
focuses its explanation on and what explanations have been proposed. Three 
broad sets of theoretical perspectives are identified: (i) the metaphor 
perspective, (ii) the cognitivist perspective and (iii) the sociomaterial 
perspective. Each perspective incorporates different theoretical assumptions 
and methodological approaches which reflect what they prioritise and see to be 
of interest. Despite their differences, all perspectives converge on some aspects 
of the definition of improvisation: it is an activity which pertains to the 
simultaneous use of planning and execution, where preconceived material (e.g., 
policies, rules, protocols, routines, knowledge) is adjusted to varying degrees 
in order to deal with the exigencies of a specific situation (see Cunha et al., 
1999, 2017; Hadida et al., 2015; Vera & Crossan, 2005; Weick, 1998, p. 544) 
 The metaphor perspective is one of the first approaches to be adopted for 
studying improvisation. This perspective emphasises that to study this 
phenomenon one must draw on analogies from aspects of improvisation mainly 
from the arts (especially jazz music and improvisation theatre) and then relate 
these to how organizations may develop improvised responses to the exigencies 
of situations faced (Hatch, 1999; Kamoche et al., 2003; Vera & Crossan, 2004). 
As such, the focus of this perspective is on illustrating the similarities between 
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the arts and organizations when having to craft novel solutions. So, attempts to 
explain how novel responses are improvised by organizations is achieved via 
the linguistic device of metaphor. Metaphors are utilised to present what 
characterises and facilitates improvisation in the arts and how this could also be 
the case in organizations too. As a consequence, the majority of these studies 
do not focus upon instances of improvisation within organizations, but instead 
rely mostly on theoretical arguments which do not utilise detailed empirical 
evidence gathered from organizations. 
  From a different angle, the cognitivist perspective, seeks to explain how 
organizations craft responses to arising situations by focusing on the individuals 
that are part of it. Specifically, it reduces such explanations to how 
organizational members process information. Hence, the focus of this 
perspective is not the organization or any similarities with the improvisational 
arts, but the individuals within each organization and more specifically, how 
their knowledge and memory are related to the way they process situations 
which require novel responses (e.g., Bingham & Eisenhardt, 2011; 
Kyriakopoulos, 2011; Moorman & Miner, 1998b). Consequently, this 
perspective conceptualises responses to the unexpected primarily (but not 
always) as a rational mental phenomenon (cf., Weick, 1993b): first an 
individual must engage in information processing, which in turn is applied to 
the situation at hand. Different methodological approaches have been utilised 
by this approach. They range from purely theoretical arguments, to in-depth 
qualitative studies and quantitative analysis. 
 The sociomaterial perspective seeks to offer explanations of how 
organizations respond to unexpected situations in reference to locally available 
normative structures/practices and/or resources (e.g. Baker & Nelson, 2005; 
Bechky & Okhuysen, 2011; Yanow & Tsoukas, 2009). Thus, unlike the above 
two, it neither focuses on individual mental processes, nor on comparing 
instances of improvisation in one setting with another. Therefore, the key 
characteristic of this perspective is to show how unfolding sociomaterial 
processes influence improvisation. While most sociomaterial studies do so in 
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terms of holistic approaches (e.g., Batista et al., 2016), some studies discuss 
latter in terms of variables (Davis, Eisenhardt, & Bingham, 2009). The majority 
of the scholars adopting this perspective rely on the analysis of singular cases 
of improvisation that have occurred in organizations (cf. Davis et al., 2009). 
 The aforementioned perspectives are presented, in the three following 
sections respectively. Within each respective section the main findings and 
theoretical claims of the perspective under discussion will be outlined. After the 
illustration of each perspective, I offer a critique so as to explicate both their 
contributions and limitations. Once all perspectives are illustrated, an 
evaluation is attempted across all three perspectives. The evaluation will be 
c ce a ed  he di c i  f each e ec i e  -epistemological 
assumptions, methodological orientations and theoretical claims. Even though 
the different perspectives offer competing understandings, they nevertheless 
largely share a common assumption. That is, most scholars studying the 
phenomenon of how responses to unexpected events are enacted - some 
implicitly and others explicitly - differentially draw a line between the 
i di id a  i d and the environment. In addition to this, improvisation is 
largely conceptualized as the rational outcome of the interaction between the 
individual and their environment. Hence, the process of how improvisation is 
actually lived and experienced by agents in a dynamic and ever changing 
environment is side-lined in order to offer mainly retrospective explanations of 
the concept. As a result, what actually occurs during improvisation - an 
integrated explanation of how improvisation is enacted through the point of 
view of a sociomaterially embedded agent, has not been fully developed (viz. 
lived experience) (see Fisher & Barrett, 2019, p. 149). Both the nature and 
adequacy of these limitations will be fully scrutinized. 
In sum, this chapter has two objectives. The first is to outline the 
theoretical lenses of the respective perspectives and the second is to evaluate 
each  findings. The depth in which each of these objectives will be pursued 
will depend on both their relevance to this study and the perspective under 
consideration. It should be noted, that the intended result of this critical review 
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is not to provide a clear answer to the research problem of this project. Instead, 
it is expected that it will afford problematizing the current literature and by 
doing so, to open a new window to formulate the initial questions which will 
guide the rest of this study. 
 
2.1.1 Literature Review Methodology  
To ensure that the literature on improvisation was systemically reviewed I 
combined three complimentary search methods. First, I conducted a search on 
he Web f Scie ce. I ed he ke d i i a i  a d i   
b ic age   ea ch f  a ic e  b i hed i  high  e ab e j a  he 
fields of Business, Management, Sociology and Psychology (from 1900 to 
2019). The search returned studies that utilized wide range of theoretical and 
methodological approaches for studying the phenomenon and represent both 
American and European schools of thought. After carefully reading each of the 
returned articles I decided to only include the articles in which improvisation 
was central to the study, rather than auxiliary. In addition to the journal articles 
I also searched for books or book chapters that focus on improvisation/bricolage 
(Berliner, 1994; Cunha et al., 2017; Hutchins, 1995, 2010; Kamoche, Cunha, & 
Cunha, 2002; Sawyer, 2011). 
Second, to complement the findings of the above searches, I used a 
snowballing technique by checking the reference lists of other literature reviews 
that were already published on the topic (Cunha et al., 1999, 2017; Cunha, 
Neves, Clegg, & Rego, 2015; Hadida et al., 2015; Vendelø, 2009). In this way, 
I ensured that studies that were relevant to improvisation, but not returned in 
the database search, were included in this chapter. Finally, the reference lists of 
the latter studies were also considered to ensure that no improvisation-related 
studies were overlooked. 
 
2.2 The Metaphor Perspective 
The engagement of organizational theory with metaphors is not an event 
that was triggered by the study of organizational improvisation. It was 
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a i ed b  Ga e h M ga  (1980) a ic e i ed Pa adig , e a h  
a d e i g i  ga i a i  he  a d he b e e  b ica i  f 
hi  e i a  b k I age  f O ga i a i  (1997). In the book, it is argued that 
metaphor is a driving force of creating new theory (both in the humanities and 
sciences). The linguistic device of metaphor in its simplest form operates as a 
di c i e ce  hich c ai  ha  X i  Y  a d ha  he ig ifie  (X) i  ed 
to understand the signified (Y), or vice-versa (Cornelissen, 2006).  
For instance, consider the two fo i g e a h : (i) Shake ea e  
fa  i e f  hi  a  A   Like i : A  he d  a age   (ii) he 
a  dic  f i e i  e . I  he fi  e a h , e eek he 
commonalities between the world and the stage (e.g., how all people essentially 
enact certain social roles), and in the second the commonality between time and 
money (e.g., time is seen as a finite resource that can be used to produce wealth). 
The result of attending to these commonalities is the generation of partial 
h  hich ca  ide ig ifica  i igh , b  if ake   i e a  ca  be 
distorting (Morgan, 2017, p. 19). According to Cornelissen and Kafouros 
(2008), metaphors have the ability to advance and augment understandings 
about organizations depending on whether the utilised metaphors capture 
several relevant features and are easy to understand. 
Tsoukas (1991, pp. 569 570) further refined our understanding of 
metaphor in organization studies by discussing the underlying mechanisms of 
metaphors: similes and analogies. Specifically, a simile i  defi ed a  a 
c a i  f e hi g i h a he  (e.g., the world is like a stage) which 
highlights the commonalities between two different domains. As such, any 
metaphor implicitly depends on the existence of a simile. An analogy is defined 
a  he e a i a i a i  f e a h   a i i e b  f c i g  relationships 
between items . S  e e ia  a  a a g  eek   de i e ha  he 
characteristics of two seemingly unrelated objects/constructs can be shown to 
be related by employing the a e e a a  c e . F  e a e, he 
stage is to an actor as the world is to any member of society. Analogies can be 
used both within the similar domain (e.g., the sun is to daytime what the moon 
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is to night-time) or between two conceptually dissimilar domains (e.g., 
Descartes is to modern philosophy, who Newton is to modern physics).  
Bearing in mind the above discussion about the mechanics of metaphors, 
the explanation of how metaphors have played a significant part of furthering 
our understanding of organizational improvisation should become clearer. 
Specifically, scholars studying how organizations devise responses to the 
unexpected, have sought to operationalise metaphors to draw to our attention 
the similes and analogies across diverse domains and organizational 
improvisation. The key reason for this is the inherent complexity in explaining 
organizational responses to unexpected events. Thus, by utilising metaphors, 
researchers hoped that doing so would make the phenomenon more 
understandable (Hatch, 1998).  
The most popular metaphor employed is jazz, followed by 
improvisational theatre (Hadida et al., 2015, p. 443). According to Cunha et al 
(1999, p. 301), the reason these two domains were drawn upon so extensively 
i  beca e i i a i  i hi  he e e i g  i  he . O he  i a  
metaphors utilised include Indian music, music therapy (Kamoche et al., 2003), 
computer platforms (Ciborra, 1996) and real time foresight (Cunha, Clegg, & 
Kamoche, 2012). For the sake of a clear review of what each metaphor has 
contributed to our understanding of organizational improvisation, this section 
will be subdivided into the following subsections: (i) jazz metaphor, (ii) 
improvisation theatre metaphor and (iii) other metaphors. 
2.2.1 Jazz metaphor  
Research on organizational improvisation has been linked with jazz since its 
infancy in the late 1980s and has generated numerous insights (Hadida et al., 
2015, p. 443). Bastien and Hostager (1988) were some of the first to draw on 
jazz to make sense of organizational innovation. They did so by analysing a 
videotape of a concert of four jazz musicians who improvised a performance 
without prior rehearsals. The authors argue that jazz and organizations converge 
in two basic ways when improvising.  
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First, like jazz performers, organizations face similar circumstances of 
uncertainty by operating in unpredictable markets. A decade later, Barrett 
(1998) notes that both groups (jazz musicians and organizational members) 
respond to new situations in novel ways without being certain of the outcome. 
As a result, both discover the results of their actions while being in the midst of 
action.  
Second, similar to improvised performances of jazz pieces, 
organizational members that improvise always rely on both technical and social 
structures (Bastien & Hostager, 1988). These structures can be either tacit or 
explicit. Technical structures are understood to include skill in a task and 
knowledge of task (e.g., melody, keys, playing jazz). Social structures are 
understood to include behavioural norms (e.g., roles in band) as well as attitudes 
(e.g., risk taking) and communication codes (see also Kamoche & Cunha, 2001, 
pp. 745 748). Building on the above, authors utilising the jazz metaphor to 
e ai  ga i a i a  i i a i  ha e g e  fa  a   c ide  he ja  
ba d a  a e f ga i a i  hi e i i i g (Barrett, 1998, p. 605; 
Berniker, 1998; Dennis & Macaulay, 2007). I will discuss social and technical 
structures in turn. 
By drawing on the jazz metaphor, researchers illustrate that both jazz 
musicians and organizational members always improvise in relation to an 
established social structure. That is, a hierarchy or established sequentiality 
(i.e., an expected sequence of responses to certain actions) which revolves 
around certain shared norms, stories or objectives (Cunha & Chia, 2007; 
Griffin, Humphreys, & Learmonth, 2015; Humphreys, Ucbasaran, & Lockett, 
2012; Kamoche & Cunha, 2001; Zack, 2000). For example, jazz musicians take 
turns in taking the lead by soloing while the rest of the band must follow the 
lead by listening carefully to each other. But the musician who takes the lead 
must implici  ai ai  he c e f he head . The head f a e; a ba ic 
melodic idea that is usually played at the beginning and the end of a song. 
Although, improvisation centres around the head (e.g., by changing the key, or 
rhythm or harmony), one cannot discard it completely as it serves as the 
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invisible stitching holding a performance together (Hatch, 1999, pp. 78 79; 
Pavlovich, 2003, pp. 443 444).  
Similarly in organizations, members follow an established sequentiality 
of action (see Llewellyn & Hindmarsh, 2010), wherein collaboration is 
expected by paying attention to each other, just like the jazz band (Peplowski, 
1998, pp. 560 561). Moreover, jazz soloists may be seen as managers, who 
introduce something new and their subordinates need to adapt to it (ibid., p. 
561). However, both senior staff and subordinates are confined and held 
accountable by the organizational rules. Hence, like jazz musicians which must 
adhere to maintaining the head while improvising around it, organizational 
members must maintain and improvise around organizational rules and norms.  
At the same time, several authors highlight that to improvise successfully 
in both jazz or organizations, agents must adhere to predeveloped technical 
structures (Barrett, 1998; Crossan et al., 2005, p. 140; Dennis & Macaulay, 
2007, p. 616). The latter being, the techniques (i.e., know-how) developed 
through practice. Likewise, Weick (1998, p. 544), stresses that both jazz 
musicians and organizational members can in fact with adequate experience be 
disciplined practicers , who can appropriately draw on various techniques to 
improvise. Consider learning to be jazz musician. One must first develop a deep 
understanding of jazz as genre. This understanding is acquired with years of 
exposure, imitation of the masters of the genre as well as plenty of hands on 
trial and error (Dennis & Macaulay, 2007). When mastery is attained, the 
musician is free to notice the reactions of the crowd or their fellow musicians 
which in turn allows them to select an appropriate response by drawing on their 
repertoire of techniques (Barrett, 1998; Hatch, 1999; Peplowski, 1998). This is 
similar, to what occurs to an experienced member of an organization. After 
years of practice, members master the routines and rules of their organization 
and improvise around them (Barrett, 1998). 
Consequently, three major insights have been generated about 
organizational improvisation by drawing on the jazz metaphor: (i) 
improvisation is linked to crafting responses with uncertain outcomes; (ii) 
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improvisation always occurs by the individual relating to social structures; (iii) 
to improvise successfully the individual must relate the situation to the 
appropriate technical structure. Despite these important insights, the suitability 
of utilising the jazz metaphor has been questioned. A key reason behind the 
questioning being the fact that not all organizational theorists or practitioners 
have a good understanding of the technical nuances of jazz and its terminology 
(e.g., head, keys, melody) (Vera & Crossan, 2005). This in turn has been argued 
not to allow researchers or members of organizations who lack a musical 
education, to grasp the jazz metaphor correctly. 
2.2.2 Improvisational Theatre Metaphor 
 Improvisation theatre entails performing a play in which the plot, 
characters and conversations are created in the moment. For inspiration, in 
many cases, actors may take cues from the audience. In contrast to jazz, 
improvisational theatre is a much less technical field which is easier to 
understand to all. This is because improvisation theatre draws on material of 
everyday interaction which is familiar to all. Such material being: speech (e.g., 
words, sentences, verbal expressions, tone of voice), bodily movement (e.g., 
facial expressions, posture, gestures) and everyday events (e.g., marriage, 
financial transactions, mourning) (see Crossan, 1998). As such, improvisation 
theatre is argued to be a more useful metaphor to use in order to understand 
improvised organizational responses due to its content being more accessible, 
universal and transferable (Vera & Crossan, 2005, p. 204). Like the use of the 
jazz metaphor, the use of the improvisation theatre metaphor focuses around 
he i i e  a d a a gie  be ee  he hea e  d ai  a d he ga i a i a  
domain (see Meyer, 1998, pp. 573 575).  
 Two facets of similarity between improvisational theatre and 
organizational improvisation that are commonly used by the researchers 
utilising the improvisational theatre metaphor: (i) spontaneity (also referred to 
a : e i g g ) a d (ii) c ea i i  (a  efe ed  a : aki g d ). B h a e 
c ide ed  be  ke  di e i  f he a e  c c  f 
organizational improvisation (Crossan & Sorrenti, 2002; Gibb, 2004, p. 734; 
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Vera & Crossan, 2004, p. 735, 2005, p. 205). This is because, like improvisation 
theatre, organizations must respond to situations under time pressure and 
ambiguity. On the one hand, the spontaneous dimension of the construct refers 
to the fact that like actors in improvisation theatre, organizational agents are 
e i ed  eac   a i a i   he  f he e  i h  k ing 
about it in advance. On the other hand, the creative dimension in both theatrical 
a d ga i a i a  i i a i  i  aki g d  i h ha  i  a ai ab e i  he 
moment and highlights that although improvisation is a creative process, does 
not always produce innovative outcomes.  
 For organizations to be as successful as improvisation theatre when 
responding to unexpected events they need to maximize the use of the two 
aforementioned dimensions. To do so, organizations must emulate the 
improvisation theatre in a number of ways (see Crossan, 1998). Improvisation 
hea e  ike a  ga i a i  a e c ide ed  be c a  e i ie  (Vera & 
Crossan, 2005, p. 205). Therefore, for organizations to be able to improvise, 
they must adopt an appropriate culture. Specifically, they must adopt a culture 
where experimenting is not punished, but sought after. By doing so, the 
organization is argued to be able to offer both cognitive (i.e., shared mental 
models) and emotional resources (e.g., trust, respect and support) to the 
individuals which will make them more open to improvising (Vera & Crossan, 
2004, p. 733, 2005, pp. 206 207). By promoting an experimental culture where 
people share common interpretations, organizations like successful 
improvisation theatre companies are more likely to develop trust and respect 
among their members (Vera & Crossan, 2005). The latter are key to 
improvisation as the individual members of organizations are more likely to be 
acceptive of colleagues undertaking risks  as actors do in successful 
improvisation theatre companies (Crossan, 1998). However, no other effects of 
emotion-related constructs are explored. 
 Following the above, researchers utilising the improvisation theatre 
metaphor explicitly argue that the organizational or group level is so different 
 he i di id a  e e , ha  he i a e i k  be ee  he  a e ha ed 
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mental models (Crossan & Sorrenti, 2002, p. 37). On the individual level, both 
members of organizations and theatre actors, are seen as distinct entities which 
e i f a i  a d a g i h  i  hei  e   hich he  ha e acce  
instantaneously if required (Vera & Crossan, 2005, p. 206). The information 
stored in each individual  e  is seen to be dependent on the cognitive and 
emotional resources made accessible by the organization. This mental process 
allows members to store expertise that is relevant to their roles and thus be more 
able to think on their feet. According to Crossan (1998) individuals in both 
improvisation theatre and organizations, can acquire expertise in improvising 
by practicing certain techniques and learning principles (see also Meyer, 1998).  
 Vera and Crossan (2005) conducted one of the few empirical studies that 
relied on the improvisation theatre metaphor to explain organizational 
improvisation. Specifically, they collected survey data from teams of a 
municipality that was participating in training about improvisation. In addition 
to the survey data, the authors collected 20 semi-structured interviews to get a 
sense of the types of improvisation the participants engaged in as part of their 
work. The authors utilised the improvisation theatre metaphor to justify the 
constructs they selected to test. For example, as discussed above individuals 
with more expertise are more likely to be successful in improvisation, or that 
better relationships between a team has better results in improvising. As a result, 
the authors tested whether these two factors as well as the existence of memory, 
experimental culture and real-time information moderate the relationship 
between improvisation and innovation. The results of their study found that the 
relationship between improvisation and innovation is equivocal and essentially 
influenced by four factors: (i) expertise, (ii) teamwork, (iii) the existence of 
experimental culture and (iv) real-time information. Moreover, they also found 
that if people are trained to improvise this increases the frequency and quality 
of enacted improvisations.  
To summarise, the improvisation theatre metaphor has furnished 
organizational theory with the following insights: (i) organizational 
improvisation can be considered to be a variable which is comprised of two 
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dimensions (spontaneity and creativity); (ii) the organizational culture 
(sometimes conceptualized as a variable because it is measured) influences the 
frequency of enacted improvisations; (iii) individuals store cognitive and 
emotional organizational resources that in turn influence the quality of enacted 
improvisations; and (iv) organizational members may be able to learn to 
improvise if trained to do so. 
2.2.3 Other Metaphors: Indian Music, Music Therapy, Computer Platforms 
and Real time foresight 
Even though most research conducted on organizational improvisation 
has relied on the two above metaphors, researchers realised that the utilisation 
of other metaphors could also potentially allow them to gain new insights into 
the phenomenon (see Ciborra, 1996; Cunha et al., 2012; Kamoche et al., 2003). 
As argued by Tsoukas (1993, p. 324), different metaphors allow one to 
ge e a e a e a i e cia  ea i ie  (see also Morgan, 1997, p. 4). 
 Kamoche and colleagues (2003, p. 2026) attempt to establish the validity 
of the Indian music and music therapy metaphors with antecedents, influencing 
factors and outcomes of improvisation. The authors argue that antecedents to 
improvisation are divided into motivating factors and the potential to improvise. 
The former are equated to the social structures, while the latter to technical 
structures; both of which were discussed in the jazz metaphor subsection. The 
authors define influencing factors as moderators of improvisation such as the 
ones identified in the subsection of improvisation theatre (e.g., teamwork, 
memory, competence). Outcomes of improvisation were defined in relation to 
whether it was successful, novel or adaptive. Both the Indian music and the 
music therapy will be discussed in turn in relation to antecedents, influencing 
factors and outcomes Kamoche and colleagues identify. 
 Indian music has been argued to offer incremental insights over the jazz 
metaphor (Kamoche et al., 2003) despite both requiring the antecedents of a 
social structure which is favourable to experimentation and specific technical 
structures. The key differences between jazz and Indian music are that the latter 
is not written, but transferred orally and that performers tend to be competitive 
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with their colleagues instead of cooperative during performances. Due to the 
lack of written Indian music pieces, each time Indian music is performed it must 
be reproduced with variations. Each time, performers may essentially create 
new music, but this must preserve the musical score that is common in the 
Indian music tradition. Hence, like jazz musicians and organizational members, 
musicians within this musical tradition must depend on their memory to be able 
to improvise. H e e , i  each e f a ce, icia  eek  h a e  
each other when soloing (Sharron, 1983). As such, a key difference in the 
influencing factors of improvisation is that instead of teamwork focusing 
around cooperation (like in jazz), it focuses on competition. Similar to jazz, the 
outcomes of improvising in the Indian music tradition result in creating novelty. 
Consequently, the Indian music metaphor of improvisation has been argued to 
be useful when one must interpret organizational cases of improvisation that are 
characterised by competitiveness (instead of cooperation) and novelty 
(Kamoche et al., 2003), such as teams of designers trying to pitch their own 
work. 
 Music therapy is a recognised psychiatric technique for assisting people 
suffering from mental health problems. The therapist allows patients to 
improvise while using musical instruments (e.g., drums) or singing. The 
purpose being to bring a change in their behaviour and emotional state. Because 
each patient is different, there is no standard repertoire to draw upon and no 
limitations on genre or topic selection. Usually the theme of each session is 
chosen by the therapist whose goal is to lead his patient to improvise. Therefore, 
only the therapist must rely on their memory of any technical structures and the 
improviser does not require any practice. However, the building of trust 
between therapist and patient is pivotal to the success of the therapy. Following 
the above, the requisites of improvising in this tradition rely on a social structure 
which favours patients and therapists experimenting, but only the therapist is 
required to memorize a technical structure. The core influencing factors are the 
existence of trust between the therapist and the patient and the initiative of the 
therapist introducing a theme for the sessions. In contrast to the other 
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metaphors, the outcome is not centred around creating novelty but of problem 
solving. In summary, Kamoche et al (2003) have argued that this metaphor is 
best suited to interpreting improvisation of organizational examples that are 
dysfunctional and require a knowledgeable problem solver (like the musical 
therapist) to guide the organization out of its problems. 
 Cibora (1996) used the metaphor of platform to understand how Olivetti, 
at the time, a leading computer firm, underwent transformations over a 10-year 
e i d f ce ai . I  c e , a a f  i  ike ed  a c g i i e 
e gi e  e  d a  upon enact different operations (ibid., p.104). For example, 
to use text editor a computer must have an operating system (i.e., computer 
platform) that can execute such a programme. Thus, like the operations of a 
computer rely on its platform, organizations act as the platforms for their 
e be . S ecifica , a  ga i a i a  a f  i  defi ed a  a f a i e 
context that moulds structures, and routines shaping them into well-known 
forms, such as the hierarchy, the matrix and even the network but on a highly 
a i e ba i  (ibid., .103). The ef e, he ga i a i  i  de d a  a 
c ec i e c g i i e che e  that enables members to improvise through 
creatively recombining organizational resources (ibid., p.116). 
 Finally, Cunha and colleagues (2012, p. 265) metaphorically present, in 
the context of strategy, improvisa i  a  a f  ea  i e f e igh . Like the 
Maginot line, built by the French as a safeguard against German aggression 
prior to WW2, plans often become redundant in the face of fast-changing 
environments. Hence, the authors suggest that organizations should focus on 
detecting weak signals (i.e., difficult to detect indicators of potentially emerging 
issues). As the latter entails the detection of unexpected elements, effectively 
dealing with environmental change entails responding through improvisation. 
Consequently, the authors suggest that when strategists deal with weak signals 
through improvisation, he  a e i  fac  ac i g i h ea  i e f e igh  (ibid., 
p. 265). 
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2.2.4 Critique of the Metaphor Perspective 
The Metaphor perspective has played a significant role in helping make 
sense of improvisation. As illustrated in a recent review by Hadida et al. (2015, 
p. 443), metaphors have served management scholars as sense-making devices 
which allowed analogical thinking between the management and art discourses. 
Some key insights offered by drawing on art metaphors include highlighting 
that like artists, practitioners must react in real time to emerging circumstances 
in novel ways (Barrett, 1998; Barrett & Hatch, 2003; Crossan, 1998; Vera & 
Crossan, 2004, 2005; Weick, 1998; Zack, 2000). But, in parallel, these novel 
responses do not occur outside social hierarchies, norms, technical standards or 
infrastructures (Barrett, 1998; Kamoche & Cunha, 2001; Kamoche et al., 2003, 
p. 2028). As the Organization Science Jazz festival special issue illustrates, 
analogies from the arts have enabled organization scholars to understand that 
improvisation is an inherent feature of organizations (Meyer, Frost, & Weick, 
1998). In fact, the editors of the special issue posit that improvisation itself 
h d be de d a  a e a h  f  ga i i g .   
However, the tendency to focus primarily on metaphors, rather than on 
instances of organizational improvisation themselves (Dennis & Macaulay, 
2007; Zack, 2000) b ack b e  he ce  h gh hich i i a i  i  
achieved in specific settings. As a result, Hadida et al. (2015, p. 444) have noted 
ha  e a h ica  OI [O ga i a i a  I i a i ] e ea ch i  a ge  
be  e i ica  OI e ea ch . He ce de i e he be efi  f i g 
metaphors (Letiche & Van Uden, 1998; Tsoukas, 1991, 1993), it is no surprise 
that some scholars have highlighted that solely relying on art metaphors (i.e., 
ja )  d  i i a i  ha  i  i i  (Hadida et al., 2015, p. 444; Hatch 
& Weick, 1998; Kamoche et al., 2003, pp. 2031 2032). 
As discussed above, metaphorical theorizing is particularly useful when 
it starts an entire process of theorizing, which ends with models or theoretical 
insights, rather than when it merely spots similarities. From a social scientific 
point of view, it is the search for some unifying principles across domains that 
social scientists should be looking for (Tsoukas, 1991). However, metaphorical 
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approaches to improvisation stop short of suggesting such models or theories, 
confining themselves to highlighting surface similarities (see Crossan & 
Sorrenti, 2002; Cunha et al., 1999; Vera & Crossan, 2004). 
Specifically, Mirvis (1998, p. 591) argued that researchers should not 
only consider the similarities, but also the differences between the metaphor 
they are drawing on and the business environment. Thus, one of the core 
problems of primarily relying on one set of metaphors to study improvisation is 
that they may restrict researchers to selectively articulate aspects of 
improvisation that fit into the analogical mould, and to marginalise aspects 
which do not (see Clegg & Gray, 1996; Hatch, 1999, p. 96; Kamoche et al., 
2003, p. 2032; Morgan, 1997, p. 4). Thi  i  a ge  beca e e a h  a e 
inherently partial [as they] must emphasize certain features at the expense of 
he  (Tsoukas, 1991, p. 571), which a a  c ea e  di i  (Morgan, 
1997, p. 4). By prioritising the use of metaphors over the actual experience of 
practitioners (including their emotions and values), explanations of 
improvisation tend to be in terms of specific metaphors (e.g. jazz, improvisation 
theatre) and not in terms of how improvisation is experienced by practitioners. 
This is why Montuori (2003) emphasizes the need for detailed and in depth 
studies to understand improvisation. 
Thus, by focusing on the metaphorical terms, what may be missed is how 
ac i i e  e cei e hei   k -h  (Ryle, 1945, 1949) or tacit 
knowledge (Polanyi, 1958) that is utilised to respond to unfolding situations, in 
their own terms. This is especially important to capture, because adopting 
appropriate modes of comportment in response to unusual circumstances is by 
no means a straightforward and generic affair (Shotter, 2017; Shotter & 
Tsoukas, 2014a; Tsoukas, 2013). Each situation encountered has its own 
idiosyncrasies, which practitioners must perceive in order to successfully 
respond (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 2005; Feldman, 2000; Hadjimichael, 2017; 
Tsoukas & Chia, 2002). When events are unfolding normally, an experienced 
practitioner may intuitively respond to them based on cues they have come to 
know after immersion in a specific setting (Dreyfus, 2002; Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 
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2005). As illustrated by Yanow and Tsoukas (2009), when the usual flow of 
events is punctured, practitioners experience a breakdown which forces them to 
consider how to proceed (see also Barrett, 1998; Dreyfus, 1991; Lok & De 
Rond, 2013). When facing a breakdown, this evokes diverse emotional 
reactions which influences which actions are considered (Yanow & Tsoukas, 
2009). Put simply, the metaphor approach is not suitable for capturing the 
process through which agents are able to perceive the necessity and possibility 
to improvise. 
 
2.3 The Cognitivist Perspective 
One of the key contributions of the cognitivist perspective to the improvisation 
literature is that it has emphasised that both information and knowledge are tied 
to improvisation (see Bingham & Eisenhardt, 2011; Chelariu, Johnston, & 
Young, 2002; Miner, Bassoff, & Moorman, 2001; Moorman & Miner, 1998a, 
p. 15; Vera, Nemanich, Velez-Castrillon, & Werner, 2014). To establish this, 
research within this perspective has focused upon how individuals process 
situations in their minds and how this, in turn, leads them to take specific actions 
as the result of the processing. Two approaches can be distinguished within the 
cognitivist perspective: the (i) organizational memory approach and the (ii) 
sensemaking approach. The former focuses on how different types of memory 
(which are implicitly equated to knowledge) influence the outcome of 
improvisation. The latter focuses on explaining how people interpret the 
situation (i.e., make sense) they find themselves in need to respond to, affects 
how they improvise. 
 The emphasis of both approaches is on explaining individual mental 
activities in relation to improvisational actions. Collective improvisational 
actions are conceptualized as an amalgamation of individual improvisational 
actions so as to achieve a shared goal. The latter is understood as organizational 
improvisation (Moorman & Miner, 1998b, p. 70). A seminal example of this, is 
a case in which while entering a port a large ship could not use its navigation 
systems due to an engineering problem (Hutchins, 1991, 2010). The situation 
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did not end in disaster because the crew engaged in a series of local 
improvisations. Specifically, the navigation team assigned new roles to its 
members on ad hoc basis which resulted in successfully making the necessary 
calculations (without computers), with which they guided the ship into the port. 
Although, not everyone on the ship was aware what the other crewmembers 
were doing, the fact that all were working towards navigating the ship allowed 
them to create new routines on the spot, which in turn rescued the situation.  
In addition to the above, to a large degree the cognitivist perspective 
assumes a similar structure of perception/cognition: cognition as a dual 
processing system. Theories of dual processing maintain that cognition is the 
result of two processes; an automatic/unconscious process and a 
conscious/explicit process (Gilovich, Griffin, & Kahneman, 2002). Given the 
importance bestowed on cognition in relation to improvisation, I will first 
outline how this perspective conceptualises cognition and later discuss how 
each approach relates improvisation to cognition.  
Cognition in organisations has been imported from cognitive psychology 
in order to explain a diverse set of processes ranging from intuition to team 
improvisation through adaptation (see Hodgkinson & Healey, 2008, p. 393). As 
evident by various publications one may construe that interest in cognitive 
theories using dual process explanations has risen significantly in 
organizational theory and is considered instrumental to explaining how people 
improvise in response to situations (Gilovich et al., 2002; Hodgkinson, Langan-
Fox, & Sadler-Smith, 2008, p. 6). This is because, to think of ways to improvise, 
according to this perspective, necessarily relies on cognition (and cognition 
itself is considered to be a matter of information processing) (see Moorman & 
Miner, 1998b). Due to the relevance of cognition and dual-process models to 
i i a i  I i  b ief  a i e hi  he  ke  i . I  he e  
section I will discuss studies that utilize the latter to explain organizational 
improvisation. 
Dual process theories of cognition get their name from the fact that they 
accept that two different cognitive systems allow humans to process 
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information (Epstein, 1994). However, before going into more detail about 
these systems, it is important to highlight how these systems function. 
According to Smith and DeCoster (2000), the two processing systems depend 
on two memory systems - these being long-term memory and short-term 
memory. On the one hand, long-term memory is defined as a slow process of 
information storing, in which regularities are established following repeated 
exposure to a series of experiences over a period of time. Once these regularities 
are formed they affect the interpretation of any new acquired information. 
Long-term memory can be further divided into two parts: procedural and 
declarative memory. Procedural memory stores information of how to perform 
specific activities. Declarative memory stores information of facts and events, 
which can be recalled (Kyriakopoulos, 2011; Moorman & Miner, 1998b). On 
the other hand, short-term memory is seen as a rapid information saving process 
that creates new representations at the exposure to any experience (see Weick, 
2001, p. 72). These two memory systems are interlinked with the two 
processing systems outlined above (E. Smith & DeCoster, 2000). 
Regarding the two processing systems it should be noted that Healey, 
Vuori and Hodgkinson (2015) highlight that dual process models are referred 
to using different terminological notions (e.g., system 1 and 2, X-system and 
Y-system). However, the authors also underline that despite the diverse 
terminology there is a shared consensus with regards to what the two systems 
e ai . F  he e  f hi  di c i  Hea e  e  a  (2015) e i g  f  
the two cognitive processes will be adopted. The two cognitive processes will 
be referred to as the X-system and the C-system.  
The X-system refers to a process of information processing that operates 
effortlessly at a subconscious level of awareness. During this process, 
information is rapidly associated (based on cue salience) with stored 
representations located in long-term memory (E. Smith & DeCoster, 2000). The 
C-system refers to a process in which information is processed in a conscious 
manner that requires effort for retrieving information from either long-term or 
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short-term memory. It should be noted that the of the C-system  requires both 
motivation as well as cognitive capacity (see Strack & Deutsch, 2004).  
Having outlined a basic illustration of how dual processing models 
explain cognition in the next two subsections I will outline how each approach 
relates improvisation to cognition. 
2.3.1 The Organizational Memory Approach 
Within the improvisation literature it has been highlighted that organizations 
invest a considerable amount of resources in acquiring better information to 
uncover new knowledge. Hence, it has been argued that what also needs to be 
focused on is how the stored information and knowledge are utilised in 
improvisation (Crossan et al., 2005; Majchrzak, Jarvenpaa, & Hollingshead, 
2007; Moorman & Miner, 1997, p. 91; Pavlou & Sawy, 2010). In accordance 
with this view, both practical knowledge such as organisational routines and 
skills, as well as abstract knowledge of facts or events, constitute organisational 
memory (Cunha et al., 1999, p. 325; see also King & Ranft, 2001, p. 257). As 
discussed in the previous section, the first type of knowledge is referred to as 
procedural memory, while the latter as declarative memory (Kyriakopoulos, 
2011, pp. 1058 1059; Kyriakopoulos & De Ruyter, 2004, p. 1470). Both are 
part of long-term memory. 
Both forms of long-term memory are theorised to affect organizational 
members in two ways: (i) interpretation and (ii) orientation of action 
(Majchrzak et al., 2007; Moorman & Miner, 1997, p. 93; Vera et al., 2014, p. 
11), which has consequences for improvisation. Regarding the former, the 
availability of stored information and memory has been established to affect 
how experience is filtered and categorised (Daft & Weick, 1984). Take the 
example of a jazz artist (Moorman & Miner, 1998b, p. 708). While facing a 
specific audience and circumstances, through information processing, the artist 
can associate and interpret their current experience in reference to similar past 
situations stored in their declarative memory. The association allows the jazz 
artist to choose a response (or orient their action) from a large repertoire of 
potential actions that have been stored in their procedural memory. If the other 
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members of the jazz band also have the same or similar experiences, by taking 
the lead from the first artist, the band as whole may improvise more effectively 
(ibid., 708). 
Broadly three levels of improvisation are identified by memory scholars 
(Moorman & Miner, 1998b, p. 703). I will define and discuss each in reference 
to the examples given by the authors: (i) minor tweaks to existing processes 
(e.g., rescheduling production plans to meet demands of client), (ii) major 
tweaks to existing processes (e.g., design of new products that are variations of 
existing products) and (iii) discard of original processes and creation of new 
ones (e.g., creation of new product that is inconsistent with organizational 
a eg ). Le e  f i i a i  ha e bee  ea ed  h ee e a ic 
differential seven- i  ca e  i g he f i g a ch : (i) fig ed  
action as we went along/action followed a strict plan as it was taken, (ii) 
improvised in carrying this action/strictly followed our plan in carrying out this 
action, and (iii) ad-libbed action/not an ad- ibbed ac i  (Moorman & Miner, 
1998a, p. 10). Environmental turbulence and the level of organizational 
memory are associated with the level of improvisation. Specifically, 
environmental turbulence was found to be a positive predictor of the level of 
improvisation in new product actions, because improvisation is more likely to 
occur in environments that are unstable. Organization memory was found to 
have a negative effect on improvisation level. The latter was argued to occur 
because existing knowledge may restrict creativity in improvisation (Moorman 
& Miner, 1998a, p. 12). 
To shed light on how each type of organizational memory (i.e. 
procedural and declarative) affects improvisation Moorman and Miner (1998b, 
pp. 706 707) have theorised (but not empirically investigated) that the level of 
each type of organizational memory has a differential moderating impact on 
three outcomes of improvisation (coherence, novelty and speed). Coherence 
refers to whether actions fit the performance context. Novelty is defined as the 
degree to which the actions are new. Finally, speed refers to the time required 
to plan and execute an action.  
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Procedural memory is characterised by automaticity; consider the nature 
of knowing how to do things such as riding a bicycle, writing or typing. These 
activities, like many others can be enacted coherently with little effort upon 
mastery (Kyriakopoulos, 2011; Moorman & Miner, 1998b). This is because the 
X-system will instinctively link any current representations in short-term 
memory with procedural memory in the long-term memory (Strack & Deutsch, 
2004). Higher levels of procedural memory are theorized to increase the 
likelihood of coherent action in improvisation. This is because procedural 
memory increases the likelihood of having a large repertoire of procedural 
routines which can be drawn upon and recombined (through the X-system). 
Higher levels of procedural memory are theorized to increase the likelihood of 
speedy action in improvisation. This is because procedural memory has an 
a a ic  aci  a i , hich d ce  a  ec  f ac i  (Moorman 
& Miner, 1998b, p. 708; see also Crossan et al., 2005, p. 138). Finally, higher 
levels of procedural memory are theorized to produce actions low in novelty 
(see also Cunha et al., 1999, p. 321). This is because procedural memory is 
argued to restrict actions to the ones that are routinely used (Moorman & Miner, 
1998b, p. 709). 
Declarative memory is memory of abstract facts. It is not about how to 
accomplish a specific task, but about what it entails (Kyriakopoulos & De 
Ruyter, 2004). For instance, it might be about formulating the mathematical 
f a hich de c ibe  kee i g e  ba a ce  a i g bic c e,  ab  
ica  he  ab  ch d g e i   h h ic a e  (M a  & 
Miner, 1998b, p. 710). Higher levels of declarative memory are theorized to 
increase the possibility of coherent action in improvisation. This is because 
when improvisers have access to rich repository of declarative memory they are 
theorized to be capable to recognize patterns in events and select actions that 
are relevant to the events (Moorman & Miner, 1998b, p. 710). Higher levels of 
declarative memory are theorized to increase the possibility of new actions 
during improvisation. This is because declarative memory is assumed to be 
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more abstract and thus applicable in numerous new ways across a variety of 
circumstances (ibid., p. 711).  
Finally, higher levels of declarative memory are theorized to increase the 
possibility of lower speed improvisations. Due to the abstractness of declarative 
memory, it is not associated with a specific use. To identify a relevant fact in 
declarative memory requires an extensive search which can take time (ibid., p. 
711-712). This is because when the C-system is triggered, the association of 
short-term memory with a relevant fact in long-term memory requires effort 
and motivation (Strack & Deutsch, 2004). In contrast to the latter, Bingham and 
Ei e dha d  (2011, p. 1439) theorize that stored explicit knowledge (viz., 
dec a a i e e  i  M a  a d Mi e  (1998b) e ) i  e effec i e 
as it is the basis of cognitive shortcuts. This is because they assume that explicit 
knowledge entails that an individual has a better understanding of procedures 
(Bingham & Eisenhardt, 2011, p. 1439). 
In another study Kyriakopoulos (2011, p. 1052) explores how procedural 
and dec a a i e e  affec  he a e f i i a i  i  he D ch f d 
industry. The scholar found that high stocks of procedural memory in the 
e e ce f i i a i  had a ega i e effec   a fi  a ke  e f a ce. 
This has been theorized to be because procedural memory may be detrimental 
when applied to unusual or nonstandard situations as they may not fit the 
context. The author also found that high stocks of declarative memory while 
improvising positively affected cost efficiency  (Kyriakopoulos, 2011, p. 1067). 
This is because having rich pool of facts to select from may provide more 
options to improvise.  
In summary, the organizational memory perspective has illuminated the 
following in relation to improvisation: (i) organizations constantly acquire 
information and knowledge i  hei  e be  g e  e  that influence 
their interpretations and courses of action, which in turn affects the results of 
organizational improvisation; (ii) procedural memory is associated with 
improvisational actions that are speedy, coherent but not novel ; (iii) declarative 
memory can be applied in a range of situations, but is associated with 
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improvisational actions that are of high novelty but take longer to be conceived 
and applied. 
2.3.2 The Sensemaking Approach 
The sensemaking approach is mostly centred around the seminal work of Weick 
(1979, 1995). Sensemaking refers to the notion that people are beings whose 
actions are guided by their expectations (viz., interpretations). Because 
expectations can vary greatly, sensemaking implies that the variability of 
human behaviour is infinite. To minimize variability in expectation and guide 
action towards a common goal, organizations institute common labels. When 
e e a  e e ha e he a e abe  he  a e a  efe ed a  a f a e f 
efe e ce , c ec i e i d , ha ed e a  de   e ec a c  
f a e k  (Bigley & Roberts, 2001; Mendonça & Wallace, 2004; Patriotta 
& Gruber, 2015; Weick, 1993a; Weick & Roberts, 1993). Labels (i.e., 
information shared in common with other organizational members) are given 
by organizations to their members in the form of organizational design to allow 
members to interpret and respond to situations in an organized and coherent 
way (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007, p. 153; also referred to as 'typifications' by 
Patriotta & Gruber, 2015). Responses to expectations through sensemaking are 
a g ed  ha e a g e e e  f i i a i  (Weick, 1995, p. 181). 
 I  Weick  (1988) e i a  d  E acted Sensemaking in Crisis 
Si a i , he a g e  ha  e ec a i , c i e  a d ca aci  affec  b h 
sensemaking and enacted responses (see also Maitlis & Sonenshein, 2010). 
Enacted responses to crises often feature improvisation (Weick, 1988, p. 314). 
Each concept will be discussed in turn, then their links will be illustrated and 
finally each term will be related to an example of improvisation identified in 
the Mann Gulch disaster (Weick, 1993b).  
Expectations (how associating cues creates meaning) (Maitlis & 
Sonenshein, 2010, p. 564) arise by associating external cues with an 
i di id a  i e a  ca a  a  f if- he  a e i  that contain previously 
observed consequences (Weick, 1988, p. 307). As discussed above, 
organizations offer their members labels to allow them to encode their 
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representations found in short-term memory into labels that facilitate actions 
aligned with the organizational purpose (e.g., patient as a person who requires 
treatment) (Weick, 2006, p. 1729). Through the association of cues with labels 
and long term memory (Weick, 1988, p. 307) i di id a  g ad a  b i d  
c fide ce ab  a defi i i  f a i a i  (Maitlis & Sonenshein, 2010, p. 
564; see also Colville, Pye, & Carter, 2013, p. 1204). Consequently, it is 
a e ed ha  ac i  ecede  c g i i  a d ha  he ga i a i  a  e  a  
he e i e  a e i  he i d f he ac  (Weick, 1988, p. 307; see also 
Gioia, Corley, & Fabbri, 2002). This position raises onto-epistemological 
concerns in the form of solipsism  if everything is in the mind of the individual 
how do we know that it actually exists (Nagel, 1987) (more about this later)? 
Nevertheless, according to Weick (1988, p. 307) this suggests that responses to 
c i e  a e affec ed a ia  b  e i  abe  a d a ia  b  c e  
c e . 
Commitment refers to the reasons for which individuals act in the way 
they do (Weick, 1988, p. 310). Reasons for behaviour, according to Weick 
(ibid., . 310),  e d  be ca a   e e  i e e i g  he  beha i  i  
not public. However, it becomes less casual when behaviour becomes public. 
The latter increases the need for generating explanations for behaviour. Thus, 
i di id a  f e  ge e a e e a a i  e ec i e   j if  ac i   
hich he  ha e c i ed  (Maitlis & Sonenshein, 2010, p. 562; Weick, 
1988, p. 310). Commitment can often be an important resource to cope with 
crises. For example, when soldiers got lost in the Alps, they committed to a map 
which served as the foundation for their actions. Although they successfully 
found their way, they later discovered that it was actually a map of the Pyrenes 
(Weick, 1979). 
Ca aci  efe   e e  be ief i  hei  ca abi i ie  a d hei  e e 
repertoire (Weick, 1988, p. 311). The more things individuals think they can 
do, the more responsive they can be to a wider variety of inputs. This epitomizes 
Weick  (ibid., . 311) a e i  ha  capacity affects the perception of what 
e e fee  he  ha e he ca aci   d  e hi g ab . I  i  a g ed ha  
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increased exposure to situations increases the likelihood that an individual will 
see a specific change that needs to be made to cope with a crisis. Therefore, 
expertise built up through exposure to wide variety of situations is seen as 
means for identifying key events. Narrow expertise (i.e., when one is not 
exposed to variety of situations), however, is seen as detrimental because 
individuals may miss the broader picture by being fixated on cues that they are 
familiar with. The above suggest that interpretations about a situation tend to 
be in terms of the existing frames of reference, which creates a cycle of self-
fulfilling prophecies (Plowman et al., 2007; Weick, 2006, p. 1729). People 
retrospectively rationalise their improvisations in terms of what they think the 
situation ought to be like, based on their preconceptions. 
Before illustrating all three concepts (expectations, capacity and 
commitment) in an example I will summarise them together. From the above, 
during the enactment of an improvisation, a person is portrayed to make sense 
of it retrospectively. As illustrated by the notion of expectations, an action 
occurs first, and only then do people associate cues with expectations. This is 
because external events are encoded in the short-term memory of agents in the 
f  f e e e a i . De e di g  he e e  f e  e e ie ce , he  i  
have different information which they deem to be relevant, stored in their long-
term memory to which the representations are associated with (either by the X 
or C system). By drawing on long-term memory they are likely to access causal 
a . Ca a  a  a e if- he  a e i  hich elate to how a person expects 
the current situation to be, based on previous experiences, and what to expect 
in the future. When faced with an unusual situation, a person will draw on their 
most relevant causal maps that will ultimately guide their responses to the 
situation. Responses to expectations are influenced by the capacity of the 
individuals based on their preconceptions. Finally, when dealing with a crisis, 
agents often generate an explanation about their commitment and actions 
retrospectively. Hence, Weick (1993a) i  ha  e e ac  hei  a  i  
ea i g  he  he    e ai  e a ed ac i .    
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To illustrate expectations, commitment and capacity during 
improvisation I will refer to the example of the Mann Gulch disaster (Weick, 
1993b). A group of firefighters was dispatched to extinguish a fire in Mann 
Gulch (Montana, US). They were flown to the site. On the way, they heard over 
he adi  ha  i  a  a 10:00 fi e  (ibid, p.635). This term was a label developed 
in the organization that signified that it is the type of fire which could be 
controlled by 10AM of the following morning. Therefore, on arrival the 
firefighters responded to the situation in line with the expectations evoked by 
the label  so they took it easy.  
However, after a while they realised that the fire was not behaving in the 
way they expected it to be  it was rapidly advancing towards them. During this 
phase they could not make sense of what was occurring. Panic was argued to 
inhibit sensemaking processes that would allow the firefighters to recognize 
what to do (ibid, p. 637). One group trapped by their commitment to 
organizational frames of reference tried to outrun the fire without dropping their 
equipment (abandoning equipment was not recommended). This resulted in 13 
deaths. Dodge the formal leader of the unit, managed to break free from the 
i  commitment to organizational frames of reference, and utilised his prior 
understanding of how fire spreads to save his life. Thus, the latter served as a 
justification for improvising by dropping his equipment and lighting an escape 
fire in front of the unit, which he unsuccessfully ordered to join him. Belief in 
the escape fire working, illustrates how capacity, seeing what changes can be 
made, is tied to expectations from the stored causal maps of fire behaviour. It 
should be noted that Weick (1993b, p. 638) argues that Dodge did not 
experience panic because he assumed that he had his group under control. 
Beyond panic, however, other emotions are not discussed.  
It should be noted, however, that some scholars have criticized the 
Weickian account of sensemaking and its ensuing conception of improvisation 
(Holt & Cornelissen, 2014). Adopting a Heideggerian perspective, Holt and 
C e i e  a g e ha  e  e e i  a ed  he e i e  h gh 
moods. Moods are implicitly equated to emotions about the state of affairs. In 
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their study, the authors specify that the fear felt at Mann Gulch, for example, 
is a mood  (ibid., p. 534). A distinction, however, between moods and emotions 
is not offered. Indeed, emotions are not alluded to at all. Neither, are moods 
discussed in relation to practices. Nevertheless the authors maintain that moods 
reveal the world under a certain prism. This is because by drawing on Heidegger 
they suggest that the way an agent exists is an issue for them. Because of the 
latter, agents press forward into possibilities of being based on how their mood 
colours their existence. For example, in the Mann Gulch disaster panic coloured 
the world for the firefighters as frightful. This in turn opened possibilities for 
them such as running away, or improvising by lighting an escape fire. Thus, 
given that moods open possibilities about the future, this counters Weick  
central claim that sensemaking is retrospective. It suggests, instead, that sense 
is future-oriented through attunement with moods (ibid., p. 533). This line of 
argumentation has been encouraged by other scholars who argue that further 
research should focus on explaining how agents make sense prospectively in 
unfolding situations, which are not necessarily crises (Sandberg & Tsoukas, 
2015, p. S25). 
In summary, the sensemaking approach has offered the following 
insights regarding improvisation: (i) improvisation depends on the expectations 
of individuals, (ii) expectations and justifications for actions are usually made 
e ec i e  i ce ac i  ecede  c g i i  (Weick, 1988, p. 307), (iii) 
expectations of individuals are tied to shared frames of reference through labels, 
(i ) hich a  c ea e diffe e ia  be ief  i  ca aci  de e di g  ( ) e e  
causal maps and, thus experiences. 
2.3.3 Critique of the Cognitivist Perspective   
In comparison to the metaphor perspective, where most of the material 
came from beyond conventional organizational settings, the cognitivist 
perspective has allowed the organizational improvisation literature to focus 
more specifically on improvisation within conventional organizations. 
However, it gives rise to the information processing controversy (which will be 
explained later). As will become evident below, some Metaphor studies 
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(Kamoche & Cunha, 2001; Kamoche et al., 2003; Vera & Crossan, 2005) and 
many Cognitivist studies accept that the way agents improvise by processing 
information in their minds.  
By drawing on the metaphor of the computer, many scholars 
differentiate between procedural and declarative memory, which they claim to 
be the equivalent of tacit and explicit knowledge (Kyriakopoulos, 2011; 
Moorman & Miner, 1998b; see also Bingham & Eisendhardt, 2011). However, 
if one examines the assumptions of dual process systems through Merleau-
P  (2012) counter-empiricist argument [which will be briefly outlined 
below by drawing on Matthews (2006)], one may be able to see that the 
cognitive explanation of intentionality (i.e. perceiving and experiencing) should 
not be considered adequate. To do so, the philosophical foundations of dual-
process models will be outlined and discussed in relation to Merleau-P  
(2012) critique of empiricism. This has important implications for the 
suitability of using dual information processing to explain organizational 
improvisation. 
According to Matthews (2006), cognitive process models are 
descendants of the empiricist philosophical tradition (see also Merleau-Ponty, 
2012; Morris, 2012; Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991). This is because both 
traditions accept that perception is passive and that the individual is distinct 
from their environment. These two assumptions are of paramount significance 
to both cognitivism and empiricism. This is because passive perception 
guarantees that people have access to the outside world via their perception. 
Because perception is assumed to be passive, this is seen to guarantee that it 
does not distort how the external world actually exists. As such, claims that 
empirical data are valid and reliable are seen to be guaranteed by the acceptance 
that the individual passively perceives the external environment (Merleau-
Ponty, 2012). However, if one scrutinizes the way by which perception is 
explained by both cognitivism and empiricist philosophy, one would see that 
their explanations are circular (Matthews, 2006). Given the fact that empiricist 
philosophy is beyond the scope of this thesis, a short examination of the 
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argument of cognitivism will be outlined. As shown above, cognitivism relies 
heavily on the processes of association and memory to provide explanations. 
As such, both these two constructs will be examined.   
Association is seen as the means by which different representations are 
linked with other representations in order to provide a coherent stream of 
c ci e  i  e  i d (Matthews, 2006; Merleau-Ponty, 2012; E. Smith 
& DeCoster, 2000). However, accepting that perception is passive, that is 
representations come to mind based on cues from perception - how does 
association occur between supposedly distinct representations? One could say 
cue salience, but if perception is passive, how could cue salience account for 
association? Cue salience would imply an active role of perception. If one 
accepts an active role of perception, the foundations of the cognitivist 
perspective would be at risk because one would not have a basis to show that 
what one is perceiving actually exists as it is (Varela et al., 1991). Therefore, 
one can see that associating distinct representations does not guarantee a 
coherent way of explaining how one makes sense of any situation (Taylor, 
2005, pp. 30 31). Thi  i  beca e c he e ce i  a ead  e ed i   
abi i   a cia e  (Matthews, 2006, p. 30; Merleau-Ponty, 2012, p. 18).   
Alternatively, one could turn to the construct of memory to explain why 
one perceives a situation as a meaningful and unified whole. Specifically, one 
could say that because s/he encountered something similar in the past, s/he is 
enabled to perceive a similar situation in the present under a similar light. 
However, again this is also a circular argument. If memory is given the role of 
affecting current experiences, this assumes that memory is organised in a 
similar manner in all previous experiences (Matthews, 2006, p. 30). So, if one 
revisits the first time they perceived something, how was that experience 
organised as a coherent and meaningful whole without prior experience to 
organize it? And given the latter, how is that first experience supposed to be the 
basis of all subsequent similar experiences (ibid, p. 30)? 
If the above problematization about the underlying assumptions of 
association and memory that form the basis of dual process models is accepted, 
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one can see that explanations suggested by theories relying on the above 
foundations would be problematic. This is because they do not seem to account 
what they claim to be explaining: how people perceive the world in a way that 
is meaningful which allows them to engage in improvisation (Moorman & 
Miner, 1998b; Vera & Crossan, 2005; Vera et al., 2014). This suggests that the 
lived experience of improvising is not fully understood. This is an important 
issue because it can shed light on how improvisation is experienced and 
enacted. Apart from this limitation, additional major inconsistencies have 
infiltrated the improvisation literature through dual process explanations and 
their treatment of memory.  
Specifically, memory and knowledge are, sometimes, assumed to be 
identical (Kyriakopoulos, 2011; Moorman & Miner, 1998a, 1998b) and that 
action precedes cognition (Gioia et al., 2002; Maitlis & Sonenshein, 2010; 
Weick, 1988). Memory and knowledge are not necessarily the same. As it is 
portrayed in the improvisation literature (Kyriakopoulos, 2011; Moorman & 
Miner, 1998b), the term memory entails having recollections of past 
occurrences that are then associated via mental processing (E. Smith & 
DeCoster, 2000) with current situations. These in turn, enable practitioners to 
respond in the same way as they did in the past. In addition, according to Weick 
(2001), a person can only make sense of their actions after s/he has performed 
them by revisiting their experience. This implies that when a person is 
knowledgeable or makes sense of a situation, they increasingly respond to their 
internal representations found in memory and less to the cues that are presented 
to agents in unfolding situations (Dreyfus, 2007a; Gibson & Gibson, 1955a). 
Hence, due to the implicit assumptions of this approach, past-experience is 
considered to be more important than present experience.  
However, recent studies cast doubt on this conception (see Dane, 2011). 
Extant studies on the acquisition of expertise point towards the importance of 
lived experience (i.e., perception) which is underexplored in this approach. 
Dreyfus (2002) argues that when one becomes an expert in a skill, what 
distinguishes them from a novice is that they unreflectively perceive subtle 
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nuances of situations which allow them to react differentially (Ribeiro, 2014; 
Rietveld, 2010; Rietveld, de Haan, & Denys, 2013; Rietveld & Kiverstein, 
2014). F  we do not react to objects in any single uniform way. We respond 
a d e a e e e   he  i  diffe e  a  i  diffe e  ci c a ce  
(Shotter, 1996, p. 304).  
K edge i  ee  a  he e e  abi i   e cei e fi e  di i c i  i  
each situation which in turn allow one to react in a different way depending on 
present circumstances (Benner, Hooper-Kyriakidis, & Stannard, 1999; Dreyfus, 
2007a; Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 2005; Selinger, Dreyfus, & Collins, 2007). In a 
laboratory experiment on perceptual learning, conducted by the founders of the 
ecological approach, James and Eleanor Gibson (1955a, p. 40), it is shown that 
e e i i   ac ice i  ece a  f  he de e e  f he improved 
e ce , b  he e i   f ha  i  i c a e  e ie . Th  he  gge  
ha  e ce a  ea i g c i  f e di g  a iab e  f i a i   
e i  e ded  (Gibson & Gibson, 1955b, p. 448). Nearly fifty years 
later, the neuroscientist Walter Freeman (1999) offers supports to these 
findings. By studying the functioning of the brain of how mammals learn 
diffe e  ki , he f d ha  he e i   e ide ce ha  he b d  e a  
networks correlate information gathered from the outside with information 
stored in the brain. 
Similarly, Suchman (2007, p. 70) highlights that in contrast to the 
dominant cognitivist view that people simply implement memorised abstract 
rules to take action, every course of action depends on a person perceiving the 
unique material and social circumstances. Beyond the silence in the memory 
die  a d Weick  a e efe e ce   e e i  (e.g., panic), as well as 
H  a d C e i e  (2014) allusion to moods, the literature largely 
overlooks emotions. This is counterintuitive as everyday experience suggests 
that during actions we often feel emotions. Although Holt and Cornelissen 
(2014) do not delineate between emotions and moods, it is to their credit that 
they have conceptualized responses to situation to also entail responding to an 
age  mood. Being in a certain mood is argued to make salient some 
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interpretations of the situation and make certain responses more likely over 
others. In other words, Holt and Cornelissen suggest that knowledgeability 
entails being more responsive to the situation itself. As a result, knowledge 
cannot be seen as identical to memory, because an expert never reacts in the 
same manner, or to the same stimuli (Benner et al., 1999).  
By contrast, the expert reacts to different cues each time based on the 
perceived circumstances (Freeman, 1999; Holt & Cornelissen, 2014; Varela et 
al., 1991) and their emotional reactions to them (Solomon, 2007). Hence, how 
could action precede cognition as claimed by Weick (1988, p. 307), if one 
differentially responds to stimuli on an ad-hoc basis? Action before cognition 
is impossible, for cognition is the basis for action (Merleau-Ponty, 1964). The 
person needs to be immersed in their environment to respond appropriately 
(Ingold, 2002). One does not draw only on their past experience to identify the 
appropriate response based on cues from the environment. One must, draw on 
both their experience and their perception of the environment to adapt their 
responses to suit the circumstances (Sa dbe g & Da A ba, 2009; Sa dbe g & 
Tsoukas, 2011, 2015). Therefore, the separation of mind and environment 
implicit (and its passive relationship) in the disjunctive paradigm cannot explain 
how one can engage in an action by drawing on both their understanding of its 
unique circumstances as well their own experiences. 
By characterising proced a  e  a  a e e e a i  f aci  
k edge , a d dec a a i e e  a  a  ab ac , fac a  e f k edge 
(Kyriakopoulos, 2011, p. 1058; Moorman & Miner, 1998b, pp. 708, 710) a false 
epistemological dichotomy is introduced (Tsoukas, 2005, pp. 384 386). As 
signified by Polanyi (1958; Polanyi & Prosch, 1977) and underlined by Tsoukas 
(2011a), tacit and explicit knowledge are not two separate types of knowledge 
hich a e c i ge  i ked, a he , he  a e a  c i ed - like two 
ide  f he a e c i  (Tsoukas, 2005, p. 386). This is because embeddedness 
in a social sphere of meaning is unavoidable (Dreyfus, 1989; MacIntyre, 2007; 
Toulmin, 1992) and tacit knowledge is sculpted by this embeddedness 
(MacIntyre, 2007; Polanyi, 1958, Chapter 7; Toulmin, 1992). Tacitly taking for 
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granted this sphere, is the context that gives meaning to even the most explicit 
facts (Dreyfus, 1991; Heidegger, 2013; Schatzki, 2005). For example, making 
sense of differential equations depends on one participating in the practice of 
mathematics in which one takes for granted certain assumptions, so as to make 
sense of the equations. But participating in the practice of mathematics rests on 
there being a cultural understanding of mathematics. For if no one knew about 
mathematics, how could one practice them? Hence in the case of differential 
equations one attends from the tacitly held assumptions (cultural and practice-
based), to seeing the meaning of the equations (Gueldenberg & Helting, 2007; 
Polanyi, 1962b; Tsoukas, 2011a).  
Thus, by accepting that tacit knowledge is separate from knowledge of 
facts, is to suggest that factual knowledge is separate from shared sociomaterial 
practices. In other words, one is asserting that sociomaterial embeddedness is 
not required for perceiving meaning, and facts are endowed with meaning by 
individuals that function as lone information-processors who can have a private 
language (see Taylor, 1985, pp. 2 8, 1995, Chapter 4). However, following the 
work of Wittgenstein (1986, §243-271), the aforementioned possibility has 
been shown to be an impossibility (see also Castoriadis, 2005b; Dreyfus & 
Taylor, 2015; Merleau-Ponty, 2012; Taylor, 1995, Chapter 4,6). Otherwise, 
acce i g ch a bjec i i  e i e g  h ea e   i h a a chic 
e a i i , he a e i  ha  k edge i  ha e e  e i agi e  (Spender, 
2008, p. 170). Hence, adopting the disjunctive (i.e., atomistic) onto-
epistemological view proposed by the cognitive approach in order to interpret 
improvisation, risks overlooking the complexity of the phenomenon of interest 
(Tsoukas, 2017). Namely that if improvisation is tied to knowledge, then it 
relies on know-how which relies on perceiving and dwelling in an overarching 
cultural nexus of meaning. Consequently, improvisation is never purely an 
individual accomplishment  an accomplishment separate from the 
sociomaterial environment. One relies on the meanings that exist in the 
sociomaterial practices that one is part of in order to take any action 
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(Castoriadis, 2005b; MacIntyre, 2007; Tsoukas, 2005, Chapter 16; 
Wittgenstein, 1976). 
 
2.4 The Sociomaterial Perspective  
The term sociomaterial refers to the notion of how individuals in relation 
to material and social structures are enmeshed across different settings (Davis 
et al., 2009; Nicolini, 2011, 2012; Spencer, Murtha, & Lenway, 2005). Material 
structures refer to the raw materials, tools and equipment individuals use to 
accomplish an activity (e.g., hammer for driving nail). The social structure is 
understood as the overarching patterned social conventions that is the source 
and basis for all individual action. Jointly material and social structures form 
Practices. According to Yanow and Tsoukas (2009, p. 1347), a Practice is 
characterised by three features. One, it involves cooperation that is temporally 
bounded by rules. Two, it seeks to achieve internal goods, which is an outcome 
only produced by participating in the specific practice. Three, practitioners 
ine dib  eek  achie e he ac ice  a da d  f e ce e ce  (it should be 
noted that this interpretation of Practice draws heavily on MacIntyre, 2007). By 
adopting the view that activities derive their meaning from social nexuses, the 
Sociomaterial perspective has managed to move beyond the individualist bias 
found in the cognitivist perspective (e.g., Duymedjian & Rüling, 2010). 
 While most studies in this perspective refer to both social and material 
structures, some tend to offer explanations of improvisation by leaning more 
heavily on one of the two. For example, as will be discussed below, Bechky and 
Okhuysen (2011) focus on social structures to explain improvisation, whereas 
Baker and Nelson (2005) focus mostly on material structures. Although the 
terms structure/practice can trace their lineage to Giddens (1984) and Bourdieu 
(1990), the discussion of this section will be restricted to the studies that focus 
on improvisation/bricolage. The primary goal is to understand how social and 
material structures are discussed by the latter studies when referring to 
improvisation/bricolage. Most of these studies rely on in-depth case studies of 
organizational improvisation. Like the other perspectives, improvisation is 
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shown to be necessary when organizations are faced with uncertainty and 
change (S. Brown & Eisenhardt, 1995; Eisenhardt & Tabrizi, 1995; Orlikowski, 
1996).  
In one of the most seminal studies of the perspective, Bechky and 
Okhuysen (2011) e i ica  de a e h  he ga i a i  ci -
cognitive resources (roles and routines) affect how their members improvise 
(see also Cunha, Cunha, & Clegg, 2009). By using ethnographic data from a 
police SWAT team and film production crews, they suggest that practitioners 
respond to unusual events by relying on the structurally sculpted process of 
organisational bricolage. Bricolage, a French term is often used 
interchangeably with improvisation. It originates from the work of structural 
anthropologist Lévi-Strauss (1966) and is defined as an improvised 
reorganisation of available resources in order to respond to situations (see also 
Duymedjian & Rüling, 2010).  
Bechky and Okhuyesen (2011, pp. 246 249) argue that the studied teams 
exhibited three bricolage behaviours. First, they noticed that team members 
engaged in role shifting (viz., substituting someone at performing a task). For 
example, one day while observing the film crew, the operator of the aerial 
camera did not show up for work. Thus, another camera person fulfilling a 
different role was asked to take over. Second, the authors noticed that SWAT 
team members reorganise routines (viz., change of goals and shift of routines 
to achieve new goal). For example, as the unit was about to place explosives to 
blow up a door, a member noticed that the door was unlocked. Consequently, 
he i  e ed a he  i e ca ed ea h e . Fi a , he a h  
noticed that the film crew members engaged in reordering routines (viz., change 
of task sequence). For example, when a lead actor was unwell, the director 
chose to shoot other scenes in which the actor was not required, and return to 
the missed scene later.  
Bechky and Okhuysen (2011, p. 258) maintain that all three bricolage 
behaviours discussed above, arise because of the socio-cognitive resources that 
the organizational structures produce. They highlight that for organisational 
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bricolage to be enacted, presupposes a period in which practitioners are shaped 
by organisational norms over interaction. That is, the agents developed shared 
knowledge of a repertoire of organizational routines and roles. By drawing on 
the repertoire agents were able to improvise by switching between roles and 
routines, depending on the situation. 
Although, this explanation is valuable in the sense that it highlights the 
e f he ga i a i  a  a a f  (Ciborra, 1996) for the socio-cognitive 
resources agents draw upon to improvise, it marginalizes material resources, 
overlooks emotions and downplays human agency by emphasizing social 
structuration (cf., Sonenshein, 2014). Bechk  a d Okh e  e a a i  f 
improvisation assumes that agents mostly recycle organizational socio-
cognitive resources. Although, routines have an ostensive (i.e., pre-defined 
structure) as well as a performative aspect (i.e., actions of agents), agents do not 
simply recycle resources to cope with situations as a natural consequence of 
what is already in place by the structure (Feldman & Pentland, 2003). Put 
otherwise, neither resources nor situations come with a priori labels. A  age  
judgement is required to view something under a particular prism (Tsoukas, 
2018a, p. 9). Agents do not have a fixed/pre-set repertoire for action (Feldman, 
2000, 2004). Moreover, agents can creatively borrow aspects from other social 
settings and thus create new responses (Parmigiani & Howard-Grenville, 2011, 
p. 435; see also Tsoukas & Chia, 2002).  
Indeed several studies on bricolage focus on how individuals re-create 
(Baker & Nelson, 2005; Halme, Lindeman, & Linna, 2012), re-frame (Kannan-
Narasimhan & Lawrence, 2018) or combine (Garud & Karnoe, 2003) resources 
beyond the restrictions of sociomaterial structures. A seminal study underlying 
the point that agents do not recycle ready-made resources was conducted by 
Bake  a d Ne  (2005). The  a g e ha  a  ga i a i  e i e  fa  
f  bei g a  bjec i e ec g  (ibid., . 331) i  idi c a ic . Tha  i , 
he e i  a ide c e f  j dge e  (ibid., . 332). F  he a ch ad f 
this insight, the authors focused on how material resources were recombined by 
diffe e  ga i a i  f  e  e  he  faced b  e ce c ai . 
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Across the studied organizations the authors found that they were able to 
improvise through novel combinations of material resources insofar as there 
a  a ge e a  a a e e  f e i i g ac ice  a d  a d a c ci  
i i g e   ab ga e he  (ibid., . 342). It should be noted, however, that 
in most of the above studies, bricolage is described as the result of a rational 
response (Visscher et al., 2018, p. 356), thus overlooking the role of emotional 
experience and organizational values in the process. 
Beyond the focus on improvisation/bricolage within the material 
structure exemplified by Baker and Nelson (2005), other studies have shown 
that improvisation depends on the imaginative (and in some cases arbitrary) re-
interpretation of the existing sociomaterial structure, in a manner that was not 
previously predetermined. Re-interpretation can be achieved 
narratively/discursively (Illia & Zamparini, 2016; Spicer & Sewell, 2010), 
intentionally (i.e., through conscious selection of which resources fi  age  
values) (Perkmann & Spicer, 2014) or unintentionally (an unforeseen 
con e e ce f age  ac i ) (Lamberg & Pajunen, 2010). Pre-established 
structures cannot accommodate the mutation and complexity of everyday social 
life that inevitably leads to facing novel situations (Hadjimichael, 2017; 
Tsoukas, 1998b). Hence, scholars have argued that routines are in a constant 
state of flux, because standardised routines cannot always attain their intended 
goals (Tsoukas & Chia, 2002).  
Consequently, actions of organizational members do not always strictly 
follow the organizational structure even in high-reliability organizations 
(Weick, 1990, 1993b). Brady (2011), for example, describes how the Russian 
General Vasilyi Chuikov overtly improvised to change the tide of the war. By 
the time of the battle of Stalingrad during World War II, the Russian army had 
been on the retreat for months. This was largely due to the superior equipment 
and novel tactics of the German army. Indeed, the tide of events was so stark 
for the Russians that they were on the brink of collapsing by the time the fight 
eached S a i g ad (ibid., .37). U de  he ic  g ide i e  f S a i :  a e  
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back , Ge e a  Ch ik  had  fi d a a   i a e hi  de a i ed a d i  
equipped troops to hold their ground (ibid., p.41).  
While in command of the 62nd Russian Army, Chuikov noticed that 
Germans did not favour hand to hand combat and fighting at night. 
Additionally, Chuikov realised that when Russians were close to the Nazi lines, 
the Nazi artillery and air force were reluctant to fire (ibid., p.38). By taking 
these observations into consideration General Chuikov decided to reorganise 
his troops in small semi-autonomous groups. This was later referred to as the 
 g  ac ic . Thi  ac ic e ied  he ilisation of small groups of 
lightly armed soldiers to attack enemy controlled buildings in three successive 
waves to capture them. This was a major deviation from the norm because until 
October 1942, Russian offensive or defensive operations were usually 
organised in the standard groups of regiments and battalions. By ceding central 
control to small semi-autonomous groups, General Chuikov managed to gain 
an advantage over his Nazi adversary Field Marshal Friedrich Paulous and 
eventually win the battle. Gene a  Ch ik  i i ed ac ic a  
subsequently used in other battles and influenced the developments in the 
German Eastern Front.  
In fact, normative directives of sociomaterial practices are sometimes 
evaded by hiding in the organizational underlife. The organizational underlife 
is defined as the informal activities of staff, which are performed in secret 
because they are beyond the organizational structure and policies (Giustiniano, 
Cunha, & Clegg, 2016, p. 228). An ethnographic study of a British medical 
emergency unit has shown that underlife improvisations are not necessarily 
harmful (Batista et al., 2016). On the contrary, deviating from uniform protocols 
 dea  i h - if  b e  f a a ie  i  a ed  be ece a  
in the practice of the unit (ibid., p. 416). This is because blindly following the 
official/generic protocols in all situations, would limit the care for patients who 
have unique problems.  
Each situation has singularities and nuances that cannot be captured in 
abstract rules. Improvisation is required to bring together abstract protocols to 
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grounded problems (Clegg, Cunha, & Cunha, 2002, p. 489). I  Ba i a  e  a . 
(2016, p. 419) study, given that improvisation is not understood to be dictated 
by organizational protocols, the authors argue that improvisation is tied to tacit 
k edge a  a f  f i i i . I i i  i  defi ed a  i i i g that 
i ici  (  e e  c ci ) be efi  f  e i  ac i  (ibid., . 
410). However, beyond maintaining that tacit knowledge is a spontaneous 
synthesis of past and present experience, the exact mechanism of how the latter 
occurs is not focused on. 
In summary, the sociomaterial perspective has allowed the following 
insights in relation to improvisation: (i) improvisation is not a strictly individual 
affair, (ii) improvisation happens in relation to collective standards or 
conventions, (iii) improvisation can occur overtly or covertly depending on 
whether it complies or deviates from the instituted collective standards or 
conventions. 
2.4.1 Critique of the Sociomaterial Perspective 
Most of the above studies suggest that people improvise by depending 
on (e.g. Bechky & Okhuysen, 2011), ignoring (e.g. Baker & Nelson, 2005), or 
avoiding (e.g. Batista et al., 2016) sociomaterial structures. Whether 
organizations/agents improvise by complying or rejecting (overtly or covertly) 
sociomaterial structures, scholars agree that there is need for creativity and 
situational responsiveness. While sociomaterial studies attempt to move closer 
to lived experience of improvisation by bringing to the fore the ongoing 
relationality of human activities with sociomateriality, they do not consistently 
focus on lived experience itself (see Fisher & Barrett, 2019; for a similar point 
ee Sa dbe g & Da A ba, 2009, . 1351). This is detrimental to understanding 
organizational improvisation as it has been high igh ed ha  ea  i e 
e e ie ce  ac i  i  he defi i g cha ac e i ic f i i a i  (Miner et 
al., 2001, p. 316). 
 Real time experience is characterized, to a great extent, by perception 
(Gibson, 2015a; Ingold, 2002; Merleau-Ponty, 2012). In turn, perception is 
largely coloured by tacit knowledge (Hadjimichael & Tsoukas, 2019; Ribeiro, 
 59 
2014) and emotional experience (Frijda, 2009; Solomon, 2007). As argued 
above, he de e e  f age  tacit knowledge is entwined with 
sociomaterial practices and permits them to intuitively respond, or identify 
solutions to unexpected developments (Tsoukas, 2011a). Participating in the 
sociomaterial context not only allows agents to hone their perception of 
contextual nuances, but also entails developing a sensitivity to the ends valued 
by their practices (Nicolini & Monteiro, 2017). In parallel, emotions entail 
judgements about unfolding developments based on the valued ends 
(Nussbaum, 2009). Deviation from values garners emotional tension, which in 
turn is argued to offer the motivation to respond to situations (Frijda, 2010b). 
As organizational improvisation entails responding to contingencies and moods 
(Holt & Cornelissen, 2014), based on the ends valued in practices (Nicolini & 
Monteiro, 2017), the sociomaterial perspective must pay closer attention to 
emotions, moods and tacit knowledge. 
 While improvisation is not at the centre of Yanow and Tsoukas (2009) 
study, the authors influenced by Dreyfus (1991), offer the beginnings of a 
sociomaterial explanation of improvisational behaviour that pays direct 
attention to lived experience (including tacit knowledge and to a limited extent, 
emotions). Specifically, they argue that for a person to be a good practitioner, 
they must become skilled. This, they contend, can only occur by expending time 
and effort in developing habitual responses to variety of situations that comply 
with the standards of their practice. When mastery is attained, responses are 
enacted spontaneously. Spontaneous reactions are tied to tacit knowledge, 
which is essentially described as a type of non-cognitive background awareness 
that orients people towards certain courses of action (Tsoukas, 2011a). As such 
improvising in the face of various situations becomes a natural part of being a 
skilled practitioner - a e  di a  a a ge f e e  he  he  
e c e  di ba ce  a  k, f  ab bed c i g  a a ic ef ec i  
(Raelin, 2007, p. 500). 
 In each situation, both emotional and mental reactions are triggered by 
he c e  ffe i g a ed a d -rational  backtalk (Yanow & Tsoukas, 
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2009, p. 1348). Thus, in a sense this explanation of improvisation implies that 
the social structure is a taken-for-granted referential background from which 
the individual attends from. Therefore, the structure and agent are mutually 
constituted: the one becomes a part the other (they do not exist separately). This 
unreflective awareness allows agents to either intuitively respond to situations, 
or to reflect on them by perceiving ha  i  e ed  be c  e e  (i.e., 
normal or abnormal circumstances). What is common sense and how does it 
come about? As Chia (2002, p. 866) e e   i : he ga i a i  i  a 
censoring/centring device that works to create a figure/ground effect so that 
a e i , f c  a d ef e  a e di ec ed a d  d c i e c e , 
but of course is not exhaustive. In the next chapter, I will draw on Yanow and 
T ka  (2009) he i a i   e ab a e h  i  ca  assist in further theorizing 
about organizational improvisation. 
 
2.5 Discussion 
This section seeks to critically examine the contribution and the 
limitations of studies across the three identified perspectives. Particular 
emphasis will be paid to explicating the onto-epistemological (viz. 
metaphysical) assumptions that underlie the claims (see Alvesson & Sandberg, 
2011). This is important because theories are inherently underlain, explicitly or 
implicitly, by metaphysical assumptions (Harré, 1985). Metaphysical 
a i  a e a ife ed i  a he  ch ice f f da e a  c ce  a d 
the relationship assumed between them (ibid., p. 100). The relation between 
c ce  c ea e e  f ic i g  (ibid., .16). A  Wi ge ei  (1986, 
§115) a  i ed , ic e  ca  h d  ca i e . T  ca  ff he hack e  
of metaphysical pictures one must explicitly identify their underlying 
assumptions (Harré, 1985, p. 17). That is not to say that someone can attain a 
ie  f  he e  (Nagel, 1986), a  a  de a di g  i  e a h ic  
(Camus, 1979, p. 10). Ra he , if I a  b  Nie che  a a g , he i  i  
to become cognizant of which chains one chooses to dance in (see Ortmann & 
Sydow, 2018).  
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As discussed above, the three perspectives have generated important 
insights for understanding of improvisation. Nevertheless, studies across the 
perspectives are differentially underlain by three onto-epistemological 
controversies that limit our understanding of improvisation. While some onto-
epistemological have already been discussed in relation to each perspective in 
their respective critiques; in this section I will focus on onto-epistemological 
controversies that can be found across the three perspectives. These being: (i) 
the separability controversy (i.e., whether improvisation can be understood in 
terms of distinct components); (ii) the outcome/process controversy (i.e., 
whether improvisation is understood as an outcome or a process); and (iii) 
finally, the functionalist controversy (i.e., whether improvisation can be 
understood strictly in terms of its function). I expand on each controversy 
below. 
2.5.1 The Separability Controversy  
This controversy underscores the tendency of various studies across the 
perspectives to understand improvisation and other related constructs in terms 
of a disjunctive theoretical approach (Tsoukas, 2017). The disjunctive approach 
seeks to abstract social phenomena from their settings and dissect them into 
separable components with the aim of signifying quasi-causal relationships 
between them. A strong form of this approach would urge scholars to utilise a 
positivistic epistemology and an objectivistic ontology (see Tsoukas, 2012). A 
positivist epistemology concedes that knowledge about society should be 
produced deductively, akin to mathematics and that the knowledge produced 
should enable scientists to make predictions (Harré, 1985, pp. 53 57). 
Objectivist ontology concedes that human agents and their societies are akin to 
natural phenomena. That is, like natural science understands that the emergent 
properties of the human body (e.g., perception) can be gradually attributed to 
configurations of molecules, so improvisation should be analysed in terms of 
underlying factors (ibid., pp. 128-133). 
 The combination of the positivistic epistemology and objectivist 
ontology makes the disjunctive paradigm liable to three main assumptions (see 
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Tsoukas, 1997). First, it implies studying social phenomena (including 
improvisation) as reducible to separable entities that are quasi-causally related 
through general laws (i.e., it adopts an atomistic ontology). Secondly, it accepts 
and seeks to emulate the notion that the entities that underlie social phenomena 
(including improvisation) are subject to general laws similar to the way natural 
phenomena are found to be in the natural sciences (Harré, 1985). Thirdly, as 
knowledge about social phenomena is supposed to be understood in terms of 
generalizations, it follows that knowledge of improvisation should be abstract, 
and therefore separate from the colloquial understandings of people because the 
essence of phenomena is not as it prima facie appears. 
The three above assumptions are adopted to varying degrees across 
different studies of the three perspectives. Dissecting improvisation into 
discrete entities that are subject to abstract general laws will be classified as 
adopting a strong disjunctive paradigm, dissecting some aspects of 
improvisation into discrete entities that may not always be subjected to 
generalizable laws will be classified as a weak disjunctive paradigm. While 
understanding improvisation in terms of relational holisms that may be 
understood via colloquial conceptualizations will be classified as rejecting the 
disjunctive paradigm or using a conjunctive paradigm (see Tsoukas, 2017).  
Several metaphor studies adopt a strong disjunctive paradigm by seeking 
to postulate identified insights about improvisation, by separating 
improvisation and other related constructs in terms of antecedents, influencing 
factors and outcomes (Cunha et al., 1999; Kamoche et al., 2003). For example, 
Vera and Crossan (2004, p. 733) embrace the disjunctive paradigm to such an 
e e   a   e ha  improvisation can be modelled as a latent construct 
with two dimensions: spontaneity [whether time is scarce] and creativity 
[ he he  he i i a i  i  e ] . O he  ch a  i   ha  a ecede  
to improvisation include social structures (e.g., experimental culture, supportive 
culture) and technical structures (e.g., expertise) (Cunha et al., 1999, p. 318; 
Kamoche et al., 2003, p. 2026; see also Kamoche & Cunha, 2001). 
Parenthetically, this illustrates the assumption of the separation between social 
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structures and skills. This goes hand in hand with the fact that other scholars 
also separate between individual and collective levels of analysis (see Crossan 
& Sorrenti, 2002). Moving on, moderating factors between improvisation and 
innovation include expertise, teamwork quality, experimental culture and real 
time information. Training was found to increase the frequency and quality of 
improvisation (Vera & Crossan, 2005, p. 219). In addition, other influencing 
factors identified by Cunha et al. (1999, p. 321) include leadership, member 
characteristics and resources. Finally, outcomes include innovation, 
improvisation frequency and quality (ibid.), learning and flexibility (Kamoche 
et al., 2003).  
Most studies in the Cognitive perspective either adopt a strong or a weak 
version of the disjunctive paradigm. Some studies view information processing 
as the basis of how individuals improvise. Information processing is often 
dissected in terms of its constituting elements e.g. memory (and by extent 
knowledge) is dichotomized in terms of procedural and declarative 
(Kyriakopoulos, 2011; Kyriakopoulos & De Ruyter, 2004; Moorman & Miner, 
1998b), and in turn are quasi-causally related to other outcomes such as 
improvisation novelty, speed, market performance and cost efficiency. 
Adoption of a weak disjunctive paradigm can be found in studies that do not 
dissect all aspects relating to improvisation into entities and do not necessarily 
accept that these phenomena can always be understood in terms of generalizable 
laws. For example, some scholars differentiate between the individual and the 
world [e.g. Weick (1988, p. 307) e  ha  he ga i a i  i  i  he i d f 
he i di id a , h a  ha e e e e a i  f he e e a  d],  be ee  
tacit and explicit knowledge (e.g. King & Ranft, 2001). 
In the Sociomaterial perspective, most studies adopt a weak disjunctive 
paradigm. This is because most studies implicitly assume the duality of the 
individual and the structure (with the exception of Davis et al., 2009). Like the 
d a i  f he c g i i i  e ec i e he e he e  i d i  a ed to 
be distinct from the external world, here the individual is portrayed to be in 
relation to a social structure. In various studies agents are portrayed to either 
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improvise in accordance or contrary to sociomaterial structures. This was 
evident in discussions of the organizational underlife (Batista et al., 2016), and 
how agents draw on their organizational, or broader sociomaterial structures 
(Bechky & Okhuysen, 2011; Davis et al., 2009; Illia & Zamparini, 2016; 
Spencer et al., 2005).  
Only a handful of studies across the perspectives appear to completely 
reject the disjunctive view. Such studies focus on understanding improvisation 
in terms of relational holisms. That is, they do not dissect improvisation in terms 
of distinct contributing factors. Improvisation for them can only be understood 
by taking into account the wider context in which the phenomenon occurs (e.g., 
Holt & Cornelissen, 2014; Yanow & Tsoukas, 2009). Improvisation is seen as 
a necessary propensity for organizations to function because their pre-defined 
procedures will inherently fall short of addressing the arising novelties of an 
open-ended world (Tsoukas & Chia, 2002).  
Following from the above it is evident that most studies adopt either a 
strong or weak view of disjunctive paradigm. Emphasis on separable entities 
and the regularities that govern their relationships oftentimes overshadows the 
uniqueness of improvised responses (Tsoukas, 2016). When compared to non-
disjunctive studies, emphasis on abstracting social phenomena from their 
originating social contexts and dissecting them into separable components 
(even implicitly) raises questions about whether picturing the world in a 
disjunctive manner is adequate for accounting for the intricacies and 
singularities of practice (Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2011; Tsoukas, 2012).  
According to Tsoukas (2016), organizations are constantly faced with 
singularities. This is because the world is open-ended. Even though 
organizations retrospectively create rules to deal with situations, they always 
find themselves amid new unique circumstances. Focusing on generalizable 
laws necessarily marginalizes the uniqueness of the circumstances agents face 
when improvising. Moreover, over the last years it has been increasingly argued 
that agents do not perceive their environment in terms of separable entities, but 
rather as a relational whole (D e f , 2007b, 2017b; Sa dbe g & Da A ba, 
 65 
2009; Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2011). I  Sh e  (2017, p. 231) words, the 
di j c i e acc  e ha i e ge e a  e , f a e k , a  a d 
ced e  [b ] ch acc  erlook how experts make sense of the 
a ic a i ie  f he f di g i a i . 
T   , he c a  be ee  he di j c i e a adig  a  f 
picturing and how improvisation is experienced in open-ended contexts, 
suggests that the former may not be the best prism to use in order to understand 
the process of improvisation. Over-relying on a disjunctive paradigm 
(especially the strong version) is problematic for the field of organizational 
improvisation because it marginalizes understandings of how agents develop 
new understandings to deal with situations on the spot. Put otherwise, picturing 
singularity in terms of regularity is a restricted view of the phenomenon, and 
over-reliance may lead to a limited view of how agents actually respond to 
situations. 
2.5.2 The Outcome/Process Controversy 
Adopting disjunctivist view or rejecting it, has implications about 
whether improvisation is understood in terms of an already completed outcome, 
or as an ongoing accomplishment. In particular, I argue that adopting a strong 
disjunctive paradigm is related to understanding improvisation as an outcome, 
and inversely related to understanding improvisation as an ongoing 
accomplishment (and vice versa). This is because the disjunctive paradigm 
favours conceptualizing the phenomena under investigation in terms of objects 
that have stable characteristics, while conjunctive studies tend to conceptualize 
in terms of processes. 
Langley and Tsoukas (2017) discuss a typology through which the 
process or outcome orientation of studies can be identified. In particular, the 
authors theorize that the aforementioned orientation can be explained through 
he dich  f g ce  a d eak ce  ie  (see also Chia & 
Langley, 2004). In response to criticisms that the dichotomy is too restrictive 
(Sandberg, Loacker, & Alvesson, 2015, p. 321), I build on the former 
de a di g a d c bi e i  i h Ha  (1985) e a h ica  ca eg ie  
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(Parmendidian, Heraclidean and Aristotelian) to develop a continuum of 
process views.  
On the one end of the continuum, the Parmenidean process view is 
characterized by a metaphysical commitment to entities with unchanging 
essential natures (i.e., a strong disjunctive view). That is, change does not 
change the nature of things but only their manifestation. Borrowing an example 
from Harré (1985, p. 108), if a stone is gradually sculpted into a statue, this does 
not change the underlying nature of the stone (e.g., its chemical composition), 
only its appearance. Hence, the Parmenidian view analytically emphasizes a 
he e  e e ia  nature over its manifested qualities.  
On the opposing side of the continuum, the Heraclidean process view is 
characterized by a metaphysical commitment to viewing phenomena in a 
constant state of flux (i.e., rejecting the disjunctive view). Change is understood 
as a transformation of quality. For instance, the way a stone is gradually 
transformed into a statue changes its existential status (viz., nature) - the stone 
can become something other than it initially was. Hence, the Heraclidean view 
places analytical emphasis on a he e  quality over its nature. This does 
not suggest that this view denies the possibility of analysing an immaterial 
object such as a stone chemically, but chooses to highlight the existential aspect 
(if this can be said of inanimate objects), rather than the natural aspect of the 
phenomenon. However, it should be noted, because the statue analogy cannot 
illustrate this point, that beyond material objects, a Heraclidean process outlook 
views social phenomena in terms of fluctuating qualities because it does not 
accept a static underlying nature to such phenomena. Indeed, Heraclidean 
he i  d ech  Sa e  (2007, p. 20) central tenet that, at least for social 
he e a, e i e ce ecede  e e ce , a bei  i  e ca e  i h a e 
intense communitarian emphasis than Sartre. Of course, a Heraclidean process 
theorist would admit that nature (e.g., having a body) is a condition for social 
behaviour to be possible, but the former does not determine the latter 
(Castoriadis, 2005b; Matthews, 2006).  
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Conceptualizations that fall between outcome orientation and strong 
process understandings are referred to the Aristotelian process view (i.e., a 
weak disjunctive view). The latter explain entities in terms of processes, which 
nevertheless retain their substances (Langley & Tsoukas, 2017, p. 3). That is, 
sculpting a stone into a statue (viz., changing its quality) is understood as 
fulfilling/actualizing its potential (developing quality in terms of a set nature). 
In terms of social phenomena, this view recognizes the importance of quality, 
but subjects it to an underlying essential nature which pre-specifies its potential. 
In the improvisation literature, most studies offer Parmenidean or 
Aristotelian process understandings, while Heraclidean process understandings 
are scarce. Studies adopting a strong disjunctive paradigm are also classified as 
having a Parmenidian process view (for example see Kyriakopoulos, 2011; 
Moorman & Miner, 1997, 1998b; Vera & Crossan, 2004, 2005; Vera et al., 
2014). For example, Moorman and Miner conceptualize the essence of 
improvisation as static, but nevertheless understand that its manifestation 
changes depending on the levels of procedural or declarative memory. Studies 
that adopt a weak disjunctive view, but conceptualize outcomes being changed 
by other outcome-related processes or as time-limited processes, are classified 
as espousing the Aristotelian process view (Bechky & Okhuysen, 2011; 
Giustiniano et al., 2016; Patriotta & Gruber, 2015; Weick, 1993b). For example, 
Bechky and Okhuysen (2011) conceptualize that improvisation unfolds as a 
ce  ha  i  ha ed  b  a e-specified organizational repertoire. While 
studies that reject the disjunctive view and discuss improvisation as a process 
in relation to other ever changing processes are understood as having a 
Heraclidean process orientation (e.g., Feldman, 2000; Tsoukas & Chia, 2002; 
Yanow & Tsoukas, 2009). For instance, Yanow and Tsoukas (2009) theorize 
that improvisation is an unfolding process that occurs in relation to dynamic 
changes in perception triggered by unfolding changes in situations. 
To further justify my interpretation of why many process sensitive 
studies, manifest an Aristotelian process view, I would like to discuss two 
implicit assumptions. Sociomaterial structure is often portrayed as a fait 
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accompli (an already completed accomplishment) that sculpts its subscribers 
(e.g., Bechky and Okhuysen, 2011), and/or improvisation itself is confined to 
specific time-limited instances (e.g., Baker & Nelson, 2005). In contrast, a 
Heraclidean view is in agreement with what Castoriadis (2007, p. 76) was at 
pains to point out: the sociomaterial structure is never fully determined - it is 
always in a fluid magmatic state, thus agents are called to continuously 
improvise.  
The reason for this is because structure does not exist a priori, but is a 
by- d c  f age  beha i  (Harré, 2002, p. 116). For example, no external 
structure instituted the practice of tennis. The institutionalization (i.e., the 
formalization and wide adoption) of the sport was brought about by human 
agents. Nor were the rules of the sport imposed on people, rather the rules were 
chosen by people. However, even after rules are formalized, people do not 
follow rules (Harré, 2002)   e  a  be a  aid  eachi g  he ac ice 
(Wittgenstein, 1986, §54). This is because even though rules may exist for 
certain situations, situations are not presented to agents with labels specifying 
what type they are (Tsoukas, 2018a, p. 9) and neither do rules contain their 
interpretation (Taylor, 1993; Wittgenstein, 1986, §201). Put simply, agents 
constantly have to interpret how to behave depending on the circumstances  
not on rules (Harré, 2002; Wittgenstein, 1986, §201). 
This alludes to the affinity between agents and acrobats. Like acrobats 
who main ai  hei  abi i   he high i e b  c i  c ec i g  hei  
imbalances, individuals accord with rules by continuously making adjustments 
to their behaviour in order to fit their behaviour with a rule (Tsoukas & Chia, 
2002, p. 572). Hence, continuous adjustments continuously change (to a 
varying degree) the structure (and consequently the rules) ad infinitum. Thus as 
a  e i , he  a  a cia  c e ca  ha e i  ha  f a di c i e 
ca eg , a a  f a ki g ab  de  behaviour on large scales (Harré, 
2002, p. 121) and improvisation itself is a seamless feature of organizations 
given that ways of behaving are not set in stone (Tsoukas & Chia, 2002). 
Illustrating how the assumptions of Aristotelianism and Parmenidianism 
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contrast with Heraclidianism, may show that the former two oversimplify the 
complexity of improvisation. 
Appropriate responses vary from context to context (Wittgenstein, 1986, 
§199) a d a ia e e  edic ab  cha ge  e  i e (Castoriadis, 
2005b). This leaves both the Parmenidian and Aristotelian prone to two 
criticisms. First, against the Parmendidian view, one can employ Tsoukas 
(2016, p. 145) a g e  ha  fi -time events are not exception but the rule in 
h a  ife.  There is a temporal asymmetry between the creation of rules and 
dealing with situations. Thus, structures are far from being unchanging, because 
novel situations require new responses not contained in the structures, which 
nevertheless could be incorporated in the structure as a consequence (ibid., p. 
152) .  
Secondly, against the Aristotelian view, one can use Charles Taylor  
(1995, p. 179) argument: even if rules exist for responding to a specific instance, 
e  a e  e f-interpreting with a sense of what he e ab , a d a  affi i  
 hei  i i , he  e ai  dead e e   bec e a a e  i  ac ice . 
Ch i g a d acc di g  a e e i e  a  age  j dge e  a d k -how, 
 a   ake he a ia e  ide ifica i  a d a ica i  f  each specific 
situation (Dreyfus, 2007b, p. 248) Appropriateness, as was discussed above, is 
not set in stone - it fluctuates from situation to situation and from practice to 
practice (Wittgenstein, 1986, §19). In other words, each situation is unique and 
its meaning is context-dependent (Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2011, p. 341). Thus, 
there is always an element of uncertainty that a practitioner must overcome, 
because everything is subject to instability and judgement (Taylor, 1995, p. 
177). Consequently studies that restrict improvisation to specific instances, 
overlook that it is an ever-present and inherent feature of all social settings.  
In contrast, a Heraclidean views everything (including structure and 
improvisation) in a constant state of flux. By eschewing stability it is more able 
to capture the consequences of the lack of a fully predefined script (Shotter, 
2011), and can in turn more fully illustrate how overcoming this uncertainty 
i he e  ead   i i a i  (Tsoukas, 2013, p. 61). It allows us to see 
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that improvisation occurs in an unstable world, which is further destabilized by 
the improvisation itself. Change is incremental (Chia, 2002; Tsoukas & Chia, 
2002). Therefore, the Heraclidean ie i  a   a  f g a i g  
continuously changing sense of living relatedness, both to each other and the 
larger world around us. Our modern, intellectualistic and individualistic [viz. 
disjunctive and Parmenidian] notions of understanding leave these relations-in-
i  iced i  he backg d  (Shotter, 1996, p. 293).   
2.5.3 The Functionalist Controversy  
In a recent study, Visscher and colleagues (2018, p. 356) aptly highlight 
ha  he ai  a i  ha  de ie  he b ic e  (  i i e ) i  ha  
/he i  a f c i a  age  e di g   hei  e i e a  cha e ge . I  
he  d , b ic age/i i a i  i  c  ic ed a  a a i a  
response  e i e a  c ai  (ibid, . 356). The a e  bei g e ce 
scarcity (Baker & Nelson, 2005; Halme et al., 2012) and surprise (Bechky & 
Okhuysen, 2011; Cunha, Clegg, & Kamoche, 2006). The mainstream way of 
picturing bricolage/improvisation omits important aspects of lived experience 
in organizations (Fisher & Barrett, 2019). Specifically, it marginalises that 
improvisation is rarely enacted sterile of moods a d ha  he ai  d e f 
situational responses can be to uphold values or the standards of excellence of 
practices (see Holt & Cornelissen, 2014; Yanow & Tsoukas, 2009).  
In a recent review of improvisation, the authors have pointed out the 
need to further examine how motivation and emotions influence improvisation 
(Cunha et al., 2017, p. 567; see also Fisher & Barrett, 2019). Although the latter 
is underexplored, some scholars have highlighted that moods play an integral 
part in making sense of how to respond to situations (Holt & Cornelissen, 2014; 
Weick, 1990), while others have highlighted that the underlying driving force 
of (re-)action is for the sake of values (Castoriadis, 2005b; Gehman, Trevino, 
& Garud, 2013; MacIntyre, 2007; Tsoukas, 2018b; Yanow & Tsoukas, 2009). 
In particular, Weick (1990) gge  ha  e i  ca  g ide a  age  
perception to salient features of the situation. For example, stress is understood 
 f c i  a  a echa i  ha  a  d  a  age  a e i   he 
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stimulus that is threatening. This enables the agent to concentrate their cognitive 
resources to deal with the threat. Holt and Cornelissen (2014) highlight that 
moods can colour situations to appear under a specific light, which in turn 
motivate reactions. For example, by a situation appearing as dangerous, they 
can be motivated to flee (e.g., like the firefighters during the Mann Gulch 
disaster).  
B h b e a i  i   Ca iadi  (2005b, p. 14) insight, namely 
that facts (e.g., environmental conditions) and sense (viz., perception) are 
mutually constituted. Agents are embedded in a world of significations (viz., 
values/goods) a d i  i  h gh he a e  ha  he bjec  ece a i  g a ,  
begi  i h, he h e f he hi ica  a e ia  (ibid., .14). MacI e (2007) 
similarly suggests that human actions are driven by what is considered good, 
that is valued, by a community of practice (see also Tsoukas, 2018b; Yanow & 
Tsoukas, 2009). According to Gehman and colleagues (2013, pp. 103 104) 
values create unity around a concern and contribute to according to 
organizational norms. Thus, if the above is accepted it can be construed that to 
further understand improvisation requires a deeper understanding of both 
emotions and values. 
 
2.6 Implications and Tacit Knowledge as the Way Forward 
Taken together the discussion of the literature has revealed four 
limitations across the improvisation literature: (i) Metaphor as a device for 
understanding a phenomenon has its limitations. (ii) Separating social 
phenomena such as improvisation into distinct Parmenidian entities in order to 
identify quasi-causal relations between them, or into Aristotelian entities which 
have pre-specified ends, cannot adequately capture the singularity, open-
endedness and pervasiveness of improvisation in lived experience. Thirdly, (iii) 
the circular assumptions of information processing cannot be a solid basis from 
hich  de a d age  e ce i  a d improvisation. Finally, (iv) 
approaching improvisation/bricolage from a functionalist perspective 
oversimplifies the role of social values/goods and the emotional responses 
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situations evoke in agents. The above suggest that adopting a conjunctive (i.e., 
a holistic) view, a Heraclidean process orientation and a non-cognitive 
conceptualization of perception in combination with an examination of the role 
of values and emotions may offer a more suitable onto-epistemological 
platform to build a new theory of improvisation upon.  
A move towards this direction has already been anticipated by a handful 
of studies (Tsoukas & Chia, 2002; Yanow & Tsoukas, 2009). These studies 
share an understanding of the world as being open-ended and value driven, and 
as such, inherently prone to singularities. The singularities are then constantly 
addressed through improvisation, which is also a non-predefined process. In 
addition, by drawing on phenomenology, they lay the foundations of a non-
cognitive explanation of how agents are able to see and act upon opportunities 
for improvisation.  
Ya  a d T ka  (2009) viewpoint is a suitable basis for building a 
new theory of improvisation for four reasons. First, in contrast to the metaphor 
perspective, which does not directly examine incidents of organizational 
i i a i , Ya  a d T ka  ie i  a  e ea che   a a e 
actual incidents of improvisation. Second, and in contrast to the cognitivist 
perspective where emphasis is put on an a-social individual and retrospective 
i f a i  ce i g, Ya  a d T ka  ie i  a  e  g a  
ha  i i a i  i  a cia  he e  ha  e   e e  -cognitive 
awareness during action. Lastly, by suggesting that through tacit knowledge the 
social structure is a part of an individual, highlights the primacy of contextually-
embedded agency. This overcomes the duality and pre-closure of sociomaterial 
practices, in which individual and sociomaterial structures are seen as two 
interacting entities. 
However, important questions remain unanswered in this account. 
Although, it is highlighted that there are different levels of awareness, ranging 
from intuitive to reflective deliberation (see also Holt & Cornelissen, 2014; 
Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2015), i  i   f  ca ed h  he ac i i e  
perception affects improvisation (Yanow & Tsoukas, 2009, p. 1354). In other 
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words, when practitioners are involved in dealing with arising situations, how 
do they perceive what they ought to do? What do they notice? How does the 
context guide agents perception? How do emotions as opposed to moods 
influence what they notice (e.g. Holt & Cornelissen, 2014)? In either 
a e  eac i   ef ec i e eac i , he e i  a ac i i e  a e i  
oriented to and how? How does this orientation allow them to improvise? 
Unlike previous studies on improvisation, what I am alluding to is grasping how 
aci  k edge gi e  bi h  ki d f k i g i ge e i , a  e hica  k -
how, to do with our way of being in the world, our stance in relating ourselves 
  di g  (Shotter, 1996, p. 309). 
K i g ha   d  i  ac i  ha  bee  efe ed  a  i a e  
e e aki g  (Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2015), or more simply, perception 
(Merleau-Ponty, 2012), which is highly dependent on tacit knowledge (or 
know-how) (Hadjimichael & Tsoukas, 2019). As highlighted by Sandberg and 
Tsoukas (2015), this phenomenon has been largely undertheorized and 
underexplored (see also Willems, 2018). This is largely because sensemaking 
has focused more on retrospective accounts of actions (Holt & Cornelissen, 
2014, p. 536). A  a e , e ack a de c i i  f he c e f i a ed 
ac i  (Suchman, 2007, p. 122), which calls for the development of a 
vocabulary that can do so (Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2015; Shotter, 2017). Focusing 
on retrospective accounts, in combination with the scarcity of empirical studies 
on improvisation (Hadida et al., 2015), has led to recognition that little is known 
ab  h  ga i a i a  e be  de e  e e   i e  i  he id  
of unfolding events (see Cunha et al., 2006, p. 326). By building on Yanow and 
T ka  i igh , a  e  a  c ide i g he c ce  ab  e ec i e e  
the next chapter will seek begin to lay the foundations for answering the above 
questions by developing a vocabulary to talk about improvisation and 
e ce i  d i g ea  i e e e ie ce  (  i ed e e ie ce) (Miner et al., 
2001, p. 316) and further refined research questions. The foundation of this 




 This chapter has permitted the opportunity to see that the different 
perspectives on improvisation illuminate certain aspects of the phenomenon 
under discussion. By doing so, each in its own way has enhanced our 
understanding of improvisation. The metaphor perspective has focused on 
highlighting the similarities between diverse fields such as those of music, 
theatre and psychology with organizational improvisation. The cognitivist 
perspective has insisted on the fact that the way individuals process situations 
affects how they improvise. Key moderators that affect information processing 
and improvisation have been identified to be memory and expectations. Finally, 
the sociomaterial perspective has specified that individuals enacting 
improvisation, do so in relation to social and/or material structures. 
 All the above perspectives have been discussed and critiqued based on 
their theoretical and methodological premises. This in turn has assisted in 
explicating their major contributions and limitations. Each of the above 
perspectives faces its own limitations and none can adequately account for 
organizational improvisation by itself. By focusing on the similarities of 
improvisation between the arts and other areas with organizations, the metaphor 
perspective does not focus on actual instances of organizational improvisation. 
As a result, the nuances of improvising within organizational settings are not 
captured. By adopting a dual processing perspective of cognition to explain how 
people can improvise, the cognitivist perspective is liable to several theoretical 
limitations. First, it relies on circular assumptions to explain how perception in 
the present is related to previous experiences. Second it maintains that 
responding to a situation entails responding to internal representations rather 
than the exigencies of the situation itself. The latter theoretical premise 
contrasts the findings of several empirical studies which highlight that the 
ability to perceive nuances particular to each situation is key to improvising. 
Lastly, the sociomaterial perspective does not account for how the individual is 
able to assimilate practice in order to enact improvisation. Improvisation is 
argued to occur in very specific instances and in many cases it is argued to occur 
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in relation to sociomaterial structures (cf., Tsoukas & Chia, 2002). However, it 
has been argued that improvisation is more pervasive than originally argued and 
that structures cannot prescribe responses. Although, Yanow and Tsoukas 
(2009) lay the foundations for a new, non-cognitive explanation of 
improvisation, there is still no consistent theoretical account of how a person 
can draw on their past experience and their actual surroundings to perceive an 
appropriate action. Specifically, the following rather broad question has 
e ai ed a e ed: h  d e  a  age  e cei e h   g    
improvise? 
Given the lack of answers to the above question, it is still relatively 
unclear how organisational members enact improvisation in relation to their 
lived experience. For the purposes of my project I will rely on a conception of 
perception and tacit knowledge deriving from strands of ecological psychology, 
phenomenology and practice theory (Gibson, 2015a; Ingold, 2002; Koffka, 
1936; Merleau-Ponty, 2012; Rietveld, 2012a). In the first two traditions, it is 
assumed that perception and knowledge: (i) do not require the association of 
distinct representations, but the perception of situations and objects as coherent 
wholes (Koffka, 1936); (ii) the person is as much a part of the structure, as the 
structure is a part of the person. The meaning of anything perceived is affected 
by its place in the nexus of both the sociomaterial context (see Dreyfus, 1991; 
Dreyfus & Taylor, 2015; Matthews, 2006). These theoretical traditions and their 
potential relevance to organizational improvisation will be discussed in detail 
in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 3: INSIDE PERCEPTION AND IMPROVISATION 
 
 
I i i e de a di g e  i  
perceptual skills that emerge, for 
each and every being, through a 
process of development in a 
historically specific environment. 
(Ingold, 2002, p. 25)  
 
"Ability affects perception: people 
see those things they can do 
something about" (Weick, 1993a) 




The purpose of this chapter is to develop a preliminary understanding of how 
improvisational action unfolds in relation to the lived experience of agents in 
ever-unfolding sociomaterial practices and unique circumstances. This is 
important because over the last years there have been calls to take into 
consideration the relation of situated action to local circumstances (Shotter & 
Tsoukas, 2011; Tsoukas & Dooley, 2011). To overcome the shortcomings of 
current terminology in talking about unfolding action, I seek to synthesize 
terminology from phenomenology, ecological psychology and practice theory.  
The synthesis allows my thesis to address the identified theoretical 
limitations of the previous approaches to studying improvisation by having 
three advantages. (i) Unlike the metaphor and cognitivist perspectives, the 
terminology of the phenomenological and practice fields is especially 
formulated for capturing the unfolding experience and the local sociomaterial 
embeddedness of agents (Shotter, 2008, 2017). (ii) Unlike cognitivist scholars, 
theorists espousing phenomenology have developed a theory of mind which is 
not reliant on association or knowledge stored in memory (Dreyfus, 2017a; 
Polanyi, 1958; Ribeiro, 2014; Rietveld, 2012b). On the contrary, accounts of 
the workings of the mind are seen to be interdependent with local circumstances 
and established social practices (Tsoukas, 2011a, pp. 455 456). (iii) Lastly, 
unlike some manifestations of the sociomaterial and cognitivist perspectives, 
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the combination of phenomenology and practice theory overcomes the duality 
between individual and structures and functionalism (Reed, 2005). This is 
because the phenomenological-cum-practice perspective assumes that agents 
are entwined with their environment by it being both a part of themselves and 
they themselves being its creators. That does not mean that the environment 
does not exist outside of people, but that it is socially interpreted and utilised 
(Dreyfus & Taylor, 2015; Holt & Mueller, 2011). As a result, agents are social 
beings who themselves are responsible for sustaining or abstaining from habits 
of behaviour depending on how they interpret the affordances of their 
environment (Rietveld, 2013). Such patterns of behaviour are seen as the 
manifestation of the structure itself.  
The chapter is organized as follows. First, I explore how the notion of 
tacit knowledge is conceptualised by improvisation scholars across all three 
perspectives. This is important for two reasons: (i) tacit knowledge in the 
previous chapter was identified as a way of overcoming disjunctive and 
functionalist dilemmas (e.g., structure/agent) (Yanow & Tsoukas, 2009), and 
(ii) many scholars have considered tacit knowledge important for improvisation 
(Batista et al., 2016). I then focus on the phenomenology of tacit knowledge  
i.e. how tacit knowledge is experienced. After explaining how tacit knowledge 
is experienced, I highlight how tacit knowledge is acquired in relation to 
participating in a sociomaterial context. This signifies how structure and agents 
are mutually constituted. After highlighting, the entwined nature of tacit 
knowledge to the sociomaterial context, I seek to create the basis of describing 
how situations are perceived and experienced by agents in terms of affordances. 
That is, how agents differentiate between aspects of their surroundings amid 
changing circumstances in order to improvise. This suggests that the agent and 
their environment are also mutually constituted. Then, I seek to clearly delineate 





3.2 Approaches to Tacit Knowledge in Relation to Improvisation 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, Yanow and Tsoukas (2009) introduce a 
phenomenological-cum-practice perspective. The theoretical underpinnings of 
this perspective allow the discussion of improvisation to overcome limitations 
of the other identified perspectives. A major component of this perspective is 
skilfulness (or, expertise/mastery). Skilfulness suggests that agents can 
improvise in relation to unfolding events insofar as agents draw upon tacit 
knowledge (or know how). For example, without expertise in fires, the 
firefighter in the Mann Gulch disaster would not had been able to improvise by 
creating an escape fire (Weick, 1993b).  
As consistently highlighted throughout the literature, skilfulness relies 
on individuals cultivating tacit knowledge (Dreyfus, 2014; Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 
2005; Ribeiro, 2014, 2017; Ribeiro & Collins, 2007; Sandberg & Pinnington, 
2009; Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2011; Tsoukas, 2011a). Tacit knowledge is 
commonly defined as knowledge agents draw upon in use, but cannot express 
in language, nor have consciousness of (Hadjimichael & Tsoukas, 2019). It 
allows practitioners to intuitively respond to situations in the event of both 
routine and non-routine occurrences (Ribeiro, 2014; Shotter, 2008, p. 513; 
Tsoukas & Vladimirou, 2001). The process through which skilfulness allows 
agents to improvise will be gradually assembled throughout the chapter. 
Researchers have established that the ability to consider contextual 
factors is key to improvising successfully (Bechky & Okhuysen, 2011; 
Kamoche & Cunha, 2001; Vera et al., 2014). This is because ac ice 
inevitably exceeds the enframing of its own procedures of order 
d c i [ hich i  ] i  a ac ica  b e  f  e e da  ife, ed 
ag a ica i  a  g d e gh f  [ he age ] e  a  ha d  
(Suchman, 2007, p. 193; Tsoukas, 1998b). Tacit knowledge, irrespectively of 
the perspective held on improvisation, is considered to be fundamental for 
improvisation (Cunha et al., 2009, p. 187). From a metaphor perspective, aci  
de a di g  a e ee   de e  h gh e e ie ce  (Bathurst & 
Williams, 2013, p. 42). For example, the more a musician performs across a 
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variety of audiences, the more able they are to draw on their experience to 
improvise. F  a c g i i i  ie , ced a  k edge f e  e e e  
aci  k edge  (Moorman & Miner, 1998b, p. 708). For instance, a teacher 
can improvise in a more time efficient manner when dealing with a student that 
forcers them away from their lesson plan (ibid., p. 709). Similarly, from a 
sociomaterial perspective, Bechky and Okhuysen (2011, p. 258) have showed 
that SWAT officers and film crews draw on collectively taken for granted 
k edge f he c a  c e   i i e. Nevertheless, most 
researchers use tacit knowledge as a peripheral construct in relation to 
improvisation (Batista et al., 2016, p. 420; Brady, 2011; Crossan et al., 2005; 
Cunha et al., 2009, 1999; Kamoche & Cunha, 2008; Kamoche et al., 2003; Vera 
& Crossan, 2005; Vera et al., 2014, p. 22) and very few have focused upon it 
(Kyriakopoulos, 2011; Moorman & Miner, 1998a, 1998b; Yanow & Tsoukas, 
2009).  
Approaches to tacit knowledge within the management literature are 
diverse and in some cases, have conflicting assumptions (for an extensive 
review see Hadjimichael & Tsoukas, 2019). For example, while some scholars 
maintain that tacit knowledge can be best described as knowledge that has not 
yet been abstracted from practice (Feller, Parhankangas, Smeds, & Jaatinen, 
2013, p. 316; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995; Nonaka, von Krogh, & Voelpel, 
2006), other scholars maintain that tacit knowledge cannot be abstracted 
because it is an inescapable feature of all knowledge (Gueldenberg & Helting, 
2007; Miller, 2008; Oborn & Dawson, 2010; Tsoukas, 2011a). Similarly, while 
some scholars maintain that tacit knowledge is a feature of individuals 
(Athanassiou & Douglas, 1999; McCloy, Campbell, & Cudeck, 1994; 
Sternberg, 1997), others argue that tacit knowledge is a feature of groups (J. S. 
Brown & Duguid, 2001; Collins, 2010; Cook & Brown, 1999). The controversy 
about the nature of tacit knowledge has affected how the construct is theorised 
in relation to improvisation. Largely two perspectives on tacit knowledge have 
infiltrated improvisation research: the (i) entitative and (ii) process. A 
discussion of both follows. 
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The Entitative perspective was popularized by Nonaka and Takeuchi 
(1995) and has proven influential as it was the foundation for the emergence of 
the knowledge-based perspective on organizations (Easterby-Smith & Lyles, 
2011; Grant, 2013; Spender & Grant, 1996). It manifests two basic 
assumptions: (i) it maintains that knowledge, can be dichotomised into two 
separate entities: tacit and explicit knowledge (see Nonaka, 1994; Nonaka & 
von Krogh, 2009; Nonaka et al., 2006); (ii) both types of knowledge are further 
refined to include the level of analysis  individual or collective (see Collins, 
2010; Cook & Brown, 1999; Kogut & Zander, 1992; Lam, 2000; Tywoniak, 
2007). Tacit knowledge at the collective level is seen as being embedded in 
social structures such as norms, whereas at the individual level it is seen to be 
part of the cognitive schemas of practitioners (Gerpott, Lehmann-Willenbrock, 
& Voelpel, 2017; Hecker, 2012). Depending on the level of analysis adopted, 
these two (i.e., tacit and explicit) or four types of knowledge (i.e., individual 
tacit, collective tacit, individual explicit and collective explicit) are seen to 
interact with each other to produce responses to situations (Collins, 2013; Cook 
& Brown, 1999; see also Moorman & Miner, 1998b). For example, to cycle one 
needs individual tacit knowledge in the form of embodied knowledge and at the 
same time collective tacit knowledge in the form of knowing the norms of 
navigating traffic in a given context (Collins, 2006). This view of tacit 
knowledge has influenced studies across improvisation perspectives discussed 
(see Baker, Miner, & Eesley, 2003; Bingham & Eisenhardt, 2011; Brady, 2011; 
Crossan et al., 2005; Cunha et al., 1999; Moorman & Miner, 1998a, 1998b; 
Pavlovich, 2003; Vera & Crossan, 2005).   
Like N aka  he  f k edge, he aj i  f i i a i  
scholars referring to knowledge, take for granted that knowledge is Janus-faced. 
That is, they distinguish knowledge in tacit knowledge (also referred to as 
procedural or skill memory) or explicit knowledge (also referred to as 
declarative or fact memory) (Moorman & Miner, 1998b, p. 708). Especially in 
the Cognitivist perspective, as discussed earlier, tacit knowledge is equated to 
procedural memory and that it produces differential responses to situations in 
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allegiance with declarative memory (which is equated to explicit knowledge) 
(Crossan et al., 2005, p. 138; Cunha & Cunha, 2003; Cunha et al., 1999, p. 321; 
Kamoche et al., 2003, p. 2045; Moorman & Miner, 1998b, p. 708; Vera et al., 
2014, p. 17). The distinction of knowledge into tacit and explicit types, 
however, is not restricted to the Cognitivist perspective. For example, in the 
Me a h  e ec i e i  i  a g ed ha  ja  icia  i e a i e he  a d 
e  ( i . e ici  k edge) f ica  g e i  (Barrett, 1998, p. 
606). Once internalized, he e e  bec e aci  and in turn allow musicians 
to improvise (ibid., p. 606). In the Sociomaterial perspective, for example, 
Brady (2011, p. 41) a g e , ha  Ge e a  Ch ik  abi i   i i e 
successfully rested on his ability to convert tacit knowledge into explicit. 
 However, the Entitative perspective has four critical issues that could 
prove detrimental to the study of organizational improvisation: (i) knowledge 
as memory thesis, (ii) disjunctive thesis and (iii) outcome orientation and 
describing improvisation in post-hoc language.  
First, as argued in section 2.3.3, knowledge and memory are not one and 
the same thing. On the contrary, if we accept this thesis then we would 
necessarily concede that agents are more responsive to information stored in 
their brains, rather than to actual situations (cf. Chia, 2002, p. 866). This would 
be contrary to a series of studies on expertise that highlight, that to be skilled is 
to be particularly sensitive to minor differences in situations (Benner et al., 
1999; Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 2005; Freeman, 1999; Ribeiro, 2014; Rietveld & 
Brouwers, 2017).  
Second and as argued in section 2.3.3, this perspective like the 
organizational memory approach, advocates that tacit knowledge is separable 
to explicit knowledge. However, this is a false epistemological dichotomy 
(Tsoukas, 2005, pp. 384 386). Both tacit and explicit knowledge are mutually 
constituted. For example, one cannot cycle by only being aware of certain facts 
such as the equation describing balancing on bicycles - one needs to practice 
cycling to know how to do so (Tsoukas, 2011a). Similarly, to understand the 
equation describing balancing on a bicycle one must already know how to make 
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e e f a he a ica  e a i . The i e e a i  f fac  ece a i  e ie  
on a socially embedded agent who has developed the ability to judge the 
relevance of facts to each situation; the latter necessarily relies on tacit 
knowledge (Ribeiro & Collins, 2007). As argued by Polanyi (1966a, p. 7): 
Whi e aci  k edge ca  be e ed b  i e f, e ici  k edge  
rely on being tacitly understood and applied. Hence all knowledge is either tacit 
 ed i  aci  k edge. A h  e ici  k edge i  hi kab e.  The 
above suggest that tacit knowledge is the ontological basis of any explicit 
knowledge, and hence it would be erroneous to consider tacit and explicit 
knowledge in terms of equivalence. 
Moreover, by viewing knowledge as a separable entity, this suggests an 
acceptance of the objectivist premise (Chia, 2002; Shotter, 2008; Tsoukas, 
1997). That is, that knowledge, people, and social norms are primarily distinct 
entities which interact thanks to quasi-causal relationships. But as argued in 
section 2.5.1, if one concedes this thesis, it is tantamount to admitting that 
people, social norms and knowledge are not embedded in discursive practices 
(Taylor, 1995, Chapter 4). In turn this raises the question of how people endow 
what they see with meaning given that they are lone information-processors? A 
theoretical dilemma may lead to two problematic possibilities: (i) solipsism 
(doubting whether reality exists outside the self) (Nagel, 1987, p. 11) and (ii) 
a a chic e a i i  ( k edge i  ha e e  e i agi e ) (Spender, 2008, p. 
170). Both features have been shown to be impossibilities (Wittgenstein, 1986, 
§243-271) 
Finally, by offering explanations of tacit knowledge that rely on quasi-
causal relationships, what is highlighted are general rules posited after the event 
of action (Shotter, 2005b). Such accounts as argued throughout the previous 
chapter overlook how action takes place in the midst of unfolding circumstances 
(Sa dbe g & Da A ba, 2009; Sa dbe g & T ka , 2011). As Shotter (2017, 
p. 232) ha  i ed a  each e  i hi  a h a  i a i , he i a i ,   
eak, a k  back   , f  a  e ake each e ,   a e e  ibi i ie  
opened up, while previously unexplored ones are shut down, but the new 
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circumstance stands before us like a question, requiring us to act into it with our 
a e i g e e . B   ca i g h  e  ibi i ie  e  , h  
he  a e h  d  a d h  ac i i e  a e  ci c a ce  i  he 
moment  e ack a de c i i  f he c e f i a ed ac i  (Holt & 
Cornelissen, 2014, p. 536; Suchman, 2007, p. 122).  
The Process perspective on tacit knowledge is less widespread and 
theoretically underexplored in improvisation; however, it appears to have the 
tools to address how people respond to the singularities of situations as it does 
not attempt to offer post-hoc analyses of situations. Except for Batista and 
colleagues (2016, p. 419) and Yanow and Tsoukas (2009, pp. 1349 1350), it 
has hardly been utilised to specifically study improvisation.  
A Process view of tacit knowledge suggests that it is not a form of 
memory, but a form of subsidiary perception. Namely, the non-focal awareness 
of a partially (sometimes) articulable understanding that informs actions. An 
e a e f hi  i  Ribei  (2014, p. 566) account of how workers at a nickel 
mine have the ability to perceive the moment at which the furnaces of the plant 
have an over proportionate amount of slag inside. Such situations pose risks to 
the equipment and the workers themselves. Experienced operators can identify 
such situations by perceiving nuances i  he e e  f he a k  e i ed 
by the furnace. Inexperienced operators and visitors do not have this ability. 
Moreover, the experienced operators themselves cannot explain exactly how 
they are able to do so. They gain this ability by spending weeks looking at the 
jet.   
I  c a   he E i a i e e ec i e, he P ce  e ec i e  c e 
assumptions maintain that tacit knowledge: (i) is not an entity, but a perceptual 
ce  ha  de ie  a  i e ac i  i hi  age  e i e s and (ii) is the 
basis for explicit knowledge (Gueldenberg & Helting, 2007; Miller, 2008; 
Polanyi, 1961; Tsoukas, 2011a). In other words, this perspective maintains that 
tacit knowledge is not a set of internalized facts that are selectively drawn upon. 
As will be further elaborated below, the process perspective illustrates that tacit 
knowledge is tantamount to perceiving nuances. The latter occurs through 
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socialization in practice. These assumptions overcome both the critical issues 
identified above as part of the Entitative perspective and the dichotomy of 
structure and agent as discussed in the previous chapter (section 2.5.1).  
The controversies and limitations identified in both Chapter 2 and this 
section, in combination with the promise and underutilisation of the process 
perspective for understanding improvisation through tacit knowledge, signify 
that there is a need for further theoretical development that can overcome the 
limitations identified. To do so, the next section seeks to build on the insights 
from Yanow and Tsoukas (2009) and the Process perspective on tacit 
knowledge. 
 
3.3 Tacit Knowledge as Indwelling: The Basis of Significance and 
Action 
 
Following from the above, tacit knowledge, in the organizational improvisation 
literature, has largely been portrayed as an entity instead of a process unfolding 
in real time (more about this later). Tacit knowledge is fundamental to 
understanding improvisation because responding to situations entails the 
utilisation of know how (Hadjimichael & Tsoukas, 2019). In order to 
operationalise tacit knowledge for my study I will first seek to synthesize 
accounts of the construct that do not see it as a static body of knowledge, but as 
an ever-unfolding perceptual process (Polanyi, 1965; see also Tsoukas, 2011a). 
I hope to unpack the black box of how people are able to perceive and respond 
to their surroundings in the midst of action by employing an approach that is 
e i i e  he a ic a , he ca , a d he i e  a d a e    he i ce a  
creation of novelty by sentient, embodied, situated, reflexive, and responsive 
beings; and emphasizes both the open-endedness of processes and human praxis 
 ha e he  (Shotter & Tsoukas, 2011, p. 335). This will allow me to begin 
to refine the research question of the study (i.e., how do agents enact 
improvisation) by beginning to craft a vocabulary that can encapsulate the 
situated nature of improvisation (Shotter, 2017). 
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In developing the concept of tacit knowledge, Michael Polanyi1 outlines 
that it can be understood to be comprised of four interdependent dimensions; 
(i) the functional, (ii) the phenomenal, (iii) the semantic and (iv) the ontological 
(Grene, 1969, pp. xiv xv; Polanyi, 1966b, Chapter 1). However, it should be 
stressed that all dimensions are not rooted in an isolated subject, but in an 
embodied subject who in turn is embedded in sociomaterial practices (Polanyi, 
1958, p. 209). A discussion of each dimension follows. 
The functional dimension refers to the notion that a person can pay 
attention to something, but can only do so by relying on other indications that 
one is unaware of (Polanyi, 1965). According to Polanyi (1966b, Chapter 1), 
this can be explained by conceiving that one has two different types of 
awareness. Both of these form the functional dimension, and are called the 
subsidiary and the focal. Focal awareness refers to what one is focusing on 
while perceiving. Subsidiary awareness refers to what is in the fringe of their 
focal awareness.  
One is not aware of subliminal awareness because it is formed by relying 
on two types of stimuli; the subliminal and marginal (Polanyi & Prosch, 1977, 
pp. 38 39). Subliminal stimuli are indications which cannot be sensed directly 
(Polanyi, 1966a). For example, in order to see something in the dark, one can 
 d   b  e i g  he hif  f he i e f e  i  de e di g  he 
lighting conditions. Marginal stimuli are also indications which one relies on in 
order to focus on something else, but one could revert their attention to them if 
they chose so (Polanyi, 1965). For instance, consider peripheral vision, when 
one is observing something it is always part of a background we do not pay 
attention to - like looking at a painting on a wall, one focuses on the painting 
but not on the background which is the wall. If one wanted to, they could shift 
their attention to the background (i.e. the wall) but that would also be a part of 
another background (i.e. the section of the room).  
 
1 Polanyi affirmed that he was furthering Merleau-P  (2012) account of perception and 
knowledge (Polanyi, 1965, pp. 807 808, 1969, p. 222) as being embedded in both the body 
and the sociohistorical context (Grene, 1969 p. xi; Nye, 2013, p. xv, 262; Polanyi, 1958, 
p.212). 
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Both subsidiary and focal awareness, apart from enabling a subjec  
perception of a visual field, also necessarily enable and underlie social 
phenomena such as reading, communicating or learning (Polanyi, 1966b, p. 5; 
Polanyi & Prosch, 1977, p. 35). Take for example reading. When one reads a 
sentence, one depends on both subliminal stimuli (e.g., motion of pupils) and 
marginal stimuli (e.g., grammatical structure) to be focally aware of the 
sente ce  ea i g. H e e , e c d hif  hei  f c   he g a a ica  
structure (marginal stimulus and new focal object), but that would imply that 
one is no longer attending to the meaning (original focal object) of the sentence. 
Following the above, it appears that in order to perceive something, we attend 
from our subsidiary awareness to the object of our focal awareness.  It should 
be stressed that subsidiary awareness is by no means an unconscious process. 
Instead it should be conceived as not being in the epicentre of our attention 
(Polanyi, 1969, p. 194; Polanyi & Prosch, 1977, p. 39).  
However, one does not experience these two types of awareness as 
separate but as a cohesive whole. The integration of the aforementioned 
awareness is referred to as the phenomenal dimension of tacit knowledge 
(Polanyi, 1966b, p. 11). Following the example of reading, for one to be able to 
read one should have already personally put effort into understanding language 
and interpreting its symbols (see Polanyi, 1958, Chapter 7, 1961). Therefore, 
hi e eadi g, e  e ce i  aci  i eg a e  hei  b di  f c i  (e.g., 
eye movements), their understanding of the language and its symbols in order 
to be able to focus on the meaning of what is being read. So, when one masters 
reading, one does not focus on the symbols or the sounds they make when 
articulated. On the contrary, one attends from the markings to what is being 
e e ed. A  ch, i  T ka  (2011a, p. 461) words, the phenomenal 
di e i  i  he a f a i  f b idia  e e ie ce  hich gi e  i e  
a e  he e a  i ed e  e e ie ce .   
As the processes of both the functional and phenomenal dimensions 
seem to occur simultaneously, a person is only aware of the meaning of this 
integration. This gives rise to the semantic dimension (Polanyi, 1966b, p. 13). 
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To perceive an entity as coherent entails grasping "the meaning of its features" 
(ibid.). I  he  d , i ead f ki g a  e e data, that is, patches of light 
a d c , e ca  ee he he e gica  ea i g f he e e da a 
(Polanyi, 1962a, p. 619). The markings on a paper do not have meaning in 
he e e . The ca aci   ee bjec  i  ac i ed b  ai i g The 
a ic a  f e ce i ha e he di i c i e ec ia i  f bei g jec ed 
f  he i e i  f he b d  i  he ace ide i  (Polanyi, 1961, p. 461).  
Ribeiro (2014, p. 560) illustrates this point beautifully with an example 
of how the light of candle changes its appearance for a child (see also Merleau-
Ponty, 2012, p. 52). Prior to experiencing the light of a candle, the child is 
attracted to it. In fact, the child may even reach for it. Upon reaching, the child 
feels the burn and as a result the light of the candle becomes repulsive. As a 
e , he ac ica  ig ifica ce  f he igh  f  he chi d  a ife  i e f 
after exploration (Ribeiro, 2014, p. 560). The light is no longer a patch of light 
and colour, devoid of significance - with experience the light of a candle has a 
meaning. As such, the child learns to attend from the light of the candle to one 
of its meanings - heating or burning. Hence, one is focally aware of what one is 
perceiving through the semantic integration of the subsidiary elements that 
de ie e  f c  (Polanyi & Prosch, 1977, p. 35). This is a feature of all 
skilful action.  
Therefore, in any skilful act a person relies on tacitly integrating 
subsidiary elements (including past experience) in order to attend from them, 
to their joint meaning (Polanyi, 1961, p. 463). To see something as meaningful 
requires seeing something against a background of meaningful particulars 
(ibid.). For example, consider a blind person that uses a stick to detect obstacles 
in his/her path (Dreyfus, 1991, p. 65). Over time s/he learned to be aware of the 
feelings the tool (subsidiary element) evokes on their hands, in terms of its use 
- whether the path is clear (focal element). If s/he reflected on the stick, s/he 
would not be able to apprehend its meaning. This signifies that when the person 
thinks about the stick, s/he is alienated from the meaning the stick offers for 
walking. This is because s/he changes the background against which s/he is 
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perceiving. That is, s/he is focusing on the subsidiary aspects previously taken 
f  g a ed, ch a  he ick  a i ie  (i.e., heavy, smooth) (Polanyi, 1969, 
pp. 147 148). Thus, reflecting on a tool or on an action, leads to a breakdown 
(see Yanow & Tsoukas, 2009), which stops fluent performance of a skill.  
Hence, tacit knowledge is grounded in non-reflectiveness but is the basis 
of intelligibility even when one is reflective. This illustrates the final dimension 
of tacit knowledge, the ontological. The ontological dimension denotes that 
aci  k edge i  a k edge f  - it is not an independent entity that exists 
in a void (Polanyi, 1966b, p. 13). Polanyi (1961, 1962a, 1965) explains what he 
ea  b  hi  b  efe i g  indwelling2 . The latter refers to the integration 
of the subsidiary and focal components which allows the perception of 
ea i g. H e e , i  hi  d , i d e i g cc  he  e  e e  
into [objects, conceptual or artefactual] and assimilate them as part of 
e e  i  de   a e d  he ea i g he  e ke3 (Polanyi, 1966b, p. 15, 
1969, p. 147; Polanyi & Prosch, 1977, p. 36). Therefore, indwelling relies on 
e  ersonal experience within a social milieu (Polanyi, 1961, 1966b, p. 17). 
B  d e i g i  e  e e ie ce, bjec  ch a  he igh  f ca d e , c ibb e  
on pages are spontaneously presented as meaningful. This illustrates that, in 
de   a ici a e i  a  de a di g, e  fi  d e  i  e  b d  i  
order to attend to meaning. This signifies that embodiment is primary and 
inseparable to acquiring any knowledge and perceiving any meaning (Polanyi, 
1966b, p. 15, 1969, p. 147; Polanyi & Prosch, 1977, p. 36; Todes, 2001, p. 88).  
Understanding tacit knowledge in terms of indwelling allows one to 
begin to talk about improvisation in strong process terms (Langley & Tsoukas, 
2017), disentangle knowledge from memory and to place a stronger emphasis 
 age  lived experience of improvising (see Fisher & Barrett, 2019). This is 
 
2 Thi  e  i  efe ed  a  ch i a i  b  Ribei  (2014, 2017) by drawing on 
Merleau-Ponty (2012) a d a a  f bei g  b  Sa dbe g a d Pi i g  (2009) by drawing 
on Heidegger (2013). 
3 Thi  e  i  i i a   Heidegge  (2013, pp. 97 98) term of equipment (see also Dreyfus, 
1991, p. 62; Lamprou, 2017; Riemer & Johnston, 2014; Sa dbe g & Da A ba, 2009).   
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because tacit knowledge (Ribeiro, 2014) and improvisation (Miner et al., 2001, 
p. 316) are understood to be contingent on real time perceptual experience. For 
example, going back to the example of the improvisation of jazz musicians  
they rely on the functional dimension of tacit knowledge. Specifically, they rely 
on both subsidiary and focal awareness. Subsidiary awareness comprises of 
musical distinctions, embodied senses (e.g., listening, seeing, feeling). Focal 
awareness focuses on playing their musical instrument, the actions of the other 
band members and the responses of the audiences. Both types of awareness are 
not experienced and made sense of separately. On the contrary, they are 
presented in terms of both the phenomenal and semantic dimensions of tacit 
knowledge. That is, jazz musicians are simultaneously aware of all the 
subsidiary particulars in terms of the meaning evoked as part of their focal 
awareness (i.e., how their band members are playing and what the audience 
demands). Finally, attending from all the latter gives rise to the ontological 
dimension. Dwelling in the meaning evoked by the subsidiary particulars, 
allows the musicians to be responsive to the situation, which in turn allows them 
to improvise in a manner that is aligned with contextual nuances (such as the 
crowd, tune and roles in band).  
 
3.4 The Pre-Requisites for Indwelling: Educating Perception 
through Experience 
Above, I have discussed the four entwined dimensions of the ability to 
indwell and as such perceive significance. Because the perceptual field does not 
have inherent meaning without experience (Polanyi, 1962a, p. 619; Ribeiro, 
2014, p. 561), there are two underlying requirements for indwelling: (i) 
a ici a i g i  a P ac ice (aka f  f ife ) a d (ii) bec i g e e ie ced i  
participating in a Practice (Nicolini, 2011; Tsoukas, 2018b; see also 
Wittgenstein, 1986, §19). I  P a i  (1958, p. 209) d  e ca  eak 
of a scie ific fac , f a d, f a e   a b i g cha i ;  a  eek  
murder or the Queen of England; of money or music or the fashion in hats, of 
what is just or unjust, trivial, amusing, boring or scandalous, without implying 
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a reference to a consensus by which these matters are acknowledged  or 
de ied . He ce, P a i (1958, p. 216) holds that participating in a community 
is what endows actions and the whole environment in general with meaning 
(see also Castoriadis, 2007; MacIntyre, 2007; Merleau-Ponty, 1964, pp. 24 26; 
Taylor, 1995, Chapter 4; Wittgenstein, 1986). One must attend from a pre-
de a di g f hei  ci a e ia  d  to perceive the focal - otherwise 
everything would be unintelligible (Castoriadis, 2007; Dreyfus, 2017a, 
Chapters 1 & 2; MacIntyre, 2007; Schatzki, 2005; Taylor, 1995, Chapter 4). As 
improvisation is tied to attending from the nuances of situations, understanding 
the two requirements of indwelling can help shed light on improvisation. Both 
requirements for indwelling are discussed in turn. 
3.4.1 Participation in Practice 
What is a Practice and how does experiencing it yield such a mystical 
power to endow meaning to what people perceive? Phenomenologically 
informed research allows us to answer this question clearly without relying on 
the duality of structure - agent (Freeman, 1999; Kiverstein & Wheeler, 2012; 
Radman, 2012; Stewart, Gapenne, & Di Paolo, 2010; Varela et al., 1991). Both 
point to the fact that by participating in a community, people learn to intuitively 
share similar (i) conceptual/normative distinctions, (ii) valences (what is 
considered valuable) and (iii) emotions. Each will elaborated in turn below. 
Conceptual/Normative Distinctions. Haugeland (2013, p. 3), a 
Heideggerian philosopher, maintains that people are a c i -
a ici a i g a i a . C i ie  a e cha ac e i ed b  c f i ,  a  
Heidegger (2000, p. 197) b  a e , adhe e ce  he dic a hi  f he 
b ic ea . C f i  does not only consist of people imitating each other, 
but also of censoring both themselves and others. That is, the tendency people 
possess to approve of similar behaviour and at the same time, suppress and 
disapprove of variation. Over time due to this peer pressure, variation is 
supressed and as a result the behavioural dispositions of the members of the 
community become ever more similar. This aggregation of the behavioural 
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dispositions due to conformism, forms norms (Dreyfus, 2017a, p. 23; 
Haugeland, 2013, p. 4).  
Norms are dispositions passed on from person to person, generation to 
generation that dictate what is behaviourally feasible or acceptable. Behaviour 
deviating from norms, is not only considered peculiar but unacceptable  it 
c e  i h a ig a a  i  i  e hi g  a e  ed  d . H wever, 
a  Ha ge a d e ha i e  i  i  c cia  ha  ha  ge  a i ed a e , ic  
speaking, actual instances of behaviour bur rather dispositions to behave, 
contingent on the circumstances  (Ha ge a d, .5, e ha i  added). 
Understanding norms becomes our understanding (Dreyfus, 2017a)  it 
bec e  hack ed   b  eei g he d i  he c  e ica  a  
(Holt & Cornelissen, 2014, p. 537),  de e i g a i h e e  (Arendt, 
1978, p. 50). For example, the Mann Gulch firefighters took it for granted that 
hei  j b a     ha  he  h gh   be he 10 c ck fi e. I  fac , i  
was so taken for granted that when there were signs that the fire of a different 
type, they did not know how to respond (Holt & Cornelissen, 2014; Weick, 
1993b) 
To discriminate between circumstances and types of behaviours, agents 
need a set of categories to arrange these into sorts and use these categories 
consistently with each other (Gabriel, 2003; Haugeland, 2013, p. 6). E e  
while our thoughts are of things and not of language, we are aware of language 
in all thinking (so far as our thinking surpasses that of the animals) and can 
neither have these thoughts without language, nor understand language without 
de a di g he hi g   hich e a e d i  ch h gh  (Polanyi, 1958, 
p. 101). C ide  Wi ge ei  (1986, §293) beetle in the box thought 
experiment4. A g  f e e ha e a b  i  hich he  ha e a bee e . B  
 e ca  ee i ide a he  e  b . De i e he a e , hi  d e   
hi de  e e f  a ki g ab  bee e  i  a ea i gf  a . Thi  i  beca e 
the shared public meaning of beetle is tempered by how people use the term 
 
4 A  efe ed  a  he P i a e La g age A g e  
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(see also Wittgenstein, 1986, §19). Although, others cannot see my beetle  to 
communicate about it I do not have any other choice than to use words that we 
can all understand.  
As it has been mentioned above, the understanding of something is based 
on how the thing is referred to. If I created my own language, no one would be 
able to understand what I am trying to say. Thus, beetle or any other verbal 
meaning is restricted to the public meaning of our language  that is how we 
learn from each other to talk about things (Taylor, 1995; Wittgenstein, 1986). 
As Edwards (1997, p. 242) i e , ha ed c ce a  ca eg ie  a e 
e a i e i  di c e  a d a e he ba i  f a hi g e ca  a  (e.g., child  
mother). Using these categories allows people to simultaneously explain, 
narrate, manage accountability and orient awareness. That is, they are used to 
establish the existence of named objects and various significations in behaviour 
and the physical word. Without the invention of categorising things into sorts, 
people would not be able to establish the existence of the significances 
distinguished in virtue of categorising them in given sorts (ibid., p.243). Which 
in turn would not allow to deem what i  a  a d ab a . I  Wi ge ei  
(1986, §242) d  if a g age i   be a ea  f c ica i  he e  
be agreement not only in definitions but also (queer as this may sound) in 
j dge e .  
Using an example from Haugeland (2013, p. 6), e  c ide  
normativity and shared categorisation in a chess community. Players need to 
know which piece is which (e.g., king, queen, pawn), what squares and 
directions are, as well as what counts as a move. A king has a designated starting 
position, it can move in any direction, but only one square at a time. It must be 
a a  ec ed, i  ca  g   a  e da ge ed  a e a d if i  i  
compromised you lose the game. From this, one can construe that the king as 
well as all the other pieces are involved in a variety of norms (e.g., how a king 
ought to move, how it is supposed to be protected). All of which are identifiable 
thanks to being categorised in sorts, that are interrelated (e.g., allowed 
movement, starting position are always in relation to the movements of the other 
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iece ). A  ha  i  i ed i  a  i e e a ed  ca  be de d 
a  a e  (ibid. .6). I  he  d , e  a e a ig e  ha  defi e ha  a 
thing/person is, based on the way they are supposed to behave or be used (ibid., 
p.36). 
Notice that chess is playable thanks to people conforming to utilising 
shared conceptual categories and behaving in agreement to a host of norms and 
roles (Stavrakakis, 2008, pp. 1039 1041). If one deviates, they are marginalised 
as a cheater or someone who does not know how to play chess (see also Lok & 
De Rond, 2013). This sort of conformism, use of categorization and censorship 
can be observed in all social engagements. In the army, if you are a private you 
salute the sergeant, and if you are a sergeant you salute the officer, or else there 
are repercussions. The debtor is supposed to repay their creditor thanks to the 
norm of ownership  if not there are consequences (e.g., indictment). Under 
normal circumstances in most Westernised countries, the government is given 
power by the citizens thanks to the norm of democracy  otherwise there are 
consequences. 
Roles and norms are not, however, restricted only to how people behave. 
People attribute roles and norms to tools too (Dreyfus, 2017a, Chapter 1; 
Haugeland, 2013). Spanners, screwdrivers, hammers, gearboxes, breaks, 
b e , e gi e  a e a  i e e a ed i  a e  f i e i ed e , i i ed 
b  he  f he ac ice f e gi ee i g. B eak  a e f  i g d  
vehicles, a hammer is for hammering, a screwdriver is for screwing, a bonnet is 
for protecting the engine of a car. The reference to each other and to the practice 
a  a h e i  ha  ake  he  ha  he  a e  a d a  a e  ha  he  a e 
f  (Dreyfus, 1991; Haugeland, 2013, p. 6; Taylor, 1995). Each element of a 
practice has traces of the other elements  thus to invoke something is to also 
invoke the totality of elements that constitute a Practice. A Practice necessarily 
refers not only to itself and its constituents but also to the rest of the practices 
of a context (Dreyfus & Taylor, 2015; Nicolini, 2012; Taylor, 1995). That is 
because, something is what is because it is not what it is not. And we have seen 
that what thing is for, is because of the ways in which it is normal to be used or 
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do (Wittgenstein, 1986, §19). Therefore, the totality of Practice (i.e., the 
e a i a i  be ee  , e i e  a d e ) i  d bbed a  he efe e ia  
e  f ig ifica ce  (Haugeland, 2013, p. 7), or more laconically, 
ig ifica ce5  (Dreyfus, 2017a, p. 28). 
The above discussion suggests that improvisation should be viewed as a 
socially embedded practice (like the sociomaterial perspective), not a subjective 
mental process (unlike the cognitivist perspective). Unlike certain studies that 
elevate either the cognitive (e.g., Bechky & Okhuysen, 2011) or the material 
(e.g., Baker & Nelson, 2005) aspects of the social context for improvising, the 
above discussion allows us to see that social and material aspects are mutually 
constituted. This in turn indicates that sociomaterial aspects must be discussed 
in tandem when explaining improvisation. To enact bricolage (i.e., to join 
resources together) relies on drawing on existing conventions to understand 
what material aspects are for and how they can be used (see Baker & Nelson, 
2005). Similarly, for members of SWAT teams to improvise by switching roles 
they must necessarily know how to operate the material equipment that is 
relevant to each role based on norms (see Bechky & Okhuysen, 2011). 
Valence. Significance has a dual meaning. The first as explained above, 
is the meaning something has on the virtue of its social use. The second is the 
reason something is valued (i.e., its valence). But how is valence linked to 
practice (i.e., enacting roles in the normal way) and why do agents largely 
conform to it? As Castoriadis (2005b, p. 25) was at pains to point out, people 
do not accord with norms or take action just for the sake of it. This would reduce 
the complexity of the human condition to a form of functionalism, where 
significance is determined prior to history (Castoriadis, 2005b, p. 34; see also 
Dreyfus & Taylor, 2015, p. 150; Harari, 2014). As Nicolini and Monteiro (2017, 
p. 112) ecif , ac ice   ac i e e e he  ga i ed a d a  e d  
bjec . F  e a e d i g he 16th and 17th century, Western Europe was 
largely consumed by religious fervour which legitimized feudal lords as 
 
5 Heidegge  efe   i  a  ich g , he ea  Cha e  Ta  (1995, .77) efe   i  a  he 
c ea i g . 
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sovereigns (Toulmin, 1992, Chapter 2). In modern Western Europe sovereignty 
has passed fr  he bi i   he a i  (Anastasiou, 2008, Chapter 2; 
Toulmin, 1992, p. 97). I   he a i  i   a g ea  e e  c ed b  a  
ec cie ific  a i a e (i.e., leveraging scientific knowledge to increase 
economic growth) where value free accounts of phenomena are ascribed value 
and which in turn are thought to offer leverage to sustain and expand the growth 
of the economy, which in turn is expected to increase the prosperity of the 
a i  a  a h e (Castoriadis, 2005a, pp. 83 84; Harari, 2014; Komlosy, 
2018, p. 25; Varoufakis, 2013, 2018).   
From this brief description of the orientations of people in different 
epochs located in the same geographical area, one can construe that people 
beha e i  he a  he  d  beca e c i ie  c ea e a e  ha  a i e 
a d di ec  h a  i e  b  c di i i g e e  acce  ce ai  ig ifica i  
a  h  a d e  (Castoriadis, 2005b, p. 25; see also Komlosy, 2018). As 
such like language, roles and norms - significations do not exist a priori (Chia 
& Rasche, 2010). Valence (or signification) is socially created, normative and 
incessantly re-enacted in practice (Gehman et al., 2013). Language and 
practices (which consist of roles and norms) are instituted as the tools at the 
disposal of agents to attain what is of significance (Klein Jr, 2015).  
MacIntyre (2007) efe   ha  ac ice be  a e , a  g d . 
As Tsoukas (2018b, p. 9) noted, the MacInterian conception of Practice is 
b ad  a ig ed  i h he e i  ed i  ga i a i a  he  (see Beadle 
& Moore, 2006; Feldman & Orlikowski, 2011; Moore, 2017; Sandberg & 
Tsoukas, 2011). In an analysis of what Practice is, MacIntyre (2007, p. 187) 
i a e  ha  i  i  a c he e  a d c e  f  f cia  e ab i hed 
cooperative human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity 
are realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence 
hich a e a ia e , a d a ia  defi i i e f, ha  f  f ac i i . T  
be a part of a Practice, people necessarily need to accept the value of its internal 
goods and to attain them, they need to conform to its standards which will be 
used to judge their performance. (ibid., p.190). Internal goods are goods which 
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cannot be acquired in any other way except from practicing in a specific way 
(Tsoukas, 2018b, p. 9; Yanow & Tsoukas, 2009, p. 1347). For example, the joy 
a potter feels when s/he makes a fine piece of pottery. Of course, Practice also 
has external goods such as money and fame. The difference of the latter is that 
they can be attained by being part of any Practice, whereas internal goods are 
specific to a Practice. However, as a number of scholars have argued 
subordinating a Practice to external goods is corrosive to the practice itself 
(MacIntyre, 2007; Tsoukas, 2018b; Yanow & Tsoukas, 2009). Therefore, 
Practice is always tied to a significance (i.e., valence) -  the goods (both internal 
a d e e a ) a e he ig ifica i  ha  d i e e e  c f   he i it of 
hei  age . 
The h gh  f e e a idab  bea  he a  f [ hei ] age a d 
ge g a h  (Foucault, 2005, p. xvi). According to Haugeland (2013, pp. 44
45), the thought of individuals is immersed in the referential nexus of 
significance, they intuitively perceive these three things about their percept: (i) 
a  a  f i e e i g, (ii) a  c ai   ha  i  ib e a d 
(iii) a ge e a     acce  a  e a hi g ha  d be i ib e . 
This is because a practice evokes significa i . The a e  ake   
i edia e  ec g i e a gi e  he e  a  a he e ake   
immediately classify in this period objects, books, instruments, sentences of 
which we would otherwise know nothing and at the same time makes us 
immediately e c de a  i fi i e be  f he  (Castoriadis, 2005b, p. 45). 
I  gi e  i e  he i a e  e i e ce f a  i fi i e e  f ibi i ie  a d 
f a  i fi i e e  f i ibi i ie  gi e  i edia e b  c f i g  
e hi g ike he i i  f he e  (ibid., .46). I  he  d , dwelling 
in Practice is the home of meaning  it is what makes things appear as 
something that is for something and to be used in specific ways (see Dreyfus, 
2017a, p. 28; Taylor, 1995, Chapter 4). It simultaneously opens and closes 
windows for action.  
Consider the example of a medical student (Polanyi, 1958; Tsoukas, 
2011a). The medical student, has grown up in a society that has a (pre)-
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understanding of what a hospital and modern medicine are. This is thanks to 
participating in a community that has both such things and developed 
conceptual categories to designate what they are for. The student knows that 
hospitals are for treating people that are unwell by using scientifically tested 
methods - not for other purposes such as organizing raves with their friends. If 
someone was to assert the opposite, the student would probably consider the 
other person i a e. S , if i  he de  ac ice he e e e  ch hi g  a  
hospitals, doctors, nurses, scalpels, stethoscopes or the practice of modern 
medicine and science, how could the student choose to become a doctor? There 
would be no meaning to such a thing, because the whole referential nexus of 
meanings derived by participating in one way or another in modern medicine 
would be missing. Thus, the discussion in this section signifies that when agents 
improvise, they tend to do so for the sake of something they value. As discussed 
in the previous chapter, this aspect of improvisation has been severely 
overlooked because of the prominence of functionalist assumptions (see 
Visscher et al., 2018). 
Emotions. Practices are teleo-affective . Indeed, emotion  connote 
e d  a d jec  affec i e  (Nicolini, 2012, p. 166; see also Nicolini & 
Monteiro, 2017; Schatzki, 1997, p. 304). In other words, emotions are integral 
to learning and participating in a Practice (Benner et al., 1999, p. 15). This is 
because by participating in a Practice, agents learn to care about significations 
and as a result they are affectively moved by them (Tsoukas, 2018b, p. 2). That 
is, agents learn to feel good when they perform well or to feel disappointment 
when they make errors (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986b). Knowledge of what is of 
significance, sterile of emotion, is not enough for agents to conform to normal 
interpretations of situations and thus perceive what the right thing is to do 
during action  emotion is a pre-requisite (Damasio, 1994; Frijda, 2007, 2010a, 
2010b). The bjec  f a  e i  i  i e f affec i e  a i e  a d e i  
is intimately tied to judgement, said philosopher Robert Solomon (1973, p. 78). 
As a result, emotions also play a key role in sustaining the significations of good 
practice (Benner et al., 1999, p. 17), as well as interacting with equipment 
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appropriately (Lamprou, 2017). Thi  i  beca e e i  c  e  d 
(see Dreyfus, 1991; Heidegger, 2013). 
Emotion as an aid to judgement, and by extension action, has not gone 
unnoticed in organizational psychology and is referred to as emotional 
intelligence (for a comprehensive review see Ashkanasy & Dorris, 2017). Meta-
analytic results suggest that emotional intelligence offers incremental validity 
over cognitive ability and personality when it comes to predicting job 
performance (O B e, H h e , P ack, Ha e , & S , 2011). 
Therefore, emotion is seen as way of assisting people to make distinctions and 
judge appropriate courses of actions (Ashkanasy & Daus, 2005; Colombetti, 
2010; Goleman, 2004, 2006; Mayer & Salovey, 1995). Research highlights that 
emotional intelligences offers the ability (i) to monitor one's own and others' 
emotions, (ii) to discriminate among them, and (iii) to use the information to 
g ide e'  hi ki g a d ac i  (Mayer & Salovey, 1993, p. 433).   
Thi  i  a ig ed  Pa  Ek a  (1973) findings that suggest that people 
i i i e  c   hei  c i  e i  e . E i  e  a e aci  
taken for granted ways of etiquette of a community, that members are expected 
to maintain. Appropriate comportment is learned on the basis of growing up or 
spending time in a community. Ekman (ibid.) identified two types: (i) feeling 
and (ii) display rules. Both of which are argued to guide comportment. The 
former relates to what type and intensity of emotion one ought to feel under 
certain circumstances, whereas the latter relates to how much one can express 
themselves in different situations. As mentioned above, being able to judge how 
to behave is called emotional intelligence. But regulating one  e e   
c f   ha  i  e ec ed ba ed  e  e, i  efe ed  a  e i a  
labour (Hochschild, 2003). For example, for police investigators it is accepted 
that they can feel and display a certain extent of hostility at work (Holman, 
Martinez-Iñigo, & Totterdell, 2008, p. 302). This is not true for cabin crew on 
planes. Cabin crew are expected not to show any hostility despite potentially 
feeling that way towards a passenger (Hochschild, 2003). 
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Following the above, Solomon (2007, p. 21) maintains that emotions are 
the product of habitual practice and consist of skilled judgements learned by 
being part of a community. I  he  d , he  a e  j  echa i  b  
the result of learning to cope with the world in ways that are in relation to norms 
and roles (ibid. p.24). By a person dwelling in norms, enacting specific roles 
and knowing the significance of things, s/he develops expectations about how 
other people ought to behave. When people surpass, meet or fall short of these 
expectations, the situation is rarely encountered indifferently (see Colombetti, 
2010, p. 148). Judgement is enjoined with emotion. For example, anger is the 
judgement that a person was treated unjustly (Solomon, 2007, p.14). Guilt is 
the judgement that a person has violated a higher authority (ibid., p.97). Fear is 
the judgement that one is in danger (ibid., p. 32). In fact, guilt and fear can be 
eac i   he e ia  e e c i  f d i g e hi g g  a d 
i g e e  a ge . The ef e, e i  a e   j dge e  
about the world but also mechanisms for maintaining conformity to the social 
order (see Stavrakakis, 2008).  
But emotions are more than that too  he  c i e ea i  b  
appraising and valuing it in a specific way (see Colombetti, 2010; Komporozos-
Athanasiou & Thompson, 2015; Shotter & Tsoukas, 2014a). For example, 
a ge  ake  he e  a  h  e i  a g  a ea  a  i f ia i g. The ha ed 
e  a ea  a  ha ef  (Solomon, 2007, p. 162). A dangerous situation is 
presented as fearful. In other words, the circumstances one faces, evoke 
intuitive emotional responses which colour the situation in a certain way 
(Frijda, 2009; Lambie & Marcel, 2002, p. 224). For example, during the Mann 
Gulch disaster, the fear experienced the firefighters painted the situation as one 
ha  i  ha a d  a d ce ai , beca e he ibi i  f i g a  a  
to deal with fire were not proving useful (Holt & Cornelissen, 2014, p. 534). By 
presenting reality in a certain way, emotions make new possibilities for action 
seem more relevant than others (Solomon, 2004, 2007). By realising for 
e a e, ha  he fi e a  g i g  e ci c e he , he fi efigh e  fear and 
anxiety about their safety, made the otherwise unthinkable option of dropping 
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their equipment and/or running away from the fire as relevant (Holt & 
Cornelissen, 2014; Weick, 1993b).  
Pe e ha  d   e e ie ce e i  ike a a  e  d, 
are argued not to be able to respond to the situation normally/appropriately 
because the situation is not presented in the way it ought to (Solomon, 2007). 
Damasio (1994) i a e  ha  e  j dge e  i   c ea ed f e i . 
Specifically, he retells how he tried to diagnose what was wrong with a patient 
- Elliot - who had suffered damage to his prefrontal cortices due to a surgical 
e a  f a . P i   he ge , E i  had bee  a g d h ba d a d 
father, had a job with a business firm, and had been a role model for younger 
ib i g  a d c eag e  (ibid., .35). H e e , d i g ec ery after the 
otherwise successful surgery, to the surprise of his friends and family they 
di c e ed ha  E i  a   ge  E i  (ibid., . 36). E i  bi a e 
behaviour had little to do with the ability to move, talk and recall events  tasks 
he could perform no different, if not better than others. He needed to be told to 
get ready and go to work. He could not keep a schedule because when 
something he was doing called to be interrupted by something else, he would 
not stop dealing with the latter. F  e a e, he  i g a e , he c d 
spend a whole afternoon deliberating on which principle of categorization 
h d be a ied . I  a e e, i  a ea ed he a  i g igh  f hi  ai  
g a  (ibid. . 36). A  a e , he  hi  j b a d c d not keep the ones that 
followed. He made a series of bad investments and lost all his savings. He got 
a divorce and ended up living with a sibling. He was not granted disability 
payments because he appeared normal. Although, he appeared normal, he did 
not learn from his mistakes as he constantly repeated them and was oblivious 
to the pleas of family and friends.  
Elliot was brought to Damasio (a neuroscientist) after unsuccessful 
psychotherapy. Damasio put Elliot through a large number of tests testing his 
intellectual soundness. His IQ was in the superior range and in all the other 
cognitive ability tests he performed average or above average. Damasio then 
tested his personality using the highly regarded MMPI test, which again showed 
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a normal personality. After all these tests failed to show what the problem was, 
Da a i  bega  ec i g ha  E i  i e ec  a  i ac  b  hi  e i  
were not. Da a i  f d hi e f ffe i g e he  i e i g  E i  
stories than Elliot himself seemed to be suffe i g  (ibid., .44). Af e  h  f 
b e a i  a d a ki g i h f ie d  a d e a i e  i  a ea ed ha  E i  
e a  e a   a a e  f e ai . He ee ed  a ach ife  he 
a e e a  e .  
In fact, it appeared that Elliot was cursed  k  b    fee  (ibid., 
p.45). So Damasio decided to explore this emotional detachment, by conducting 
tests responses to ethical dilemmas in the laboratory and on paper. Again, Elliot 
performed well in all. But all this was in stark contrast with how Elliot 
e f ed i  ea  ife i a i . E i  a  ab e  ch e effec i e ,  he 
igh   ch e a  a ,  ch e bad  (ibid., .50). S , he e e ed 
Da a i  ea i ed ha  ha  he de ed e  acked a  he g i g, e -
ended, u ce ai  e i  f ea  ife i a i . A  ed ea ie  hi  a  e 
of trivial situations too, such as the sorting task at work where he would become 
side- acked f  h . I  Da a i  d  as we are confronted by a task, a 
number of options open themselves in front of us and we must select our path 
correctly, time after time, if we are to keep on target  (ibid.,  50, e ha i  
added). What Elliot had lost was the ability to judge how to choose a path 
appropriately. After examining, all the other known cases (12) which had 
damage to their prefrontal cortices, Damasio noticed a similar set of symptoms 
to Elliot  reduced emotional sensitivity that led to bad judgement. After more 
tests and comparison to the other cases, Damasio concluded that patients with 
similar brain damage cannot orient themselves appropriately in open-ended 
situations because they are not as sensitive to emotions about their future well-
being.  
The above shows that what is common sense, is not intelligible in the 
midst of action without feeling the emotions one ought to feel (this seems to 
have been anticipated since antiquity, see Aristotle, 2009). For example, 
thinking all afternoon which criterion to use to organize files would not be 
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presented as a valid option to someone that felt accountable and under pressure 
to finish their task on time for their boss or client (Damasio, 1994). By not 
c i g  he e ec a i  f e  e  (e.g., finishing filing on time) 
because one does not read the situation as one ought to, one is likely to be 
marginalised (e.g., losing their job). Therefore, emotions are intelligible on the 
ba i  f e e  e e  P ac ice  understanding what is expected of them 
in their roles given what is of value (Haugeland, 2013; Solomon, 2004, 2007). 
In sum, understanding the entwinement of emotions with Practice can serve as 
the groundwork for beginning to understand the role of emotions in 
improvisation. This is important because we know little about how emotion 
affects improvisation (see Cunha et al., 2017). 
Summary of Participation in Practice and its Relation to Improvisation. 
In sum, a practice is not something that is private inside a person (aka 
subjective), nor a separate physical entity (aka objective)  it is a socially 
constructed way of experiencing a context by acquiring a skilled way of 
perceiving and doing things that is emotion and value laden (Dreyfus & Taylor, 
2015; Schatzki, 2005, p. 470; Taylor, 1995, Chapter 4,6; Wrathall, 2017). It is 
the semantic context that allows things to show up as significant - intelligible 
and valuable (Benner et al., 1999, pp. 15 17; Monk, 1990, p. 533). Hence, 
Practice provides the background against which improvisation is presented to 
an agent to be salient. Agents improvise by drawing on significations and their 
experienced emotions. In Polanyian terms, with experience one dwells in a 
practice which in turn allows them to see the meaning of situations (Polanyi & 
Prosch, 1977, p. 44). A person is subsidiarily aware of their past experience in 
a practice and therefore one necessarily attends from it, to attend to anything 
focally (Polanyi, 1965, p. 80). That is, a perceptual ability to spontaneously 
integrate subsidiary aspects of a situation in order to behold a focal conception 
of it, as it is unfolding, in ways that are socially constituted. Put simply, it is the 
sociomaterial distinctions (this will be discussed in more detail in the 
affordances section later) an agent has an intuitive grasp of, by dwelling in a 
socially acquired way of understanding a context (Tsoukas, 2011a; see also 
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Wittgenstein, 1969, §94). By being exposed to a similar education of 
perception, members of communities are able to attend from the same 
subsidiary elements to be able to have similar focal awareness (Pyrko, Dörfler, 
& Eden, 2017). Attending from this understanding can allow us to begin to 
understand the equally important role of social and material aspects (cf., Baker 
& Nelson, 2005; Bechky & Okhuysen, 2011), values (see Visscher et al., 2018) 
and emotions (see Cunha et al., 2017) in the process of improvisation. 
3.4.2 Becoming a Skilled Performer of a Practice 
It follows from the above that to become a competent member of a practice, one 
must learn to dwell in it (i.e., to become skilful). That is, to effortlessly perceive 
the manifestations of the context (e.g., behaviour, objects) against the backdrop 
of their normative connotations (Yanow & Tsoukas, 2009, p. 1347). Why? 
Things do not come with a priori labels (Haugeland, 2013). Labels and their 
meaning emerge in the way they are used in the social domain  in Practice 
(Gherardi & Nicolini, 2000; Nicolini, 2012; Pyrko et al., 2017). So to perceive 
meaning, one must learn and use labels in the way others are using them - 
according to the rules, not following them (Harré, 2002; Wittgenstein, 1986, 
§293). Therefore, meaning appears as social or communal -   
a e  (Taylor, 1995, p. 77).  
Without dwelling in a practice, one would not be able to respond to 
i a i  a ia e  (and thus, improvise), because they would not be able 
to perceive their meaning. Thus, experience a d b  e e  de e i g ki  
enable us to participate in a practice fluidly. But a practice is not reducible to a 
skill. It is rather the standing condition of the possibility of acting skilfully in a 
d ai  (Wrathall, 2017, p. 4). By extension, to improvise in response to novel 
conditions necessarily relies on already being embedded in Practice. Otherwise, 
how would one be able to identify something as an improvisation and whether 
improvisation is required in the first place? 
Knowledge, skill or expertise should not be confused with information 
or memory (Gibson, 2015a, p. 227; Tsoukas, 1997). Someone is not 
knowledgeable/skilful simply because they articulate information by recalling 
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it from memory. Knowledgeability/skilfulness is judgement (Tsoukas & 
Vladimirou, 2001). Being knowledgeable, skilled or an expert, relates to the 
abi i  f a e   i a e i f a i , a d de a di g i  ea i g, 
i hi  he c e  f a di ec  e ce a  e gage e  i h  e i e  
(Ingold, 2002, pp. 21 22). That is, to be perceptually sensitive to the 
idiosyncrasies of a circumstance. Ingold (ibid., pp. 21-22) argues that members 
of communities share their knowledge with newer members by showing things 
ia ch, a e e   hea i g  a d e be i hi g he h ca e i h a ce ai  
a a i e  he  e bie  ea  h   e cei e hi g  i  he a  a  
(D E edi a & Ba e , 2006; T ka , 2009a). The latter serves as the baseline 
for how situations ought to be. This in turn, allows agents to understand when 
i i a i  i  ece a  i  de   e e i a i   h  hei  a  
state. 
Over time, novices gradually become skilled and hence attuned to their 
environment in the ways that their mentors see, hear and feel things (Ingold, 
2013, p. 2). S  ha  each ge e a i  c ib e   he e , i  hi  ce , i  
an education of attention  (Ingold, 2002, p. 22). As a result, perception is not 
passive. By paying attention to something we enable it to show up on the basis 
of familiarity (Dreyfus, 1993, p. 26) - the experience of the past is present in 
the present (Polanyi, 1961, pp. 466 467). Shotter (1996, p. 301), drawing on 
Wittgenstein (1986), very effusively expresses the manner of this education: 
e e gi e c a d  ( DO hi ,  D  d  ha ); i  hi g    
e e ( L k a  hi ! ); e i d  he  ( Thi k ha  ha e ed a  i e ); 
cha ge hei  e ec i e  ( L k a  i  ike hi ); ace   gi e de   hei  
e e ie ce ( Y  e e e  c  . . .  ac ed ike a ad a ); ga i e  
their behaviour ( Fi , ake a igh , he  . . . a k agai  . . . ); a d  . A  
he e i c i e f  f a k e  [ e e], i  ac ice,  d  e hi g 
[ he ] d  he i e d ; i  ge i g   i i g  a d e hi g i  
[their] circumstances, they cause [apprentices] to relate [themselves] to their 
ci c a ce  i  a diffe e  a [ he ]a e c i a  bei g ed ca ed  i  
e  a . 
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Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986b, p. 19, 2005) elaborate on how perception 
i  ed ca ed. The  a g e ha  a e  e ce i  f a a k i  a f ed a  
the person spends more time attempting to master it (see Table 1). In the 
beginning a person is constantly trying to understand what to do next. To 
decipher what to do next, beginners usually draw on decontextualized rules in 
he f  f if X, d  Y . A  he e  e e  eff   learn and receives some 
guidance, they gradually begin to become more sensitive to the differences 
between situations and begin to rely less on rules (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 2005). 
As the aspiring expert recognises more and more nuances in encountered 
situations, they are able to react differentially to them (Dreyfus, 2017b).  
The nuances do not need to be part of the observed field, they can be the 
result of the phenomenal presence of previous experience (Ribeiro, 2014, p. 
579). With experience, a ge a  hif  cc  (Ribeiro, 2014, p. 563). Put 
otherwise, their perception dwells in aspects of tasks which have recursively 
proved to be important that in turn change what the situation means and calls 
for (Ribeiro, 2017). As mentioned previously, experienced nickel miners can 
notice the yellowness of sparks emitted by the furnace, to identify when there 
is an overproportionate amount of slag. This alerts them that they must take care 
of the situation. Inexperience nickel workers cannot notice these nuances and, 
thus do not know how and when to respond (Ribeiro, 2014, p. 566). Hence, by 
a e di g f  he a ie  de ai  f a a k, a  a ia e  ki ed  e  
instantaneously attends to the meaning of a situation and can intuitively respond 











The Five Stages of Skill Acquisition by Dreyfus and Dreyfus 
Novice i. Application of context-free rules. 
ii. Focused on the process at hand. 
iii. No situational perception. 
 
Beginner i. Application of context-free and  situational rules 
based on circumstances. 
ii. Focused on the process at hand. 




i. Conscious, selective application of rules based on 
salience. 
ii. Sees process in respect of future outcomes as well. 
iii. Increased situational perception. 
 
Proficient i. Unintentional combination of processes based on 
nuances. 
ii. Calculative, long term orientation. 
iii. High situational perception. 
 
Expert i. Intuitive grasp of whole situation. 
ii. Spontaneous reaction, no thinking required. 
iii. Grasps situation, envisions possibilities. 
Note: Adapted from Mind Over Machine: The Power of Human Intuition and 
Expertise in the Era of the Computer, by Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986). p.50.  
 
Polanyi was originally a doctor, before becoming a chemist and later a 
philosopher (Nye, 2002). A good example of how perception is transformed is 
P a i  (1958, p. 101) narration of how, as medical students, their perception 
was trained to notice certain aspects of X-rays, so as to be able to diagnose 
pulmonary diseases. To do so, students would attend classes taught by 
radiologists in a dark room where the X-ray would be put on a fluorescent 
c ee . I  he begi i g f he c e, he de  i  c e e  ed . S/he 
cannot see the lungs nor any signs of the disease that the radiologist is referring 
. S/he ca   ake  had  f he hea  a d he ib , i h a fe  ide  
b che  be ee  he   nothing else. This sensation is so strong that the 
de  ec  ha  he adi gi  i  a ci g ab  fig e  f their 
i agi a i . Wi h he a age f a fe  eek  a d e di g e h  
observing the radiologists talk about different X-rays, a realisation strikes the 
student. S/he no longer pays attention to the outlines of the ribs, they become 
part of their subsidiary awareness. S/he is attending from the ribs to perceive 
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the lungs  i  i  ike /he f g[ ]  ab  he ib  a d beg[a]   ee he g . 
Eventually, with effort the X-ray is not a slide full of nebulous blotches in which 
you can perhaps make out ce ai  ga . I  bec e  a ich a a a f 
ig ifica  de ai  hich gi e i dica i  f di ea e . Th , he e ce i  f 
the X-ray is transformed from a blurry set of details, to a manifestation of a 
chest. Even what the radiologist is talking about starts to make sense. By 
d e i g i  hei  g i g e e ie ce he de  ha  e e ed a e  d .  
The result of being a skilled member of a practice is dwelling in taken 
for granted distinctions (Dreyfus, 2017b; Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 2005). This 
allows agents to unreflectively use distinctions as tools to see the meaning of 
situations and respond (Ribeiro, 2014; Willems, 2018). The person loses self-
awareness. The tools they rely on become subsidiary aids to performance. In a 
e e, he e f a d a   ed di a ea  i  he backg d f e f a ce 
(Yanow & Tsoukas, 2009, pp. 1349 1350). Tools can be both material (e.g., X-
rays, machinery) or immaterial (e.g., language/terminology, norms). In 
Heideggerian terms, this is the primordial way of being  people are 
unreflectively absorbed in responding to their mundane life (Dreyfus, 1991; 
Heidegger, 2013). Thus, during action the social structure is not separate from 
the agent  it is part of the agent.  
As Arendt (1978, p. 50) e , i  i  a  if he age  ha  a i h e e  
which guarantees what is perceivable by their other five senses to also appear 
in the same a   he . Thi  i h e e i  i  e e ce c  e e   a  
Th a  A i a  a e ed, e  c i . B  a e i g he e f  
and by extension normative distinctions, the skilled agent can attend from the 
tools, to the meaning of the tasks at hand (Polanyi, 1966a). For example, while 
speaking or writing, an agent skilled in a specific language focuses on what they 
want to say, rather than focusing on the language itself. Similarly, an 
experienced diagnostician does not need to think about the blotches on the X-
ray- they immediately make sense and afford a diagnosis (Polanyi, 1958, p. 101, 
1966b, p. 10). Without dwelling in all the above distinctions agents would not 
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be able to improvise when the moment called for it (i.e., when things are not 
how they ought to be). 
Breakdowns in Skilled Performance. Although becoming skilled is 
entwined with the ability to unreflectively see the meaning and respond to 
situations, this does not necessarily mean that skilled agents are not faced with 
situations in which they need to reflect before responding (Sandberg & 
Tsoukas, 2011, p. 342). I  e ected situations, performances which under 
normal instances are fluid  b eak d  (Hadjimichael, 2017, p. 1362). The 
complexity of social systems results in unexpected configurations, that even 
skilled practitioners would be taken by surprise because of deviance from their 
expectations (Lok & De Rond, 2013; Sawyer, 2005; Tsoukas, 1998b). Three 
different types of breakdowns have been identified: (i) malfunction, (ii) 
temporary breakdowns and (iii) total breakdown. (Dreyfus, 1991, Chapter 4; 
Yanow & Tsoukas, 2009, p. 1351). 
Malfunction refers to a momentary breakdown in performance as the 
result of a tool is unusable. During this type of breakdown, the agent is argued 
to quickly find another way of completing their performance. This is usually 
done by finding a different tool or asking for assistance. Consequently, 
performance is easily restored to its absorbed-unreflective state (Dreyfus, 1991, 
p. 72). For example, if a hammer becomes unbalanced one can easily grab 
another one, or can ask someone to bring one. 
Temporary breakdown occurs when activity is temporarily blocked by 
something. During such a surprise, the agent gains self-awareness and 
equipment loses its transparency. The agent must deliberately pay attention to 
what they were doing and plan on how to continue. If the hammer one was using 
becomes unbalanced, but they do not have immediate access to another one, the 
agent must consider how to solve this problem while trying to perform their 
task (Dreyfus, 1991, p. 77). 
Total breakdown occurs when activity is completely interrupted and 
cannot continue. During this type of surprise, the agent can become fully 
detached from the situation and analytically reflect on what caused the 
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breakdown. For example, the hammer-head becomes detached from the handle 
and cannot be readily reattached. The agent does not have access to another 
hammer. Consequently, the agent starts contemplating the characteristics of the 
hammer and tries to figure out why the two parts cannot be reattached.  
All breakdowns have their roots in practical engagement and indwelling. 
They are the result of something that is taken for granted to behave in a given 
way, does not. During breakdowns, the agent differentially reverts their 
awareness from their focal task at hand, to the subsidiary constituents of the 
task depending on how severe the breakdown is. Malfunction only requires 
reconstituted absorbed coping. Temporary breakdown requires deliberation 
whereas total breakdown requires analytical reflection (Dreyfus, 1991, p. 79). 
Despite the severity of the breakdown, responses are always forged on the basis 
of socialisation into a ac ice  distinctions.  
Breakdowns are fundamental to understanding improvisation (Sandberg 
& Tsoukas, 2011). This is because they present practitioners with moments in 
which situations deviate from how they normally ought to be and by doing so, 
manifest the logic tacitly taken for granted in Practice (ibid., p. 343). 
Responding to breakdowns requires improvisation. The latter, often is achieved 
by reflectively considering what is relevant to restoring the situation to its 
a  a e. 
In summary, acquiring experience in a practice allows one to perceive 
what is of significance and in turn develop a set of skills to deal with arising 
situations. Values and skills are passed on from member to member by drawing 
e e  a e i   a ce  he  had  iced bef e. Thus, agents 
gradually develop a common sense of their surroundings. Beginners require 
conscious deliberation to see and respond to the meaning of situations. With 
experience agents can notice and thus respond to the meaning of a situation 
without thinking about it. Skills take the form of habitual dispositions which 
allow agents to spontaneously perceive the nuances of situations and intuitively 
respond to them in line with the normative elements of their practice. Agents 
may face breakdowns in their unreflective dealings with situations in cases of 
 110 
surprise. However, responses to breakdowns are founded on the basis of already 
acquired skills (through socialization in practice). All the above is necessary for 
improvisation because it allows agents to identify when action is required and 
presents the means for restoring the situation to how it ought to be.  
 
3.5 Affordances and Meaning 
Following the above, an agent perceives their surroundings as infused 
with meaning  it is not experienced neutrally (Gueldenberg & Helting, 2007; 
Tsoukas, 2011a). Depending on the meaning of circumstances, agents are 
motivated to engage in or shun from action (Frijda, 2010b; Frijda, 
Ridderinkhof, & Rietveld, 2014; Shotter & Tsoukas, 2014a, 2014b). Aspects of 
a  age  e i e  a e  a ea   be e e e a  i  add e i g 
a situation over others (Fayard & Weeks, 2014)  especially during 
breakdowns. According to Gibson (2015a, p. 119) to perceive meaning, is to 
perceive affordances.  
Affordances refer to the function of encountered aspects of the 
environment (Kaplan, 2011; Norman, 2013). However, to perceive affordances 
one must have the ability to do so. In most occasions, a person is able to non-
reflectively perceive the function of encountered aspects of the environment 
because of dwelling in a practice which enables one to see what they mean 6 
(Gallagher & Zahavi, 2008, p. 111; Rietveld, de Hann, & Denys, 2013). In other 
words, the meanings of situations as well as seeing affordances, are the 
perceptual manifestation of indwelling. Perceiving affordances, is tied to the 
semantic dimension of tacit knowledge which as implied above is a spontaneous 
process (even during breakdowns). This dimension, affects the perceptual field 
of people (Polanyi, 1966b, p. 68) by allowing them to spontaneously grasp 
potential uses of their surroundings (Chemero, 2003; Faraj & Azad, 2012, p. 
250; Gibson, 2015a; Greeno, 1994), in rela i   a i a i  ig ifica ce. 
Affordances may range from the use of objects and theories, to modes of 
 
6 I  Heidegge ia  e , hi  i  efe ed  a  e cei i g hi g  a  ead -to-ha d  (Heidegger, 
2013, p. 69). 
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behaviour and interaction with people (Fayard & Weeks, 2007; Jones, 2003; 
Rietveld & Brouwers, 2017; Valenti & Gold, 1991). P  i , aff da ce  
a e ibi i ie  f  ac i  ided   b  he e i e  (Rietveld & 
Brouwers, 2017, p. 546). 
Affordances were previously examined by other scholars, they were 
c ce a i ed a  bei g ei he  di i i a   e a i a  (Fayard & Weeks, 
2014). On the one hand, scholars arguing that affordances are dispositional, 
argue that affordances are predispositions created by the environment 
(Chemero, 2003; Norman, 2013). For example, the affordances of objects and 
environments depend on their design. On the other hand, scholars arguing that 
affordances are relational, maintain that affordances are the result of abilities of 
agents (Faraj & Azad, 2012; Leonardi, 2011; Zammuto, Griffith, Majchrzak, 
Dougherty, & Faraj, 2007). For example, an object may be designed to do one 
thing, but it can be used to do other things too. As a result, affordances were 
seen to be separate to practices.  
Like Fayard and Weeks (2014), I maintain that affordances should not 
be viewed as either dispositional or relational. Rather they should be viewed as 
both dispositional and relational because of their dependence on sociomaterial 
practices and semantic significance. However, in contrast with Fayard and 
Weeks (2014, p. 247) I do not seek to focus on the practice in which affordances 
are utilised. As already illustrated in previous sections of this chapter, my focus 
is on understanding how the agent embedded in practice draws on perception 
to improvise in response to unfolding situations. As a result, in this section I 
seek to synthesize insights from practice theory, phenomenology and the 
literature on affordances to create further analytical distinctions which will 
assist with the aim of my thesis. 
Affordances do not exist independently of a practice  for otherwise, 
who would perceive them? Indeed, in many cases they are a niche of different 
forms of life (Gibson, 2015b, p. 120; Zammuto et al., 2007, p. 752). The social 
and the material, are imbricated and as a result agents are able to perceive and 
use affordances (Gaskin, Berente, Lyytinen, & Yoo, 2014; Leonardi, 2011; 
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Leonardi & Barley, 2010). Agents undergo an education of perception to see 
what certain things afford, why and when they are useful. Affordances are an 
embodied and socially embedded understanding of the totality of assumptions 
and skills one unreflectively takes for granted (Fayard & Weeks, 2014). 
Affordances are perceived after a process of immersion and learning (Dreyfus, 
2002), which in turn enable one to spontaneously perceive and act upon 
affordances (Gibson, 2015a; Rietveld & Kiverstein, 2014).  
This understanding is not static; by constantly dwelling in growing 
experience, one can perceive and by extension utilise more affordances (see 
Polanyi, 1961; Wrathall, 2014). A good example is the case of reading X-rays 
(Polanyi, 1958, p. 101). The same sheet can appear meaningful and useful to 
trained medical staff. This would not be the case for your average layperson. 
Without training, the X-ray simply appears as a set of nebulous blotches. 
Although, the layperson may understand that it is useful for a diagnosis, they 
themselves cannot make one. They would require the affordance of a trained 
doctor or nurse in order to utilise the affordance of the X-ray. 
Following the above, affordances of objects or people are not perceived 
in a subjective nor in an objective manner  they are the result of immersion in 
sociomaterial forms of lives  (Gibson, 2015b, p. 121). As Tiemersma (1987, p. 
429) i   he cia  i  a ead  he e he  e are to know or judge it. It 
i  he a  i  hich e a e ed a e i   a  e e  e ca i . 
Affordances are transcendent (or transparent) in agents habitual engagement 
with their surroundings, but are also immanent - they can appear as possibilities 
for action, or reflection in breakdowns.  All action relies on seeing the meaning 
of situations and responding via affordances (Dreyfus & Taylor, 2015, Chapter 
7). This has implications for understanding for improvisation. It signifies that 
when agents improvise, they do so insofar as they utilise affordances. 
Affordances of people or objects, are tied to social roles and assignments 
 a  i  hich aff da ce  gh   be e ac ed  ed (Rietveld, 2008). On 
virtue of being a member of a community, one is accountable for how they 
i i e he aff da ce  f hei  ac ice. Bei g a e ab e f  e  ac i  i  
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to be responsible for which affordances one chooses to use (Haugeland, 2013). 
A hammer can be used to drive a nail in wood, but one would be held 
accountable if they were to use it to kill someone. A lawyer must speak politely 
to a judge  shouting at a judge is unlikely to go down well. But again, the 
acceptance of using a hammer to kill someone, or shouting at someone with a 
prestigious role depends on the circumstances. Using the affordance of 
something in ways that defy their normative use may be acceptable under 
certain circumstances. For example, if one uses the hammer as a way of self-
defence or shouts at the judge to leave the courtroom because it is on fire. The 
circumstances change the meaning of situations and make certain affordances 
more relevant over others. To be able to detect and see the new meaning of a 
situation due to the change of circumstances is again the result of dwelling in a 
practice  it occurs spontaneously. This suggests, that even during 
improvisation agents need to take into consideration the conventions that 
surround the use of affordances. 
In sum, agents dwell in sociomaterial forms of life. As a result, of 
socialisation, agents perceive all aspects of their environment as infused with 
meaning. Different aspects of a practice (e.g., objects, people), have different 
affordances. To perceive and use affordances people must undergo an education 
of perception. Although, there are many affordances offered simultaneously by 
the environment, relevant affordances can be perceived based on the meaning 
of a situation an agent seeks to address. This is especially pertinent to 
improvisation. It offers the beginnings of understanding how agents draw on 
their environment to improvise. However, affordances usually cannot be used 
idiosyncratically. This is because they are tied to social conventions  they have 
roles and assignments (see Haugeland, 2013). As such their use is differentially 
judged as appropriate depending on the meaning of circumstances and an 
age  de a di g f cia  c e i . This in turn, signifies that even 
during improvisation agents cannot completely ignore conventions. 
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3.6 Discussion: Conceptualizing Improvisation from Within  
Following the above, I argue that dwelling in the experience acquired in 
Practice permits an agent to spontaneously perceive the meaning of situations 
and ways of responding to them - affordances. Indwelling is argued to be 
synonymous with taking for granted normative distinctions and skills acquired 
on the merit of being a member of a practice (Dreyfus, 2014; Ingold, 2002). By 
dwelling in experience of a Practice, agents can perceive the meaning of the 
ever-fluctuating circumstances of their everyday life and see which affordances 
are relevant to dealing with them. As illustrated by Yanow and Tsoukas (2009), 
skilful action is grounded in being unreflective. However, depending on the 
magnitude of an unexpected event, the practitioner has to mindfully reflect 
either in or on action, guided by their experience to perceive the meaning of 
situations and possibilities for action (see also Dreyfus, 1991).  
Given that above I have argued that the meaning of situations opens 
certain possibilities of action via the manifestation of affordances, I suggest that 
when plans and expectations break down, practitioners improvise insofar as 
they are able to perceive the meaning of arising situations and act on 
affordances provided in awkward situations. For example, during the Mann 
Gulch disaster, Dodge understanding that his unit was facing a wildfire (not a 
ten c ck fi e) saw that an escape fire would afford safety.  
Exploring tacit knowledge (as indwelling) and affordances of specific 
sociomaterial practices, permits the opportunity to offer an account of 
improvisation from inside the moment of improvisation (i.e., how it is 
lived/experienced). Thus indwelling in a practice presents possibilities for 
action (viz., affordances). The latter requires an intimate understanding of how 
action unfolds  an understanding of what is normal and what is a deviation 
from normality. As argued in the previous chapter, the dimension of how 
normativity is tied to indwelling, and in turn how these interrelate with 
perceiving solutions to unusual situations is underexplored (Benner et al., 1999, 
p. 15). Exploring improvisation in vivo is important because previous studies 
have not addressed the intricacies of how practitioners are able to perceive how 
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to respond to unexpected situations. As argued by Fisher and Barrett (2019), 
lived experience of improvisation has been overlooked  this also calls for a 
better understanding of emotions (Cunha et al., 2017) and values (Visscher et 
al., 2018). Put otherwise, most studies have offered accounts of what agents do 
in response to unexpected situations (e.g. Baker & Nelson, 2005; Bechky & 
Okhuysen, 2011), but not how exactly agents are able to perceive what to do in 
the moment. In addition, by developing a new situated account previous 
theoretical dichotomies such as structure and individual, explicit and tacit 
knowledge can be viewed conjunctively, rather than disjunctively (Tsoukas, 
2017).  
This chapter has sought to develop a preliminary understanding of how 
it is to be a situated agent that is embedded in a sociomaterial practice who is 
constantly faced with a change in circumstances. Each time circumstances 
change unexpectedly, the meaning of a situation changes (this is especially 
pertinent during instances of breakdown). In turn, the agent must improvise to 
stay aligned with normative restrictions by utilising affordances.  
To outline the exact process of how this process unfolds theory requires 
supplementation with rich empirical data. This is because, theory cannot pre-
emptively extend itself to account for the singularities of practice (Tsoukas, 
2009b, 2016). Hence this study, seeks to draw on a rich ethnographic study in 
order to account for how improvisation unfolds in sociomaterial contexts in 
which agents are constantly required to enact responses to unfolding situations. 
By extension, as improvisation relies on affordances, and the latter depends on 
indwelling I seek to account for how the perception of affordances enables 
practitioners to improvise. By outlining the role of perception, meaning and 
affordances, a richer and deeper understanding of what occurs inside the 
moment of improvisation can be portrayed. In the next section, the current 




3.7 Refinement of the Research Question 
The purpose of this study is to address how organizational improvisation is 
enacted and lived i ide he e  f i i a i  i  e e -evolving 
sociomaterial practices. With the phrase inside the moment, I allude to the little 
understood process of how agents experience and perceive how to improvise 
i  he id  f ac i . T  de c ibe he ce  f h  age  e e ie ce 
improvisation, a reference to both their sociomaterial infrastructure is required.  
A term that takes into consideration of sociomateriality is the notion of 
affordances. As outlined in this chapter, perceiving affordances depends on 
dwelling in the relationality of the function of objects or people that is entwined 
with learned social practices, valences and goods. The complexity of situations 
calls for differential reactions in each situation. To react one must draw on 
affordances, however, the sociomaterial environment simultaneously offers an 
agent many different affordances. As a result, in order to respond appropriately, 
an agent must have the ability to perceive which affordances are relevant. 
Hence, the first question the study seeks to address is: 
(1.1) How do agents perceive relevant affordances for the enaction of 
improvisation? 
Choosing the use of specific affordances in a specific manner is 
tantamount to choosing different courses of action. This is because each action 
is tied to using an affordance of something to complete or justify an action in 
relation to the valences of practices. Hence, the choice of different manipulation 
of affordances in each situation leads to different courses of improvisation. 
Capturing the process of how agents choose to manipulate affordances each 
time they improvise will offer an account of improvisation practices. This 
complements the first question, by showing how the perception (viz., immanent 
experience) of affordances is tied to enacting improvisation. Thus, the second 
question the study seeks to address is: 
(1.2) How does the use of affordances influence the enaction of 
improvisation practices? 
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Following the above research questions and theoretical rationale, the 
next chapter will be dedicated to outlining the rationale for the empirical design 
and analysis of this study. 
 
3.8 Summary 
Tacit knowledge is consistently linked with the ability of agents to perceive the 
meaning of situations and to know how to respond. Although previous research 
on improvisation has taken into consideration tacit knowledge; it has done so 
in a manner that overlooks how it perceptually unfolds in vivo and how it is tied 
to a practice. Therefore, although we have some accounts of what agents do in 
response to unexpected events, we do not have a complete understanding of 
how people know how to enact their responses. This is because, most accounts 
are retrospective (Cunha et al., 2006, p. 326; Holt & Cornelissen, 2014; Shotter, 
2017) and approach improvisation as a fait accompli or at best, with a weak 
process approach (Langley & Tsoukas, 2017). Rare exceptions to this 
observation have researched tacit knowledge in line with the processual nature 
of living practice, however, they did not fully address how tacit knowledge 
affords improvisation.  
In this chapter, by synthesising theoretical insights from 
phenomenology, practice theory and ecological psychology, I sought to 
introduce a language and to identify a set of processes which would allow this 
study to address aspects of tacit knowledge which were previously overlooked 
i  e a i   i i a i . I a g ed ha  i  i e i h P a i  igi a  
conception of tacit knowledge, to better understand ongoing improvisation, 
tacit knowledge should be understood as an ongoing process of perceptual 
integration (Polanyi, 1965). People attend from subsidiary elements to perceive 
their object of attention focally. Focal objects are perceived based on immersion 
in a practice (Polanyi, 1958). As part of becoming a member of a practice, one 
learns normative distinctions which are tied to what is valued by communities 
(Haugeland, 2013). By tacitly taking these for granted, agents gain an emotional 
orientation to their surroundings based on the goods they value (Nicolini, 2012). 
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To preserve valued goods, people gradually develop habitual/skilled/non-
reflective responses to circumstances based on normative distinctions (Dreyfus 
& Kelly, 2007, p. 53).  
Because circumstances are constantly changing, agents need to 
differentiate their responses to situations to respond appropriately (Benner et 
al., 1999, pp. 10 11). If circumstances are unexpected, the fluid responses of 
skilled agents may breakdown. During breakdowns agents reflect on the 
situation to find a solution (Dreyfus, 1991; Haugeland, 2013; Yanow & 
Tsoukas, 2009). This was clearly illustrated in the Mann Gulch fire disaster. 
Rea i i g ha  i  a   a 10 c ck fi e, ed  a disruption of normal ways of 
responding. Indeed, the latter triggered several unconventional responses. 
Unfortunately, only one was appropriate. 
Situations are often addressed through affordances; the latter, include 
functions of objects or people (Fayard & Weeks, 2014). Affordances are infused 
with social meaning. Their use depends on social conventions of what is 
deemed to be appropriate (Rietveld, 2008). Consequently, I argued that 
perceiving possibilities for actions is tantamount to perceiving affordances. 
Hence, I suggested that when faced with difficult situations, practitioners 
improvise insofar as they can perceive their meaning and act on relevant 
affordances.  
 Drawing on the above conceptualisations from phenomenology, 
practice theory and ecological psychology, can offer a richer vocabulary to refer 
to tacit aspects of developing responses to situations. By doing so, sharper and 
more refined research questions were developed to address aspects of 
improvisation that have remained underexplored. In the next chapter, I will 
discuss the methodology for data collection and analysis.  
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CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH METHODS 
 
Reality, I thought, does not exist 
finite and ready, independent from us; 
it is crafted with the cooperation of 
Man; it is equivalent to the value of 
Ma .   
   Nikos Kazantzakis (2009, p. 446) 
 
F  e h d  i  e a h ic ; 
unconsciously they disclose 
conclusions that they often claim not 
to know yet. Similarly the last pages of 
a book are already contained in the 
fi  age . S ch a i k i  i e i ab e.   
 Albert Camus (1979, p. 18) 
4.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to outline the methods used and the rationale for 
adopting these as part of the empirical investigation of improvisation. As 
highlighted by a recent review, empirical investigation of organizational 
improvisation is still scarce (Hadida et al., 2015, p. 444). At the same time, 
theoretical research is argued to be limited in its ability to account for the 
singularities of organizational phenomena (Nicolini, 2011; Shotter, 2011; 
Tsoukas, 2012, 2016). Thus, this suggests that further empirical research is 
required so as to further the research on organizational improvisation.  
An ethnographic approach was adopted for the study due to: (i) the 
nature of the research questions of the thesis and (ii) its ontological-
epistemological (hereafter, onto-epistemological) assumptions. To illustrate the 
reasons for selecting an ethnographic approach, this chapter is organised as 
follows: first I will discuss the research design. This will then be followed by 
an outline of the research setting and data collection processes. Lastly, the way 
the data was analysed, ethics and trustworthiness will be considered.  
 
4.2 Research Design  
The purpose of this section is to illustrate the rationale for adopting a qualitative 
design, and more specifically, ethnographic techniques. First, I will discuss the 
differences between quantitative and qualitative designs, and then justify the 
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rationale of choosing ethnographic techniques out of the diverse arsenal of 
qualitative methods. 
4.2.1 Quantitative Versus Qualitative Designs 
Empirical research on organizational improvisation is broadly dichotomized in 
two major approaches; quantitative and qualitative approaches. Both are 
underlain by very different onto-epistemological assumptions (Tsoukas & Chia, 
2011), and, so, orient the attention of empirical investigations to very distinctive 
features of the phenomenon of interest. As Camus (1979) remarked the 
c ce i  f he a  e d  a he e  i  e aphysics; 
c ci  he  di c e c c i  ha  he  f e  c ai    k  e  
(see also Vahabzadeh, 2009, p. 454). Tha  i , h  e ic e  ea i  ead   
to asking the questions and accepting the answers we deem legitimate 
(Hadjimichael, 2017, p. 1365; Tsoukas & Chia, 2011, p. 3). By having 
awareness of the strengths and limitations of each perspective, the former can 
be capitalized on and the latter avoided. This section will briefly discuss the two 
competing approaches and explain why the qualitative was favoured for the 
purposes of this study. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the quantitative approach adopts a disjunctive 
conception of social phenomena. This means that the quantitative approach 
assumes that like natural phenomena, social phenomena can be segmented into 
distinct modules that have quasi-causal relationships (Tsoukas, 2017). To do 
so, this paradigm seeks to abstract the unique features that characterise a 
phenomenon in order to subsume them under a generic category. The generic 
category represents a phenomenon as a fait accompli and as a result overlooks 
the process though which it unfolds. Such an approach tries to answer the 
e i  f ha  i  hi  a ca e f?  (Tsoukas, 2009b, p. 289). That is, scholars 
utilising the quantitative approach, are called to categorize their objects of 
investigation under categories which have already been defined in the literature 
(see Rodgers, 2010). The a e  i  a ed  di i i h he e ea che  
subjectivity and as such guarantee the objectiveness of his/her findings. Notice, 
the underlying purpose of this research practice, is to provide allegedly al e 
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f ee  parsimonious outcome explanations by subjecting specific phenomena 
under general laws (Tsoukas, 2012, p. 68). For instance, the more training 
offered in improvising, the more likely it is that staff will enact better quality 
improvisations (see Vera & Crossan, 2005). 
While some qualitative approaches seek to emulate the deductive 
rationale of quantitative approaches described above (e.g., Yin, 1994), to a large 
extent, abductive and inductive qualitative approaches (e.g., Gioia, Corley, & 
Hamilton, 2013; Timmermans & Tavory, 2012) adopt a conjunctive conception 
of social phenomena. That is, they seek to illustrate how otherwise 
compartmentalised modules are inseparable and interconnected while 
unfolding in practice (Tsoukas, 2017). The emphasis of abductive and inductive 
qualitative approaches i   c ehe di g what is going on?  a d how this 
occurs (Tsoukas, 2012, p. 72; Watson, 2011). This in turn, orients the 
e ea che  a e i   he specificity and uniqueness of the investigated 
phenomenon (Shotter, 2005a). The abductive and inductive qualitative 
approaches have the freedom to not always subsume phenomena under a pre-
configured category. Thus, many inductive and abductive qualitative accounts 
generate complex explanations which are sensitive to the uniqueness of 
particular cases (see Cassell, 2004; Miles & Huberman, 1994; Nicolini, 
2009b). As such, abductive and inductive qualitative theorising are more likely 
to generate new distinctions and as a result hone our understandings of what is 
already known (Tsoukas, 2009b, p. 286). 
Given that in Chapter 2 and 3, I have argued for a situated approach (i.e., 
a contextualised and conjunctive account of behaviour) to studying 
improvisation; for the purposes of this study I have opted for an abductive 
qualitative approach. The reason an abductive qualitative approach was 
selected, instead of an inductive approach, is due to the fact that researchers are 
not tabula rasas. I d c i e a ache  ad ca e letting new theory emerge 
f  da a i h  he e ica  ec ce i  (Timmermans & Tavory, 2012, 
p. 168). This is highly unlikely, especially since researchers study phenomena 
in reference to a skillset developed in reference to their past experiences within 
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their specific research communities. Thus, a situated approach is compatible 
with the abductive qualitative approach for three reasons: (i) the assumption of 
situational uniqueness, (ii) the assumption of the ineffability knowledge and 
(iii) the assumption of value immersion.  
Situational uniqueness refers to the fact that organizations are constantly 
faced with unexpected and novel situations (Tsoukas, 2016). To an extent, this 
is an inherent feature of organizing. Notice, organizations seek to regulate the 
otherwise unruly human behaviour, by instituting certain routines and 
developing cognitive categories (e.g., patient) for their members to execute and 
utilise. Hence, unexpected events result from instituting expected responses 
(Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007) to an open-ended world (Hadjimichael, 2017; 
Tsoukas, 1998b). Due to the open-endedness of the world, organizations cannot 
solely rely on already established procedures. This is because each situation is 
uniquely configured in a way that is at least slightly different to previously 
encountered ones. Consequently, members of organizations must rely on their 
judgement to find an appropriate way to deal with newly arising situations  in 
other words they are necessarily called to improvise. Therefore, due to the 
nature of improvisation and its pervasiveness in organizations, deductive 
methods would not be appropriate for studying this phenomenon. This is 
because, to understand improvisation we must not only grasp regularities but 
also singularities. Given that abductive qualitative methods encourage both the 
incorporation of past research insights, as well as showing sensitivity to the 
uniqueness of circumstances, they are deemed more appropriate for the purpose 
of further developing an understanding of organizational improvisation.  
The ineffability of knowledge refers to the fact that knowledge in 
practice, is process-based and entwined with the context in which it was 
cultivated. In other words, knowledge is not an entity that can be abstracted 
from its context. Due to the variability of situations faced, a different response 
is required in each case, which cannot be captured by a rule alone as this would 
lead to the problem of infinite regress (Kiverstein & Wheeler, 2012; Tsoukas, 
1996, p. 16; Wittgenstein, 1986). This is because knowing is an overdetermined 
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social process where social distinctions overlap with each other. That is, to 
know is dependent on participating in several sociomaterial practices that tacitly 
attune agents to perceiving their environment in specific ways that habituate 
them to respond to situations by taking for granted certain symbolic criteria and 
functional strategies (Castoriadis, 2005b; Harré & Gillet, 1994; Ingold, 2002; 
MacIntyre, 2007). Thus, knowing is always routed in tacit knowledge acquired 
from socialisation. Although, one can reflect and articulate aspects of it, it is 
always grounded in tacit knowledge. Tacit knowledge is especially important 
for knowing how to deal with a situation  especially if novel or unexpected. 
This is because to know how to respond, depends on grasping the largely tacit 
intricacies of situational sensitivity (Hadjimichael & Tsoukas, 2019). Hence, 
preconceptions are key to the practice of qualitative research, which is perhaps 
overlooked by inductive approaches because they suggest detachment from 
them. Therefore, to be able to capture contextual sensitivity, abductive 
qualitative approach is better equipped for this task as it seeks to preserve the 
complexity and singularity of studied phenomena in reference to past findings 
on the topic and past experiences of the researcher. 
Value immersion refers to the notion that all agents necessarily perceive 
hei  e i e  i  a a e idde  a e  (Castoriadis, 2005b; Ingold, 2002; 
Vygotsky, 1978). This is because all agents are necessarily communards; 
participants in institutionalised forms of lives; i.e., sociomaterial practices 
(Harré & Gillet, 1994; MacIntyre, 2007; Nicolini, 2012). As a number of 
scholars have established, different communities have their own ways of 
bestowing importance on elements of their practice by establishing which 
versions of truth are considered legitimate (Foucault, 1995, 2003; Solomon, 
2007; Toulmin, 2001). Given that perception and consequently all knowledge, 
is tempered by the participation of agents in practices, there can be no objective 
account of any phenomena (Nagel, 1986). They are all relative to the conceptual 
and symbolic distinctions that can be found in any given sociomaterial practice. 
Therefore, I cannot utilise a deductive approach to study practices that are value 
ridden. This is because such approaches seek to regress the complexity of 
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practice to the identification of abstract factors and therefore filter out values, 
or treat them a  i e . The reason for this tendency, as discussed above is 
because the deductive approach seeks to offer objective accounts of social 
phenomena which have no place for values because they are considered to be 
biased. In a similar vein, inductive qualitative research overlook that 
researchers do not operate in vacuums by insisting that researchers should 
approach phenomena without preconceptions. On the contrary, the abductive 
qualitative approach is more reflexive by acknowledging that researchers have 
pre-conceptions, and in parallel does not seek to eliminate values from its 
acc  a  he  a e c ide ed  be ke   a e ea che  i e iga i .  
4.2.2 Opting for Ethnography 
Out of the diverse arsenal of qualitative methods, I have selected ethnographic 
techniques. These techniques can trace their lineage to early twentieth century 
anthropology and sociology (Robson, 2007), but were later adopted by other 
fields such as psychology and organizational theory. These techniques entail 
the study of groups of people from involved researchers observing and dwelling 
amongst the subjects in which they were interested in for a considerable amount 
of time (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). During fieldwork researchers attempt to 
record, interpret and comprehend the contextualised idiosyncrasies of the way 
of life of the group of interest and thus try to portray the meaning attached to 
these idiosyncrasies. To do so observation as well as interviews on a small scale 
are employed in order to complete the objectives of the study (Atkinson & 
Hammersley, 2007).  
A singular definition of ethnography is a tricky endeavour; ethnography 
may be generally understood as a collection of qualitative research techniques 
which primarily rely on observation and aim to capture, interpret and 
comprehend the way of life (actions and explanations) of a certain group of 
people within their natural setting (Atkinson & Hammersley, 2007). This is 
done by utilising the data collected within that setting and the first-hand 
experiences of the researchers who collected the data (Miles & Huberman, 
1994; van Maanen, 1979, 2011; Yanow, Ybema, & van Hulst, 2012). 
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As my thesis is preoccupied with understanding the experience of agents 
during improvisation within grounded settings and social practices, 
ethnographic techniques (i.e., observation in combination with interviews) are 
the most suitable techniques capturing this (Heritage, 1984; Llewellyn & 
Hindmarsh, 2010). Ethnographic techniques enable the researcher to have a 
sp a e  g a  f ca  ea i g . Thi  i   a  e ea che   k  
ha  e i   a k  i  he i e ie  (Guest, Namey, & Mitchell, 2012, p. 
80). This is the case because ethnographic techniques permit the researcher to 
become a member of the practice of his/her study (Moeran, 2009). By spending 
a significant amount of time in the field, the researcher like any newcomer to a 
practice de g e  a  ed ca i  f a e i  b  ea i g  ice ha  i  f 
importance to the agents s/he is studying (Ingold, 2002; Lave & Wenger, 1991; 
van Manen, 1990). This is particularly important when studying improvisation 
because the researcher needs to distinguish between standard practices and 
deviations from them.  
B  aki g f  g a ed he a  a  f ac ici g, he e ea che  ca  
be e  de a d hich e ce  age  d a    dea  i h a   
unexpected situations (see Nicolini et al., 2012). Consequently, by being 
immersed in the context of interest the researcher can grasp the complexity and 
a ce  f age  beha i  b  ge e a i g acc  f ac ice ha  ai ai  
overcome dualisms (Tsoukas, 2017, p. 132). By attending from the complexity 
f g ded ac ice  he e ea che  i  e ecia  e ed  h  he i d 
a d he d ca  be di e a g ed  (Tsoukas, 2017, p. 138) and that 
responses are not determined by the environment, nor that agents are self-
interested information processors (Tsoukas, 2005, Chapter 16). Thus, 
ethnographic techniques allow the researcher to remain faithful to the basic 
thesis of the situated approach.  
 
4.3 Research Setting 
To empirically study organizational improvisation, an ethnographic study along 
with theoretical sampling (i.e., choosing cases based on the possibility that they 
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will offer new theoretical insights) was deemed appropriate (Eisenhardt, 1989, 
p. 537). The selection of the setting was conducted based on the following 
criteria: (i) The setting requires dealing with potential problems on a short 
notice. By requiring speedy solutions to arising problems there is an increased 
likelihood that improvisation will be enacted (Cunha et al., 2006; Tsoukas, 
2013). (ii) The setting hosts a complex activity  increased complexity, requires 
more complex adjustments in the case of improvisation. Consequently, 
gathered examples are richer and more illustrative (see Hutchins, 1991; Weick, 
1993b; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007). (iii) The consequences of not responding to 
a situation appropriately are severe. This suggests that responding to 
unexpected situations is important to the agents. 
Following the above, I selected to conduct an ethnography of an ATC 
team of an international airport in the European Union (EU). Its name and 
location cannot be disclosed due to both confidentiality agreements and ethical 
reasons (this will be further discussed in section 4.7). The ATC team is 
responsible for the safe and expeditious transit of aircrafts from and to the 
airport, by instructing planes on which airways and altitudes to maintain so as 
the possibility of delays and crashes are minimized (Nolan, 2011; D. Smith, 
2015). 
The ATC setting meets the criteria outlined above (see table 2). First, the 
setting requires immediate responses in the case of unusual or unexpected 
developments. Specifically, aerodrome ATC have a matter of seconds to 
respond to unexpected situations to ensure not only that the flights are on 
schedule, but also to safeguard safety (Kontogiannis & Malakis, 2013). Second, 
ATC utilises complex procedures that have inherent uncertainty: (i) constant 
call to implement the legal requirements and internal quality standards and (ii) 
dependence on different agents to accomplish tasks. In particular, air traffic 
controllers not only need to juggle the local idiosyncrasies of their airport, but 
are also legally required to utilise the guidelines of the International Civil 
Aviation Organization, in conjunction with operating technologically 
sophisticated equipment (Kontogiannis & Malakis, 2013; Malakis, 
 127 
Kontogiannis, & Kirwan, 2010b; Owen, 2018). ATC requires complex 
technological systems such as communication systems, weather monitoring 
systems, flight information systems as well as navigation tracking systems and 
aids (Nolan, 2011; Owen, 2018; D. Smith, 2015).  Lastly, the consequences of 
not responding immediately to unexpected situations result in severe outcomes. 
In the case of ATC, the lack of an immediate response may have a range of 
negative outcomes ranging from loss of life to huge financial incursions 
(Malakis et al., 2010b; Malakis, Kontogiannis, & Kirwan, 2010a).  
TABLE 2 
Summary of Setting Characteristics  
Characteristics  
   
  Time Pressure Immediate Responses  
x Need to respond to irregularities to reduce danger 




x Heavy Technological Dependence: 
Communication systems, Navigation Aids, 
Navigation Tracking Systems, Weather 
monitoring Systems, Flight Information Systems 
x Rapidly Escalating Situations 
x Ongoing and parallel collaboration with other 
departments increase likeliness of unexpected 
situations  
External Sources (dependence on human and non-human 
agents to complete tasks) 
x Area Air Traffic Control 
x Superordinate Air Traffic Control 
x Airline Companies 
x Airport Operator 
x Fire Service 
x Weather 
Negative Consequences  Death or severe physical harm 
Severe psychological distress 
Large financial costs 
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4.5 Data Collection Process 
To understand a sociomaterial practice, one must comprehend what is taken for 
g a ed i  ha  e i g a d b i g i   he f e  (Nicolini, 2011, 2012; van 
Maanen & Kolb, 1985). To be acquainted with the knowledge of the 
participants of the setting, a significant period of time is required in the field 
(see Ribeiro, 2014). This is because the researcher is called to become attuned 
to both the discursive singularities of the practice, the organization routines that 
constituted the sociomaterial practice, the equipment used, as well as the 
symbolic distinctions that underlie sociomaterial practices of each organization 
(Collins, 2011; Garfinkel, 1967; van Maanen, 2011). Hence, a longitudinal 
design was adopted  I spent 7 months in the setting and conducted the 
ethnography in three stages. 
I  he fi  age, ( he fi   eek ) I e  i e ha gi g  i h 
the participants and conducted informal unstructured interviews in situ for two 
reasons: (i) to become acquainted with the participants and (ii) to understand 
their concerns at work. In the words of van Maanen (2011, p. 219), participants 
a e f e  i i ia  eca citrant and suspicious of those who come uninvited into 
hei  i e . As several participants had later told me, initially, they did not trust 
me. To test whether I was trustworthy, they told me fake stories in order to see 
if I would leak them. As I did not, the participants started to trust me more. 
Thus, without developing trust with the participants, researchers are unlikely to 
be allowed access to the natural behaviour of their participants at work (van 
Maanen & Kolb, 1985). Therefore, during the first two weeks my goal was to 
make the participants feel comfortable around me by explaining the basic 
elements of my project and getting to know each other on a more personal level.  
A a  f  b i di g a e a i hi  i h he a ici a , b  ha gi g  
and conducting informal interviews I was able to become initiated into a setting 
that was alien to me. With no experience in civil aviation, I found the first weeks 
a challenge, as the participants used terminology and enacted routines that were 
unfamiliar to me. Without posing questions to the participants and in turn, them 
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explaining what was going on, I would not have had been able to make sense 
of what they were doing and why. For the majority of the informal interviews, 
I took notes on my tablet (which were immediately expanded on after the 
interview). The reason for this was to avoid intimidating participants by 
flaunting a recording device before they trusted me. 
In the second phase, I gradually became a partial-participant observer of 
the activities of the contexts. As a partial-participant I was allowed to participate 
only in some activities [e.g., runway inspections - checking for debris on the 
runway; passing strips (see 9 in Glossary) from assistant controllers to 
controllers], while in the rest of the activities I was a passive observer (I was 
given passive observational access to all the sociomaterial resources of the 
team). Specifically, I was permitted to read the daily mail, participate in their 
training as well as to have access to parts of their archives.  
To ensure my understanding of the ea  ac ice  I shadowed different 
members of the teams on a daily basis. The ATC team worked on a rota basis. 
Five groups of approximately four to five controllers and two assistants 
alternated staffing the tower every 12 hours. Each group had at least one very 
experienced member (over 10 years of experience), two moderately 
experienced controllers (3 to 5 years of experience), two less experienced 
controllers (0 to 2 years of experience) and two very experienced assistant 
controllers (over 8 years of experience). During a shift, controllers work in pairs 
with one assistant for an hour. They rotate every hour to ensure that they rest 
for at least an hour before they are active again. This is important because 
controlling requires extremely high levels of concentration and attentiveness.  
I ensured that I observed all groups on cyclical basis and that during each 
shift I observed each controller for at least one hour. The reason for this was to 
ensure that I noticed any differences in controlling, especially in terms of levels 
of experience. Levels of experience were important because they have been 
associated with different levels of skilfulness and tacit knowledge (Dreyfus & 
Dreyfus, 2005; Ribeiro, 2013a, 2013b). I also observed assistants more 
sparsely, an hour per week. I focused more on controllers because they were 
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actively engaged in controlling, and thus improvisation while controlling, 
whereas assistants were not. Assistants supported the controllers by engaging 
mostly in bureaucratic activities (e.g., updating arrival times, preparing strips, 
answering phone calls). The difference between controllers and assistants will 
be explained in the next chapter. For a breakdown of how much time I 
shadowed members of the team depending on their role and levels of experience 
see Table 3. 7 
TABLE 3 
Information about Shadowing and Interviews 
Role Experience Shadowing Interviews 
 
A = 0-2 years 
In hours Unstructured about Semi-structured B = 3-5 years C = 5-9 years 
 D= 10+ years  Mundane Incidents 
Abnormal 
Incidents  
ATCO*  502 5 24 23 
 A 201 0 10 8 
 B 170 2 6 7 
 C 52 1 3 2 
 D 79 3 5 6 
ATCA**  28 0 24 5 
 A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
 B 5 0 3 1 
 C 13 0 10 2 
 D 10 0 11 2 
Note. *Air traffic control officer; ** Air traffic control assistant 
 
Various scholars highlight that shadowing is a powerful tool for 
understanding the interaction of people with other people or objects, the roles 
of people or objects as well as the perspectives of the participants (Czarniawska, 
2014; Vasquez, Brummans, & Groleau, 2012). Indeed, by shadowing and 
assisting the participants (where allowed), I was not only familiarised with the 
 
7 It should be noted that the reason I have spent more time shadowing controllers with less than 5 years 
of experience, rather than controllers with over 5 years of experience is because most controllers that 
reach 5 years of experience are transferred to a different unit. Thus, there was a scarcity of controllers 
with over 5 years of experience. Out of the 21 controllers permanently stationed at the unit, only 3 had 
more than 5 years of experience. To combat the shortage of experience, 10 controllers with more than 
10 years of experience stationed at a different unit would take on 3 shifts a month at the observed unit. 
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terminology and significations of the context (see Glossary for examples of 
terminology and Appx 2 for examples of significations), but was also 
necessarily familiarised with the equipment used by the participants. This 
opportunity had arisen because routines, equipment and discursive distinctions 
are mutually constituted (Dreyfus, 1989; Riemer & Johnston, 2014). An 
organizational routine cannot be what it is without relying on all three 
(Orlikowski & Scott, 2008). For example, the notions of control tower, 
approach procedures and safety are entwined  referring to one implicitly refers 
to all three at the same time (see Dreyfus, 1991; Rietveld, 2013; Taylor, 1995).  
By being a partial-participant in ATC practices, over a period of 
approximately 6 months I became skilled at distinguishing between the way 
routines were supposed to be enacted (based on the written procedures) and the 
improvised enaction of the routines. Hence, the contrast between the written 
and the enacted, greatly assisted in the documentation of instances of 
breakdown wherein the teams improvised in response to. Breakdowns assisted 
in uncovering the rationale behind improvisation because it revealed taken for 
granted aspects of work (Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2011). In addition, rules 
required personnel to note in their logbooks major deviations from the written 
routines. This allowed me to triangulate whether an instance was indeed 
perceived as unusual or not. Documentation took place in-situ by writing field-
notes, taking pictures on my tablet as well as recording unstructured interviews 
with the protagonists of each incident (Cassell, 2004; Miles & Huberman, 1994) 
To see the number of unstructured interviews in reference to the level of 
experience see Table 3. I expanded upon my field notes within 24 hours of each 
observation so as to ensure the reliability of my recollections and to maintain 
as much detail as possible (Emerson, Fretz, & Shaw, 2011; Vasquez et al., 2012; 
Wolfinger, 2002). My interpretations were discussed with controllers on a 
weekly basis to ensure their trustworthiness. 
To document responses to unexpected situations I would rely on the 
following process. Upon realising that an unexpected situation was taking place 
I would remain close to the participant who was dealing with it. During this 
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time, I would take detailed notes of each (re)action the participant was 
initiating, along with the time at which it was occurring. Specifically my notes 
included: the participants, the actions, the unfolding dialogue, the equipment 
used, the feelings, body posture and facial expressions. When permitted, I 
would also take pictures. For safety reasons, I would not interrupt the 
participant while they were handling a situation. Detailing the above is key to 
understanding unreflective action, as well as emotional responses to it (Frijda 
et al., 2014, p. 2; Lambie & Marcel, 2002, p. 229). T  b e e e e  
outward behaviour  if we understand them  i   b e e hei  a e f i d  
(Monk, 1990, p. 548). 
According to Benner and colleagues (1999, p. 21), a ici a  a a i e 
reveal their perceptions - ha  he  iced  a d h  i e  a ea ed  he . 
Thus, exactly after a situation, when possible, I would ask the participant to 
give me a brief explanation of what had occurred, which was also added to my 
notes. I would then agree on a date and time for conducting an interview about 
the situation. I made sure that the interview took place within 3 days of the 
incident to ensure that the participant would not forget important details. In 
addition to capturing the reflexive perceptions of the participants, conducting 
the loosely-structured interviews also assisted in triangulating the evidence 
gathered by observation (Miles & Huberman, 1994; Nicolini, 2009a). This is 
i a  beca e a  a  b e e  I  had acce   a ice f ac i  f 
e e e e . The ef e, a i  i   i c de he ef ec i  f he age  I 
observed (Vahabzadeh, 2009, p. 454).  
During the interview, I had my notes of the situation. The reason for 
having my notes was because they ensured that during the interview no aspect 
of the situation was overlooked. To ensure the validity of my notes, first, I 
would show them to the participant to see if they agreed with my account. 
Corrections were made when deemed necessary. Most corrections centred 
around documenting instances with the correct aviation terminology. After this, 
I would refer to the (re)actions written in my notes and ask the participant firstly 
to explain what they perceived. Second, I would ask them how they felt. Third, 
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I would ask them what actions they took. Fourth, I would ask why they chose 
to respond in the specific way and finally, I would ask if they had thought of 
other possibilities of responding. Responses were audio recorded with the 
consent of the participant.  
In the last phase of the study (during the last month), in parallel with the 
observation I organized additional semi-structured interviews with team 
members. I left most semi-structured interviews to the end of the study because 
I was familiar with the sociomaterial practices and I had specific instances of 
improvisation in mind that could be focused on and compared. Thus, it was 
easier to grasp what the participants discussed and I could ask better targeted 
follow up questions (Guest et al., 2012). In addition, by leaving the semi-
structured interviews until the end I could ask participants to reflect on their 
development throughout the months I observed them. This allowed to capture, 
h  hei  eac i   i a i  cha ged e  i e. Wi h he a ici a  
permission, all semi-structured interviews, except for one were recorded and 
transcribed. In total, I observed the ATC team for approximately, 530 hours. I 
conducted 28 semi-structured interviews along with numerous unstructured 
interviews. T  ee he be  f i e ie  i  efe e ce  he a ici a  
level of experience and role see Table 3 (above). For more details about the 















Data Collection in Numbers 
Type Number Average Duration Total Duration 
Observations 53 10.1 hours 530 hours 
1st Stage 6 - 61 hours 
2nd Stage 38 - 383 hours 
3rd Stage 9 - 86 hours 
Semi-structured Interviews 28 38 mins 1064 mins 
1st Stage 0 - - 
2nd Stage 3 29.3 mins 88 mins 
3rd Stage 25 39 mins 976 mins 
Unstructured Interviews 52 - - 
1st Stage 6 - - 
2nd Stage 40 5.6 mins 224 mins 
3rd Stage 6 5.1 mins 30.6 mins 
Documents 39 - - 
1st Stage 2 - - 
2nd Stage 31 - - 
3rd Stage 6 - - 
 
4.6 Data Analysis 
A theory building approach was adopted to enable the move from a descriptive 
account to an integrated theory of how organizational improvisation is enacted 
and experienced (Lok & De Rond, 2013, p. 192; van Maanen, 1979). The 
analysis was iterative and was conducted in three cycles; each involved a new 
round of re-reading all the collected data (Miles, Huberman, & Saldana, 2014). 
Due to the large volume of the data collected, Nvivo was used to organise and 
analyse the data. 
The first step focused on distinguishing the differences between the 
written organizational procedures and their enactments, as well as instances of 
breakdown (Cunha et al., 2006; Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2011; Tsoukas, 2013). 
This was done by relying on my experience as a partial-participant and full 
observer and my notes. Following this, I went through the data and created 
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i e a d c e  cha  f  a  e i de  hich showed major deviances from 
written the routines of the teams (Gkeredakis, 2014, p. 1482; Miles & 
Huberman, 1994). This assisted in understanding improvisation as a process 
that unfolds in time (Langley, 1999). Specifically, all episodes were put in the 
chronological order in which they occurred, and all actions taken with each 
were also chronologically noted. By doing so, I created a record of how 
improvisation was enacted, which in parallel, served as a broader archive of the 
improvisations that I had documented.  
For example in Table 5, I display how I coded an episode that I 
subsequently analyse in the next chapter. The example in Table 5 refers to an 
abnormal situation, wherein an aircraft did not follow the prescribed 
procedures. In the table, step 1 (symbolised as  in table) entailed identifying 
aspects of the episode that deviated from the written procedures. In the columns 
i h , I di play, in chronological order, segments of my fieldnotes or 
segments from interview transcripts which relate to the instance examined. For 
example in the first and fourth columns, one can see that the controller showed 
extreme signs of emotion (e.g., throwing pen, exclaiming loudly) and issued 
instructions to descend to an altitude below the minimum (2200ft). Both are 
highly abnormal behaviours in relation to written procedures. 
The second step, focused on the instances of improvisation identified in 
step one and sought to recognise what the practitioners perceived that made 
them react in an improvisational manner. To this end, I adopted interpretive 
phenomenological analysis (IPA). This is because IPA allows to capture 
elements of daily experience, ranging from the reflective to the non-reflective 
(van Manen, 1990). IPA is a qualitative data analysis technique that has two 
goals. The first goal is to capture the experience and concerns of participants by 
focusing on specific events or processes. The second goal is to interpret the 
experiences and concerns of participants in reference to the social context 
(Larkin, Watts, & Clifton, 2006, p. 104).  
I sought to identify the perceptual experience of the participant in each 
episode by paying specific attention to my notes taken in real time on 
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a ici a  b d  a g age, e i a  eac i , he e he  f c ed , he 
actions they undertook, as well as post-hoc reflections of the participants 
themselves. The unit of analysis was on the individual experience - emphasis 
was on the perceptual and emotional experience of the participants. To identify 
both types of experiences, I engaged in two cycles of reading, each with its own 
interpretive focus (J. Smith, Flower, & Larkin, 2009). Specifically, the first 
cycle of readings focused on identifying what the participants perceived in 
relation to the developments of the situation. Such elements included, the 
perceived implications of situations, which aspects of situations participants 
focused on as the situation unfolded, the perceived possibilities for action and 
the reasons for responding. This allowed me to interpret which affordances 
stood out for the practitioners and which ones they were drawn to use. For the 
second cycle of readings, I focused on the emotional experience of the 
participants. Elements coded included facial expressions, body posture, 
emotionally charged words and reflections on emotions.  
For example in Table 5, e  2 i  b i ed a  . I  the second, fifth 
and sixth columns, I try to understand the experience and concern of the 
individual (emotional and perceptual) as the event unfolded. As can be seen in 
column 2, I note how he i di id a  e i  (e.g., shock, anxiety) changed 
as the situation unfolded. In column 5, I note which possibilities for action (i.e., 
solicitations: relevant affordances - more about this later) the individual 
attended to (e.g., issuing instruction of descending to 1000ft) at different points 
during the situation. Finally, in column 6, I note the concern of the individual 
in the event (i.e., to avoid a potential collision). 
In the third and final step, I focused on the second goal of IPA. That is, 
to interpret the links between the descriptions of experience and concerns 
documented in step 2 with the wider social context (Larkin et al., 2006; J. Smith 
et al., 2009). Thus, a practice lens was applied to relay the experience of agents 
in relation to the significations of their form of life (Tsoukas & Dooley, 2011). 
The analytical unit was the socially embedded agent; the sociomaterial 
environment in sync with the agents (Ingold, 2002). Thi  i  beca e e ca  
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characterize behaviour independently of the intentions, and we cannot 
characterize intentions independently of the settings which make these 
i e i  i e igib e b h  age  he e e  a d  he  (MacIntyre, 
2007, p. 206).  
Within this step, I focused on the links between the perceptions of the 
practitioners with the broader environment in which they acted. That is, I 
considered how the lore of the practice affected the way in which everyday 
activities were perceived. The lore included my data on what was discussed 
during the trainings, the war stories shared by the practitioners, the documents 
I had collected and how more experienced team members taught less 
experienced ones in real time. All the former are important sources for the 
collectively held values/goods of the practitioners as they exemplify what 
aspects of the situations are focused and which are overlooked. Consequently, 
apart from understanding the emotions, affordances and concerns perceived by 
the individuals, I could interpret how the their reactions to situations are in sync 
with the practice of ATC.  
For example in Table 5, e  3 a  b i ed a  . I  the seventh 
and eighth columns, I try to show the links between what was found in step 2 
with broader practices of ATC.  In particular, in column 3, in this specific event, 
I identify how the controller appraised their anticipation based on the lore of the 
practice and emotional reactions. Moreover, in column 8, I identify that the 
improvisations of the individual are related to different types of improvisation 
practices that I have found across other improvisation episodes. Each 
improvisation practice in this case was tied to preserving safety. More about 
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Notes. S e  1 = , S e  2 = , S e  3 =   
 
In Table 6, I illustrate the general data framework derived from the 
analysis. It shows the process of data reduction  17 first-order themes gave rise 
to 11 second-order themes, which in turn were organized in 7 third-order theme. 
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All 7 third-order categories are shown to be related to a fourth-order theme. 
Through a constant comparison between the collected data and theory I was 
able to identify instances of conceptual categories. First order themes were 
derived from recurring situations observed in situ and discussed in interviews. 
The latter were used as the basis for the second-order themes by integrating 
conceptual overlaps through abstraction. The process of abstraction was 
repeated for the identification of the third and fourth order themes. An 
illustration of how the thematization was conducted follows in the next 
paragraphs. 
Consider the first row of themes in Table 6. Throughout the data, 
controllers were constantly using specific phrases and material resources in 
relation to rules in order to react to situations. The names of these phrases 
( de ce d , c i b , h d  e c.), rules ( a ach , fi a , a i  e c.) or 
material resources (e.g., adi , e e h e , i  e c.) served as codes. 
Due to the abundance of each, they were categorized in themes based on their 
nature. For example, references to phrases were thematised as phraseology-use. 
The use of phrases, rules and resources varied from spontaneous to hesitant. 
Spontaneous use of each was thematised under spontaneity-in-use, whereas 
hesitance to use was thematised under uncertainty-in-use. 
All three (i.e., rules, phrases and material resources) can be 
conceptualized as affordances (i.e., possibilities for action ) (Fayard & Weeks, 
2007, p. 609). Affordances are used due to the implications they are perceived 
to have on a situation. Thus, when participants used specific affordances I 
thematised these under affordances and when participants talked about the 
implications of their use, I sorted these instances in the implications of 
affordances. When participants discussed how they changed the use of any of 
the three over time and when I observed the differences between reactions of 
novice and experienced controllers, I sorted these instances in the experience as 
background theme. When participants spontaneously used an affordance or 
could not explain why they had done so, I categorized these instances under the 
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theme of intuition.  Thus, the second order themes derived were affordances, 
implications of affordances, experience and indwelling.  
Finally, I noticed that using affordances and perceiving their 
implications as well as refining their use with experience, entails both 
spontaneously anticipating their usefulness in a given situation and relying on 
past experience. Hence, the third order themes are anticipation, indwelling and 
solicitations. Circumspection, the fourth order theme is tied to all the other 
themes. The relation between the themes and circumspection will become 
clearer in the next chapter. 
TABLE 6 
General Data Framework 
First-order themes Second-order themes Third-order themes Fourth-order themes 
Rule/Procedure-use Experience as Background Indwelling  
Material Resource-use Intuition Anticipation  
Phraseology-use  Affordances Solicitations  
Spontaneity-in-use Implications of Affordances   
Uncertainty-in-use    
    
Expedition Goods Concern  
Safety Emotions  Appraisal  
Accountability Attentive Calmness (Mood)  
Circumspection 
 Positive Emotions  
Negative Emotions    
    
Minor Breakdown (or 
Malfunction) Reflection in action Reflection  
Temporary Breakdown Reflection on action   
Total Breakdown    
    
Disregard Mundane Improv. Improvisation Practices  
Role Change Critical Improv.   
Timing Adjustment    
Introduction of New 
Feature    
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4.7 Ethics 
Any research project that is social, raises the question of how to deal with the 
fellow humans involved. Researchers have established four pillars of ethical 
research (Bryman & Bell, 2011; Diener & Crandall, 1978). These being: 
informed consent, preserving anonymity confidentiality, protecting data and 
avoiding harm. I was careful to adhere to all four principles:  
(i) Informed consent: Before the commencement of data collection 
consent and approval was requested and received from the organization. 
Participants were informed in person beforehand about what the study involved 
and what will be required of them. It was stressed that participation was 
voluntary and that they could withdraw at any time. No participant requested to 
withdraw. 
(ii) Anonymity and confidentiality: To preserve anonymity and 
confidentiality, the names of both the organisation and the participants were not 
mentioned in any of my notes or documents - nicknames were used instead. In 
addition to nicknames, I also randomly changed the gender of participants in 
my descriptions. 
(iii) Data Protection: To preserve data protection, the data collected was 
stored on an offline encrypted drive which was locked in a secure environment. 
All non-electronic data were stored in a locked office at the University of 
Warwick. 
(iv) Avoiding Harm: To avoid harm, I did not interrupt the controllers 
while working. I made sure prior to each session that the controller was 
comfortable with my presence and I stressed that they could ask me to leave at 
any point. In addition, by anonymising and protecting the data I minimise the 
possibility of affecting the reputation of the studied organization or its 
personnel. 
In addition to the four above principles, scholars have highlighted that 
ethnographers are prone to deception and/or even self-deception to collect the 
data required for their research. Gaining official access to a site is not always 
enough (Fine & Shulman, 2009, p. 181). To get data, researchers must build 
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rapport with their participants (Atkinson & Hammersley, 2007, Chapter 4). In 
particular, (i) it is highlighted that ethnographers may seek to make themselves 
appear as sympathetic to the participants, but when they come to write about 
what they saw, they dehumanize their participants (Fine & Shulman, 2009, p. 
180). In addition, (ii) realist ethnographers (i.e., ethnographers that suggest 
what they saw is the single account of truth) may be pre-disposed to not try to 
understand their participants, by staying close to what they as researchers think 
the truth is (Fine & Shulman, 2009, pp. 189 190). The former is a case of 
deceiving the participants, and the second is a case of deceiving oneself by 
thinking they are the sole bearer of truth. In parallel, both are counter to the tacit 
rule of sympathetically understanding through the eyes of the informants (Wax, 
1980, p. 278).  
By being aware of these two dangers, I approached the participants in 
good faith and empathetically tried to understand how they related to their 
environment. In this way I tried, and to a great extent was able to understand 
the concerns and characters of the participants. To remain reflexive of my 
reactions and to offer a fair account of events, I kept a diary of what I saw and 
my feelings, so I could later be more aware of what may have influenced my 
interpretation (Atkinson & Hammersley, 2007, p. 151; Emerson et al., 2011, 
Chapter 4). In parallel, I shared my interpretations of observed events with the 
participants so they could corroborate my account.  
 
4.8 Trustworthiness 
It should be highlighted that, despite objections to using qualitative techniques 
beca e he  a e  bjec i e  (see Kvale, 1994; Potter & Hepburn, 2005), I 
chose to utilise them because such objections seem to be based on a simplified 
conception of what scientific knowledge is (see Polanyi, 1964). As illustrated 
by Polanyi (1958), even the most seemingly scientific practice i.e. solving 
mathematical problems depends on: (i) a personal understanding of 
mathematics and (ii) participating in a commune that values executing the 
endeavour in certain ways (viz., devel i g e   j dge e  b  
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participating in broader mathematical practices). This signifies that all research 
techniques depend on a personal understanding, which in a sense does not 
necessarily mean that this is bad, so long as research is guided by shared and 
accepted standards (Cassell, 2004; Johnson & Cassell, 2001; Sandberg, 2005). 
Positivistic (i.e., objectivist methods) are no less interpretive or unguided by 
shared social conventions. The main difference of positivistic methods from the 
i e e i e e h d , i  ha  he f e  ha e e  i  b i i  [ hei ]  
igi a  f da i  a  a  i e e a i e ac  (Vahabzadeh, 2009, p. 460). 
In order to establish that the analysis of the study was conducted in a 
trustworthy manner which adheres to the standards of the interpretative 
adi i , Sa dbe g  (2005) framework for justifying knowledge produced by 
interpretive approaches was utilised. This framework requires the researcher to 
show evidence of: (i) pragmatic validity  (whether what participants say they 
do, is actually what they do) (ibid, p. 56), (ii) communicative validity  
(coherence of researcher interpretations with available data) (ibid, p. 54), (iii) 
transgressive validity  (seek contradictions within data in order to account for 
all data) (ibid, p. 57-58) and (iv) reliability as interpretative awareness  
(evidence of dea i g i h e ea che  bjec i i  h gh  he ce ) 
(ibid, p. 58-59).  
To safeguard pragmatic validity , I sought to triangulate what was 
described by the practitioners with their actions, by combining different forms 
of observation with interviews and informal interactions (Sandberg, 2005, p. 
56). In this way, as far as possible, any differences between what the 
participants said they did, and what they actually did were noted.  
In order to achieve communicative validity , I became a partial 
participant and full observer in order to grasp the local ways of practice and key 
distinctions before conducting in-depth interviews (ibid, p. 54). Moreover, 
d i g he i e ie , e ai i g e   he a ici a  acc  a d i g 
open-ended questions which were then elaborated by follow-up questions, was 
an integral aspect of the design.  
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To take account of all the data and thus establish transgressive validity , 
I actively looked for any contradictions in the collected data. When some were 
identified, I arranged short follow up sessions with participants in order to 
clarify what was detected (ibid, p. 57-58).  
Lastly, to institute reliability as interpretative awareness  during my 
visits, I would attempt to follow a different member of the team and be present 
at different shifts, so as to become aware of variations in the ways of practice 
(ibid, p. 58-59). After each visit, I would log my thoughts and feelings on what 
was observed and said, so as to become aware of how they affected my 
interpretations. I was able to present my interpretations to participants. During 
my time at the ATC tower I presented my initial findings at training sessions 
organized by the management. In addition, after observing a situation I would 
show my notes to the participants to see if they agreed with my account. The 
participants acknowledged my interpretation, corrected it when deemed 
necessary and in many cases, expressed that they had not thought about their 
work from my perspective.   
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CHAPTER 5: AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL AND IMPROVISATION 
AT A EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT: EMPIRICAL 
FINDINGS 
 
N  g ea e  e i  c d befall aviation than a 
fatal collision between two large 
a .   
US Flight Safety Director (Biggs, 1979, p. 
23) 
 
We a e  aff ded he , he  e 
are presented with a situation, of saying, 
Gi e e i   i g  hi k 
ab  i  a d af e   he aff ee i g I  e  
 ha e a  a e .   
Air Traffic Controller (Biggs, 1979, p. 151) 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to present the findings and offer an analysis of 
the empirical investigation I conducted at the ATC tower of a European 
international airport. The findings presented relate to instances in which 
controllers improvised in response to the exigencies of situations. By analysing 
these situations, this chapter seeks to present a preliminary situated 
understanding of how agents improvise in response to local circumstances.  
 To aid the development of this understanding, the chapter is structured 
as follows: first, I offer basic background information that relate to the everyday 
activities of air traffic control officers (hereafter, ATCOs). Due to the technical 
nature of the profession, the background information is supplemented with a 
detailed glossary. Following this, to remain true to the complexity of lived 
experience and to facilitate cohesion, I provide interview extracts supplemented 
with descriptive vignettes of different episodes. The description includes a 
detailed account of actions, the way in which the actions differed from written 
descriptions of procedures and the improvisation that was triggered in response 
to situational exigencies. In most occasions I offer reflections of the participant 
on their actions. After each description, I analyse the vignettes to theorize about 
the processes that lead to improvisation in each episode. After outlining the 
process of how improvisation is experienced, I outline four practices that 
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controllers  use across several instances to enact organizational improvisation. 
At the end of the chapter, I offer a synopsis of the key findings across the 
episodes. The originality and contributions of the findings are discussed in the 
next chapter. 
 
5.2 Background Information 
In this section I will offers some key background information about the ATC 
team and its equipment. This will be done across three sections: general 
information, personnel information and layout of the control room. Throughout 
references will be made to the Glossary where the reader can find additional 
information. 
5.2.1 General Information 
The aim of ATC i   achie e afe, de , a d e edi i  f  f affic  
(D. Smith, 2015, p. 74). To achieve this, air traffic controllers monitor inbound 
and outbound traffic with the aim of regulating the flow of traffic by providing 
information and instructions to pilots. In turn this assists pilots to avoid collision 
between aircraft or vehicles in the controlled airspace areas. As part of aviation, 
airspace around the world is divided into flight information regions (FIR). 
Within these regions, information, alerts and instructions are provided to 
aircraft. The division of airspace is based on international agreements via the 
International Civil Aviation Organization (an agency of the United Nations) (D. 
Smith, 2015, Chapter 3). Each FIR may be divided into smaller regions in which 
ATC is provided. Normally, small control zones are set around airports. The 
ATC ffe ed i  a  ai  egi  i  efe ed  a  ae d e c . The e 
zones have a set upper level and their aim is to facilitate the transition of planes 
entering or leaving surrounding controlled airspace during their arrival or 
departure from the airport. The aerodrome and centre, pre-agree how and where 
the transfer of control occurs (Nolan, 2011, Chapter 3,5) 
As is usual for aerodrome control, the workspace of the team I observed, 
was on the top floor of the tall circular tower that is often seen at airports  these 
buildings are referred to as control towers and the top floor is referred to as the 
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control room. As is often the case, the control room was not enclosed by walls, 
but by UV proof glass. The reason control towers are so tall (in my case the 
tower had a height of approximately 36 metres) and that ATCOs work in the 
windowed control room, is so they can have a high level of visibility of 
incoming or outbound airport traffic. The control tower I studied handled 
approximately 200 flights a day during the winter and around 300 during the 
summer. The area of responsibility of the control tower covered approximately 
a 40 mile radius around the airport and up to an altitude of approximately 9.000 
feet (Nolan, 2011, p. 237).  
5.2.2 Personnel Information 
The ae d e  ai  ATC team is constituted by two basic job roles. 
Air traffic control officers (ATCOs) and air traffic control assistants (ATCAs). 
ATCOs are responsible for ensuring the safe, efficient and organised flow of air 
traffic (Nolan, 2011; D. Smith, 2015). To fulfil their responsibilities, controllers 
guide inbound and outbound aircraft via airways (see 3 in Glossary) by applying 
a e  f ech ica  e . Pi   a a  f  he c e  i c i . 
Pilots cannot initiate or alter their course without approval from the controllers 
(see 30 in Glossary). To reduce miscommunication, each time a controller 
issues an instruction, the pilot is obligated to repeat it to the controller 
( eadback  - see 36 and 39 in Glossary). Communication between pilots and 
controllers is achieved by using specific radio frequencies (see 10 in Glossary). 
Whatever is said over the frequency is recorded and can be used in any 
subsequent investigation. Radar images are also saved at all times (see 14 in 
Glossary). So although, controllers oversee the navigation of aircraft, they are 
always accountable for any violation of the rules and can be reported if a pilot 
feels they have made a mistake. 
ATCOs are expected to interchangeably fulfil two positions: (a) 
tower/approach control and (b) ground control. Tower/approach controllers 
i  a  ai c af  a i de ( ee 27 i  G a ), i i  a d eed i hi  hei  
designated airways visually, via radar or by pilots reporting their positions. The 
aim is to arrange incoming and outgoing aircraft into a safe and orderly flow. 
 148 
The basic rules that tower/approach controllers abide by when aircraft are in the 
air, is to keep aircraft separated from other aircraft vertically at 1000ft and 
approximately 8 miles horizontally (see 26 in Glossary). In addition to the basic 
rules, controllers must instruct aircraft to remain true to their assigned airway 
and altitude. Airways are virtual routes in the sky that lead to and from airports. 
Each airway is made up of a series waypoints (pre-defined coordinates which 
are named with five letter names - see also 25 in Glossary) and certain 
predefined altitudes. Sections of airways are also assigned names. Each airway 
has different direction and altitude constraints to ensure that aircraft are not 
flying in the opposite direction to the other or close to other obstacles (e.g., 
terrain, buildings). For aircraft on the runway, Tower/approach controllers are 
assigned their own frequency to communicate with pilots (Nolan, 2011, p. 239).  
The ground controller is primarily responsible for separating aircraft and 
vehicles taxiing (i.e., moving - see also 20 in Glossary) on the taxiways (i.e., 
type of road to get to and from runway and vice versa - see also 27 in Glossary), 
taxi lanes (i.e., type of road to get from a taxiway to designated parking spot 
which is called a stand - see also 1 in Glossary) while aircraft are taxiing for 
take-off or to the aprons (sets of stands - see also 2 in Glossary) after landing. 
Aircraft are not allowed to move without receiving instructions. There are a set 
of predefined taxi routes which ground controllers can use for directing aircraft 
to and from the runway. The routes are selected based on which side of the 
runway the aircraft will land or take off from. The direction for landing or take 
off is assigned a number [27 or 09 (nickname) in the case of the studied airport] 
and is activated depending on wind direction (see also 41 in Glossary). Wind 
direction is important because aircraft must take off or land opposite to the wind 
direction to avoid any potential dangers. The Ground controllers have their own 
frequency to communicate with pilots (Nolan, 2011, p. 238). 
The role of ATCAs is to assist and support ATCOs in their everyday 
working tasks. Typically, a large part of their role is to coordinate with other 
services (e.g., airport operator, FIR, other airports, fire service etc.) on behalf 
of ATCOs who are nearly always coordinating with the pilots of aircraft. Aside 
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from coordination, assistants enter data into flight information systems (see 5 
in Glossary), inform ATCOs of registered aircraft routes (see 8 in Glossary), 
prepare the flight progress strips (see 9 in Glossary) and update recorded 
information for pilots. Only brief and basic training is offered to ATCAs over 
a period of 2 weeks. Training largely concerns understanding basic terminology 
and procedures. However, at the control tower I observed, ATCAs do not 
change posts or jobs easily. Most had at least a decade of experience which is 
invaluable to helping ATCOs. This is because ATCOs usually move to region 
control after approximately 5 years of service at the aerodrome, perpetually 
leaving the aerodrome with relatively inexperienced personnel. Consequently, 
ATCAs informally train inexperienced ATCOs in the idiosyncrasies of the 
aerodrome (e.g., how to handle maintenance requests from ground personnel, 
equipment idiosyncrasies). 
5.2.3 Layout of the Control Room  
The control room is like an open plan office, but has no dividers. There 
are 5 work stations on a unified semi-circular office counter that faces the 
airports runway and taxiways. On both sides of the work stations, all active 
personnel can have visual access the two aprons of the airport. Four out of five 
work stations have their own telephone which is controlled by an LED touch 
screen. Each work station corresponds to a specific job role, position 2 is for 
the ACTA, position 3 is for the approach/tower controller and position 4 is for 
the ground controller (see figure 1). As a result, the equipment required for each 
position is placed near the position that requires them.  The two auxiliary work 
positions (1 and 5) located on the edge of the counter each have a computer 
with one monitor - they are not always used. At the left of position 1 is the 
backup radar monitor. Especially position 5 is used in case of emergencies. 
Personnel on standby come to help their colleagues, by coordinating with other 
services on their behalf in order to reduce their workload and allow them to 
concentrate. 
Behind the unified workstation is a desk for the shift leader. On the desk, 
the shift leader has the logbook (key events of the day are recorded) and the 
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roster (list of personnel and their corresponding shifts). In case of an emergency 
or high traffic, the shift leader usually takes a seat between positions 3 and 4 to 
gai  he ic e  a d ffe  ad ice if e i ed. Behi d he de k, he e a e 
comfortable sofas for staff to take a break between sessions and be on standby 
in case of an emergency. A floor below the control room one can find the 
ki che  a d he chi   . S aff a  g   e  a d ha e hei  f d i  
he chi   . O  he ec d f  f he c  e  e ca  fi d he 
rooms where ATCOs and ATCAs can sleep when on standby. Figure 2 shows 







Figure 1- Control Room Layout 
Figure Key:  
1 & 5: Auxiliary positions 3 Approach/Tower ATCO  6: Shift Leader 
2: ATCA   4 Ground ATCO 
 
  Telephone8                        Flight Progress Strips9   Crash Alarms10 
 Screen           Sofas11 Office Chair12 
           Stairs13  Desk 14 
 
8  Retrieved from: https://pixabay.com/vectors/analog-communication-icon-phone-1293316/  
9 Retrieved from:   https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:DCP00185.JPG  
10 Retrieved from: https://pixabay.com/vectors/bell-silhouette-black-metallic-36258/  
11 Retrieved from: https://pixabay.com/vectors/sofa-couch-furniture-home-interior-40207/  
12 Retrieved from: https://pixabay.com/vectors/business-chair-comfort-office-sit-2028295/  
13 Retrieved from  https://pixabay.com/vectors/stairs-climb-levels-descend-shapes-44070/   
14 Retrieved from: https://pixabay.com/vectors/desk-table-drawers-office-154003/  
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Figure 2 - Layout of Airport relative to the Control Tower 
 
 
5.3 Structure of the Findings 
 The investigated air traffic control unit is a setting in which 
improvisation15 in relation is prevalent (for examples see appx. 1). This is 
 
15 I do not f c   deci i  aki g. A  a g ed b  a i  ch a , deci i  aki g  ha  
connotations of detached reasoning which is atypical of everyday action (Hutchins, 1991, 1995; 
Weick, 1993a). My focus is on situated responses to arising situations in which there is often no 
time to consciously weigh which decision would be best.  
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because controllers must continuously improvise in relation to both unexpected 
and mundane occurrences. I argue that responses to unexpected incidents can 
be understood as instances of critical improvisation, while responses to 
mundane occurrences can be understood as mundane improvisation. The latter 
is the improvisation that is necessary to accomplish normal/routine tasks. 
Critical improvisation is the improvisation necessary to deal with unusual tasks 
that have imminent negative consequences. 
 To understand the extent of critical situations that the unit faces I will 
present some statistics. In regards to critical incidents, statistics kept by the 
ATC unit show that in 2017, the year during which I conducted my 
observations, 7 full emergencies (i.e., danger to aircraft was highly likely), 25 
local standbys (i.e., danger to aircraft was likely) and 5 ground incidents (i.e., 
breakdowns of aircrafts on airport premises) were recorded. In addition to the 
latter, less critical instances are recorded in the hif  gb k. S ch i a ce  
include: dysfunctional equipment, bird strikes (i.e., when an aircraft collides 
with birds), missed approaches (i.e., when an aircraft was not able to land on 
the first attempt), deviations from standard flight paths due to bad weather and 
medical emergencies on board (see appx. 1, critical improvisation section).  
 Beyond recorded critical incidents, improvisation is incessantly enacted 
as part of mundane tasks (see appx. 1, mundane improvisation section). As part 
of these tasks, improvisation is unnoticed and thus unrecorded. Like lyrics do 
not specify how a singer ought to perform a song, likewise organizational 
routines do not dictate how controllers ought to enact them. Even though 
occurrences may not be surprising, their singular characteristics constantly call 
for controllers to creatively adapt procedures to fit their mould (viz., improvise). 
This is because the combination of differences in air speed, pilot experience, 
airliner policy, aircraft type, and weather conditions each time create a unique 
blend of idiosyncrasies that controllers need to cope with (more about this 
below).  
 To assist theorizing, in addition to drawing on interview extracts, I 
mainly draw on three episodes, which are described and analysed across five 
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sections. Episode 1 is a description of how a mid-air collision was averted (it 
should be noted that this episode is gradually built up across the sections of this 
chapter). This episode was selected for two reasons: (i) it presented both 
unreflective action and reflective action in relation to all three types of 
breakdowns; (ii) it presented the most severe breakdown and most critical 
improvisation I had observed. As argued by Sandberg and Tsoukas (2011, p. 
344), focusing on breakdowns allows the relational whole of sociomaterial 
practice [to be] e a i  b gh  i  ie .  
 Episode 2 is a description of how a trainee and an experienced controller 
eac  diffe e   a  ai c af  ech ica  b e . Episode 3 is a description of 
how an inexperienced controller and their shift leader are able to assist an 
aircraft with a technical problem to make an emergency landing. The reason 
these two episodes were selected is because they deal with a similar problem 
(i.e., aircraft with technical problem), but  manifest dissimilarities in the levels 
of experience of the participants. Specifically, Episode 2 compares the reactions 
of a complete novice controller (prior to gaining licence) with an experienced 
controller. Episode 3 focuses on the reactions of an advanced beginner 
controller (a few months after gaining licence) in collaboration with an 
experienced controller. The dissimilarities allow an examination of how 
different levels of experience present different concerns, breakdowns and ways 
of improvising in relation to the same exigencies.  
 Dissimilarities are integral to theorizing because they assist in the 
construction of narrative distinctions. The latter are fundamental for refining 
the language through which we talk about a phenomenon. The subtler the 
distinctions drawn, the more nuanced our understanding becomes. Distinctions, 
however, can only become manifest through the comparison and contrast of 
e e b a ce  a d di i i a i ie . Thi  i  beca e, ha  ca  be h  ca  
be aid  (Wittgenstein, 2010, §4.1212).   
 In the Practices of Improvisation section, in addition to Episodes 1-3, I 
also draw on four additional episodes. The purpose of the subsection is to 
identify what types of improvisation practices controllers enact. The additional 
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episodes were deemed necessary, because they assist in clearly delineating the 
uniqueness of each improvisation practice. The identification of improvisation 
practices permits me to complement the detailed understanding of how 
improvisation is experienced with an understanding of how improvisation is 
enacted on the basis of lived experience.  
 The structure of the findings is as follows. First, I outline the four 
processes, one in each section, of how agents experience improvisation in 
response to the exigencies of situations (both in critical and mundane instances): 
(i) indwelling and anticipation; (ii) concern; (iii) reflection in response to 
breakdowns; (iv) appraisal, solicitations and circumspection. All four sections 
feature Episodes 1-3 to show how they each manifest the identified processes. 
It should be noted that Episodes 1 and 3, unlike Episode 2, are gradually 
narrated in part across the four sections. Second, in the fifth (v) section (i.e., 
Practices of Improvisation), I outline how improvisation is enacted through 
practices. In addition to Episodes 1-3, it features four additional episodes.  
 
5.4 Indwelling and Anticipation 
 This section is structured as follows. First, it illustrates how anticipation 
emerges through indwelling. For this I draw on some observations and 
interviews. Second, it illustrates how anticipation and indwelling are related to 
mundane improvisation. The illustration draws on part 1 of Episode 1. Finally,  
I illustrate how anticipation and indwelling are related to critical improvisation 
by drawing on Episodes 2 and 3. 
5.4.1 Relating Anticipation and Indwelling  
When fully trained, controllers see encountered situations in what Wittgenstein 
(1986, §129) ca  a ec  eei g   that is, they spontaneously see situations as 
meaning something (or in Hauge a d  e  a  a ecific sort ). However, 
when controllers are novices they are like anyone else who is not an ATCO, 
he  a e a ec -b i d   they cannot see what a situation means (Monk, 1990, 
p. 532). With time, however, though nothing intrinsic about the situations 
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changes, by learning to see them differently (i.e., as a controller) changes 
everything (Monk, 1990, p. 533).  
 The process begins by controllers learning the rules and/or procedures 
of their occupation  in other words they engage in learning rules. Rule learning 
efe   he fa i ia i a i  i h he idea  f  f ced e , i  Fe d a  
a d Pe a d  e  (2003, p. 101), he e i e  a  f i e . O ce 
selected for the programme, controllers spend 12 months memorizing all the 
rules that surround their work and then 9 months applying the rules to 
simulations. It will be shown that learning rules does not fully prepare 
controllers for real, nor even simulated situations.  
 In this section I will try to illustrate the transformation in perception (i.e., 
beginning to see from an aspect) by presenting and discussing extracts from 
interviews with the controllers. The main thrust of my argument is that 
experience serves as a dwelling from which to see situations because 
c e  ea  ha   a ici a e. The a ici a i  f ha  i   c e 
changes the prism from which controllers perceive situations. By extension, I 
argue that due to the incompleteness of the rules, their application to mundane 
activities is a form of mundane improvisation. 
 Below I display written descriptions of some procedures (i.e., the rules) 
that trainee ATCOs have to learn (see Table 7). In the first column I display 
typical arrival procedures (as displayed in the unit s manual, albeit with changes 
to names) used for aircrafts arriving from the north and east of the runway, when 
runway 27 is active. In the second column, I display the phraseology that is 
supposed to accompany the enactment of these arrival procedures. The last 
column outlines the sequence of waypoints aircrafts should be instructed to 









Procedure Name Routing Minimum altitudes 
NORTHERN ARRIVE TO INDIA THEN 
TO JULIET TO KILO TO 
LIMA AND THEN TO 
AIRPORT VOR 
INDIA: FL 130 OR ABOVE 
JULIET: 9000 FT OR ABOVE 
KILO: 6000FT OR ABOVE 
LIMA: 5000FT OR ABOVE 





ARRIVE TO MINT THEN 
TO NOVA AND THEN TO 
OSCAR 
 
MINT: 4000FT OR ABOVE 
NOVA: 4000FT OR ABOVE 
OSCAR: 4000FT OR ABOVE 
 
  
 Below, Table 8 illustrates the three phases of arrival procedures and the 
terminology the controllers ought to use at each phase. Specifically, when 
ai c af  begi  a ced e he e  c e  i  ed  i e a i a  
c ea a ce  ( ee Tab e 8, A). While the aircraft is following the procedure the 
controller has to guide the aircraft to descend in accordance to the minimum 
altitudes in the above table (see Table, 8 A and Table, 7, minimum altitudes). 
When the aircraft is close to the airport, the tower controller is supposed to clear 
the aircraft to approach the runway with the use of instrument procedure or 
visual approach (see Table 8 B1 and B2). Finally, when approximately 4 miles 
from the runway and no aircraft is on the latter, the tower controller is supposed 
to give clearance to land (Table 8, C). The meaning of technical terms can be 











Phraseology for Each Phase of Arrival Procedure 
A. Arriving aircraft clearance 
[ca  ig ] c ea ed  [ e-specified waypoint], descend via [name of arrival 
procedure] to altitude [pre-specified altitude] QNH [XXXX] no delay expected 
[i e  a ach a e] a  [ be ] ATIS [a  e e a  i f a i ]  
a. Altitude/level changes 
Dec ea e: [ca  ig ] de ce d  [de i ed e e /a i de] . 
S  de ce : [ca  ig ]  de ce  a  [de i ed e e /a i de] . 
B1. Instrument Approach Clearance 
[ca  ig ] c ea ed ILS/VOR [ a e] R a  [ a e] . 
(or) B2. Visual Approach Clearance 
Before authorising a plane to land visually, the pilot must confirm that they see the 
airfield: [ca  ig ] e  the (air)field i  igh . 
After receiving confirmation:  
[ca  ig ] c ea ed i a  a ach R a  [ a e] . 
C. Landing Clearance 
[ca  sign] runway [number] cleared to land [wind direction and speed]. 
 
 From the above, it is obvious that the rules are abstract. As a result, they 
do not prescribe exactly what to do when aircrafts are arriving. Specifically, 
they do not prescribe exactly at which point the controller ought to alter altitude, 
nor how to listen to pilots and take notes while issuing instructions, neither how 
to time their calls  these are especially pertinent when controlling multiple 
ai c af  f  diffe e  di ec i . Ma i a e ai  ha  i  a  e  ha d  
learn to think like a controller. I tried to use a formulaic a ach I ied  
learn the procedures by heart and remember that when aircraft get to point A 
they have to do X and so on, and that I had to say this and that to get the pilots 
 d  X. B  i  did  k, I had  bec e ada i e beca e he ai c af  e e  
arrived the way I th gh  he  d S   f aic a ach a  
doomed...controlling is not something that I learnt by heart, to learn I had to 
bec e ada i e.  
  Ceci ia, a e i  ai i g ffice  e ai , ai ee  a e ike babie , he  
d  k  he e  f c , h   a k  h   beha e beca e he  ca  
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see the picture - h  e hi g i ie  a he .  Ma  e e be  ha  I i  
c d  kee   i h de a di g ha  i  e e a i g, he  i i g ha  
the pilots said and responding. I felt like I was constantly playing catch up and 
a a  i g  hi k ha   d  e .  C a ce ef ec  ha  d i g he ea  
e i  a h gh e had e  12 h  ea i g he , I did  k  
a hi g. I did  k  he   h   a k  he i , he h a e g . I had 
to keep looking at the manual to find what I had to say next. I was at my wits 
e d j   fig e  ha  a d he   a  e hi g . Si i a , A h  
e e be  I  he begi i g, i  ike bei g c a  . I j  had  
planes and faced difficulties just talking to them. I kept questioning myself, 
even for simple things like talking to the pilot. How did I say it? Did I say that 
correctly? How was I supposed to say it? Was I supposed to say that now? And 
then I had to keep going back to the a a   ee if I a  c ec .  
 The reflections of Max, Constance and Anthony are typical of novices 
(see Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 2005). They illustrate how the lack of familiarity with 
their tools (including phraseology, procedures, strips to track aircraft 
movement) made them very slow to respond to situations. Max mentions he felt 
ike he a  a i g ca ch . Thei  e  a  ied  c ci  
reflecting on how they should respond - Constance and Anthony looked at the 
book to figure out what to say and Max had to think about how to respond. 
Anthony aptly remarks that due to not knowing how to respond, he kept feeling 
. Thi  gge  ha  he c e  e e  ab e  a e  ee 
what situations implied, because they could not sort them into a specific 
ca eg  (Ha ge a d, 2013, .6). I  he ai e  d , he  c d  ee he 
picture - h  e hi g i ie  a he . T  e ecific  (e.g., 
phraseology, procedures) not only requires familiarity with how to use them, 
but also when it is appropriate to use them. That is, to categorise a situation into 
a sort and in turn choose tool that has the assigned role of addressing its 
implications. All three controllers suggest that they could neither identify the 
appropriate tool, nor use tools when selected.  
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 Le a d e e be  ha  d i g he  ai i g, he cha e ge a   
memorize a hell of a lot of legal paragraphs, whole sets of rules and different 
ki d  f i f a i . Si i a , A h  aid e ed  ea  e  a d e 
rules. In a sense our job is all about rules, but back then even though we 
e i ed a  f he  e did  ea i e ha  he  ea   e did  ha e he 
experience. I only realized what the rules meant when I started working, I mean 
i  g d  k  he , b  he  a e  g ide i e . I  e hi g he  
everything is neat and tidy in theory and another when things are messy in 
ea i .  
 This was illustrated clearly when the controllers moved on to simulation 
ai i g. The e he  ea i ed ha  e e hi g we had learned was knocked out 
f he a k  (Le a d), beca e he a e f he j b had cha ged c e e , 
there were no similarities at all. Of course you could try to apply the rules, but 
i   ha  i e  (A h ). The ea  f  hi  i  ha  even though one could 
memorize the procedures in abstracto, it is another thing to apply them in 
concreto. On paper procedures specify that when an aircraft is arriving from a 
specific direction the controller ought to initiate the procedure for that heading. 
Along the trajectory of the procedure, small points specify the minimum 
altitude at which aircraft ought to fly for their approach (see Table 8). The 
procedures also dictate the exact words the controller ought to use at each 
junction of the procedure (see Table 8). But when a situation happens in reality 
 the written procedures are inherently vague  they do not dictate exactly when 
or how to enact them, especially when a controller is dealing with several 
aircrafts at the same time. To paraphrase Schatzki (1997, p. 299), understanding 
is not a formulation - simply knowing how to apply rules. In phenomenological 
e , i  ab  bei g e ce i e a d e i e  he i g a i ie  f 
situations (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 2005; Ribeiro, 2014). 
 To illustrate the difference between blindly following rules and actual 
mundane work consider the following memories Leonard describes. The first 
memory illustrates that knowing the procedures alone does not suffice to 
appropriate i e e e   i a i . D i g  fi  i a  e i  I 
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learned that the point is not only to allow aircraft to land safely. For example, I 
had two departures and three arrivals. I wanted to be safe, so I told the 
departures to hold short [i.e., wait just beyond the runway] of the runway until 
he h ee a i a  a ded. B   ai e  a  ha  i h e. She d h 
us, to see that we had to be expeditious. At first it is difficult to imagine that 
 h d  a a  ai  f  a  ai c afts land before you allow your departures 
to leave. This is a sort of  mentality and you need to internalize. You always to 
be one step ahead, issue a restriction [for the arrival, in order to allow the 
departure to take off with no conflict] and let the othe  g .  Thi  e  
illustrates that competence requires something more than accordance with rules. 
Leonard had followed the rules, but his trainer was not happy. This shows that 
to appropriately time responses, the controller has to anticipate (viz., be one 
e  ahead ) he e he e e  f he ai c af  i  eadi g  , i  de   
allow aircrafts to move without delay.  
 A he  f Le a d  e ie  i a e  ha  rules do not show where 
a controller should focus on and which aircraft to prioriti e. F  e a e, I 
a ked a  ai c af   i e  a d ai  [e e  he a  b   ake ff i  
permission is given], while there was an arrival that had just landed and I was 
ai i g f  he   aca e [e i  he a ,  he i ed  ai c af  ca  ake 
off]. At the same time, I had another aircraft on a 5 mile final [5 miles from the 
runway] and then I also had another aircraft that talked to me for the first time. 
This is an instance where I learned ha  i  i   i a   a e  he a e  
ca . I had  i e a i e hi ;  f c e hi  i  ec d a e f  e, I  
g    a e  ha  e  ca . Thi   f fi e i g i   e hi g  
can do when you are just a i g. Y  d  k  ha   f c  ha   be  
your hot zones, I mean the runway and circuits and not on an aircraft that is 40 
miles from the airport. I am not sure we even saw the hot zones as hot zones. 
As a trainee you think that h e e  a k   ,  ha e  a e b  ha  
 he ca e.  Thi  e  agai  gge  ha   e d a ia e  he 
c e   ea i e he e he h  e  i  ca ed, b  a ici a i g he e i  
is more urgent to respond to. 
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 Situations do not come with a priori rules, nor labels with which to 
arrange circumstances into specific sorts and then choose the designated 
response to deal with them (Tsoukas, 2018a, p. 9). Prior to this point in their 
recollections, controllers had spent six months memorising rules, procedures 
and phraseology. However, they had no practical experience - their experience 
was abstract. Even though they mention that when in doubt, they referred to 
their manuals which contained all rules, phraseology and procedures, they still 
were not sure if they were getting their performance right. As scholars have 
aptly remarked, humans are not blind rule followers - they do not categorise a 
circumstance into a sort by following a rule (Tsoukas, 2011a, p. 457). An agent 
needs the critical ability to judge when a categorization rule is relevant in order 
to apply it (Ryle, 1949, p. 30; Taylor, 1993, p. 57). Thi  i  beca e  c e 
of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be 
ade   acc d i h he e if e e hi g ca  be ade   acc d i h 
he e, he  i  ca  a  be ade   c f ic  i h i  (Wittgenstein, 1986, 
§201). To determine the use of a categorization rule requires dwelling in an 
experiential background against which to discriminate its relevance. 
 Without experience or familiarity of using tools, they were unable to see 
which category of situation they were dealing with and by extension anticipate 
their implications (Tsoukas, 1996, p. 20; Tsoukas & Cummings, 1997, p. 668). 
Without seeing the implications, they were unable to judge neither which tool 
was relevant to the situation, nor when it was relevant to use it (Haugeland, 
2013, p. 6). They attempted to use formulaic reasoning, kept questioning 
themselves, did not identify appropriate courses of action and checked their 
manuals. This in turn, highlights a diminished ability to anticipate how to 
respond (see Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 2005). Therefore, as illustrated in the 
beginning of this section by the accounts of the novice ATCOs, having little 
experience to dwell in signifies a reduced ability to use tools and to anticipate 
he   e he , beca e c e  ca  b idge he ga  ef  e  i  
situations (Polanyi, 1961, p. 465). 
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5.4.2 Indwelling and Anticipation as the basis of Mundane Improvisation. 
Dwelling in experience allows agents to grasp the implications of the current 
situation, against the background of past experience and by extension foresee 
the implications of its meaning  (Polanyi, 1962a, p. 19; Rietveld, 2012b, p. 124). 
Indwelling is enacted on the basis of the from-to structure of tacit knowledge. 
The latter permits agents to attend from deeply familiar aspects, to the meaning 
of their amalgamation. Thus, experienced controllers can spontaneously 
ec a e  he ibi i ie  ffe ed b  he fie d f e e ie ce  fi  he 
ga  ef  e  i  a i a i  ag e  a ici a e  a i  (Polanyi, 1961, 
p. 465). Experience serves as a background against which figures are presented. 
In fact, the way in which they respond is never exactly the same as the 
rules/procedures dictate. By constantly judging the correct time at which an 
aircraft ought to enact a specific part of the procedure, the controller slightly 
deviates from the rule/procedure.  
 The following episode sharply contrasts reflections of the novices 
discussed above. This episode was chosen to show that experienced controllers 
no longer need to think about how to respond, controllers are always in the 
process of improvisation, and that they are able to cope with situations through 
anticipation. I contend that routine coping with situations can be understood in 
terms of mundane improvisation. That is, even ordinary situations call for 
creative adjustment of the procedures to fit with the situations at hand. 
 
Episode 1, Pa  1: G a dian Angel   Mundane Improvisation. It was a 
moderately busy session for Angelo. He was fulfilling the role of the tower 
controller position. At the time of the episode, he was controlling five inbound 
aircraft16. Procedures dictate that aircraft are separated by 1000ft vertically and 
at least 5 miles laterally17. The aircraft were arriving from two directions, from 
the northwest and the south. Each direction of arrival, has specific procedures 
 
16 A departure was also flying at the time, but did not play a central role in the episode. 
17 Informal separation rule, aerodrome approach procedures allow for less separation as its aim is to 
sequence aircraft for landing. 
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(i.e., pre-a ig ed ai  e  ha  ead  he ai  a ). Each ced e 
states a range of a max and minimum altitude depending on land obstacles limits 
(e.g., mountain ranges, built up areas) and speed. Although aircraft may be 
flying in the same direction, they are seldom on the same altitude, and if they 
are, they must be separated by at least 5 miles. Hence, each time Angelo makes 
an adjustment to the altitude of one aircraft, there is a domino effect. Angelo 
must re-arrange the altitudes of the rest of the aircraft.  
Aircraft #1, was about to land, its position was about 8 miles from the 
beginning of the runway and was flying at an altitude of 1500ft. #2 was at an 
altitude of 3000ft on the base turn for aligning with the runway. Aircraft #3 was 
a  i  e e ce  a d. #3  i i  a  e  10 i e  behi d #2, a d a  
flying at 5000ft. It should be noted, that based on the position, altitude and 
velocity of the aircraft at the time, Angelo expected aircraft to follow the 
predetermined procedure for approaching the runway (see figure 318). As #1 
was about to land, this suggested that #1 will gradually reduce its altitude. 
Hence, Angelo cleared #2 to descend to 1500ft, but maintain the necessary 
lateral separation from #1. As usual, Angelo gives the instruction to #2, before 
seeing that #1 has descended from 1500ft. This is because, like in other cases 
by the time #2 descends to 1500ft, #1 will have nearly landed. Due to the 
standardised flight paths, the controllers expects that there will be no conflict 
with #1 who will already be descending anyway.  #3 is instructed to continue 
their descent to 4000ft.  
 
 
18 Runway clipart retrieved from https://pixabay.com/vectors/airport-runway-grey-asphalt-travel-




Figure 3 - Positions of Arrivals in Episode 1 
 
Analysis of Episode 1, Part 1: Each time Angelo instructed an aircraft to 
alter their altitude, he did so prior to the previous aircraft completing his 
instructions. Especially in the case of #2 and #1, Angelo gives instructions that 
could bring them on the same altitude. However, this is usual for controllers - 
Angelo knows that by the time #2 descends, #1 will have descended even 
further. After a busy, but smooth session of simultaneously handling 19 aircraft 
in one hour, the second most experienced controller (Calvin) at the tower 
ex ai ed  e: he ke  i   be ac i e,  eac i e, if  d  i e he 
a ia e i c i  i  ad a ce  i  fa  behi d b  aki g e ca . 
Th , a  Ca i  ef ec i  gge  a d A ge  ac i s illustrate, competent 
controllers do not only issue instructions in relation to current occurrences (i.e., 
current positions of aircraft), but also to anticipated future occurrences (i.e., 
future positions of aircraft).  
This signifies that controllers anticipate how the aircraft will move. With 
the anticipation of the movement, Angelo realises the implications of each 
instruction for the other aircraft. A  Ceci ia ei e a ed a  i e   ha e  
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be three steps ahead of what is already happening and this ability comes from 
experience . A ge  experience enables him to prepare for possible 
eventualities (Benner et al., 1999, p. 64; Hutchins, 2010, p. 431). By attending 
from his experience (i.e., indwelling), he has a background against which he 
ca  e cei e a  i de e i a e e e ce f ha  hich [he ha ] a ead  
e e ie ced  (Ribeiro, 2014, p. 579; see also Schatzki, 2006, p. 1868). Angelo 
can anticipate through dwelling in his past experience of how aircraft move 
when enacting the pre-specified procedures (see Benner et al., 1999, Chapter 
3). I  Ha ge a d  (2013, .6) e , he ca  a e  ca eg i e i a i  
into sorts and by extension respond to them by using the designated/appropriate 
tool (i.e., procedure and instruction).  
Categorization and enacting procedures should not be understood as an 
intellectual mental process (cf. Healey et al., 2015; Moorman & Miner, 1998b; 
E. Smith & DeCoster, 2000), but an intuitive response to the anticipated 
implications of specific circumstances (Shotter, 1996, p. 296; Wittgenstein, 
1986, §146-155). Angelo does not have a memory of an identical situation so 
he can immediately categorize it as the same as what happened in the past - 
e e  i a i  ecific  a e diffe e . A  C a ce e i ed each 
situation is very different, even a small difference in air speed, wind, company 
or pilots can change things dramatica . I deed, A ge  a  ha e had i i a  
past experiences, but since they are never identical it takes a creative leap to 
ec g i e a ike e  (Monk, 1990, p. 511) or put otherwise, to bridge the gap 
and categorize that this situation is of this sort. Lived experience does not come 
with labels saying that this situation is of this sort (Tsoukas, 2018a). 
Nor do the pre-specified procedures dictate exactly what to do (Ribeiro 
& Collins, 2007; Tsoukas, 2011a). Written procedures entail a different 
understanding, like the difference between playing chess and symbolizing chess 
moves. In Wittgenstein  d , he de a i  ha  I ca  ge  he e i  eigh  
e  c i  i   ac a  ge i g he e i  he b i [b ] hi g 
i e iece  f d ac  a b a d i  e hi g i e e ia   b i i g 
(Monk, 1990, p. 308). Along the same lines, writing ATC procedures in 
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abstracto is not the same as performing them in concreto. Performing is open-
ended and dynamic, whereas procedures are abstract - they cannot capture the 
i icac  f i a i a  d a ic . Th , A ge  acc d  e e  i h he 
procedures neither by following rules, nor by being introspective. In his own 
d , I ca  e ai  h  I k  h   eac  - I just see what needs to be 
d e a d he  I j  d  i . He bridges the gap by being sensitive to the present 
in relation to what is anticipated on the background of the past. Put simply 
A ge  d e   e   ab ac  k edge i  he f  f he  X, d  Y ; 
what he relies on is the capacity to perceive a situation as calling for something 
ba ed  a fa i  e e b a ce   e i  e e ie ced i a i  
(Wittgenstein, 1986, §67).  
F i g f  he ab e, A ge  abi i   ca eg i e h d be 
de d a  a e-i e ec a  (Shotter, 1996, p. 299) understanding evoked 
b  he ci c a ce  de  hich he had ch a  e e ie ce  (Wittgenstein, 
1986, §155), which in turn allowed him to spontaneously improvise a fit 
between the rules and the situation at hand. In a conversation with Constance 
ab  h  he ca  ead  a i a i , I d  k  h  I k  - I can just 
e I d  hi k ab  i i  a a e  f e e ie ce, b  eei g he ic e 
i  e hi g ha  I a  ab e  d  he  I a  a i g . Seeing the 
ic e  i  a c  h a e ed b  c e  (see Owen, 2018, p. 74). It 
refers to understanding where all airborne aircraft are in each moment and how 
they are anticipated to move - seeing the present under the prism of experience 
and future possibilities. Indeed, grasping the picture is so important that an 
active controller cannot be substituted unless the fresh controller acknowledges 
ha  he  ha e he ic e . 
 Returning to part 1, Angelo categorised the situation, as a situation 
which called for sequencing the aircraft to land. To assist them he knows that 
he must gradually reduce their altitude without letting them get too close to each 
other. Because of being in a similar situation dozens of times per shift (during 
peak sessions of one hour, an ATCO guides about 12 arrivals), he can 
spontaneously anticipate not only which procedure or instruction is required, 
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but also how the aircraft will move. A  T  e ai ed, I j  eed  k a  
the sky or the radar screen and I immediately know where the aircraft is heading 
a d ha  ced e he  gh   f . This is why as soon as Angelo 
adj  he a h f #1  a d, he e e ia  ed ce  #2  a d #3  a i de , 
without waiting for each to complete his instructions. Put simply experience 
allows him to see where the aircraft will be, and in turn this allows him to 
spontaneously issue another instruction to the next aircraft based on his 
anticipation of the future position of the previous aircraft (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 
2005).  
Angelo also dwells in the background of a sociomaterial infrastructure 
(see Lamprou, 2017; Riemer & Johnston, 2014). First as implied above, Angelo 
dwells in procedures (pre-defined rules and terminology - for further examples 
see sections B and C in Glossary). For instance, although airway routes are 
based on the physical airspace, they are virtual - hei   a e ia  ace  ca  
be found in maps or navigation systems. By attending from these, Angelo can 
attend from the position of the aircraft which type of procedure the aircraft must 
use and in turn anticipate where an aircraft will fly to within the next few 
minutes (Ribeiro, 2014; Rietveld, 2012b, p. 109; Wrathall, 2000, p. 113). In his 
 d , I k  he e he ai c af  gh   be beca e f k i g he 
ced e  a d eei g h  he  a e ed b  i . 
Second, Angelo dwells in equipment which he interprets in line with 
normatively established distinctions (for examples see section A, in Glossary). 
For example, recognising and categorising the positions of aircraft in relation 
to types of procedures and knowing the pre-specified paths of the procedures 
are not enough for anticipating the positions of aircraft (see Haugeland, 2013). 
Li e acki g i  e i ed. A ge  ca  ee  a d i e   he e e  f 
aircraft with the use of the radar monitor and the radio-telecommunication 
system. As mentioned above, the radar allows Angelo to see the position of the 
aircraft and thus by recognising which type of procedure is relevant, with the 
movement of the dot, he can see how aircraft are enacting the procedures. He 
does not only see dots on a screen. As a controller, the dot is an aircraft which 
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is flying towards a specific direction, with a certain speed, at a specific altitude 
as well as the previous trajectory and expected direction (based on current 
movement). By attending from these features, he can see the position of aircraft 
and anticipate how they are likely to affect the flight path of the other aircraft. 
The radio-telecommunication system allows Angelo to triangulate what he 
observes on the screen, as well as afford a means of communicating with pilots 
to adapt the flying paths of aircraft based on his anticipations. It should be 
mentioned, that Angelo and his colleagues have received training on how to 
track aircraft by only relying on the radio. By asking pilots questions, the 
controllers can keep track of aircraft positions without looking at the radar. 
Following the above, by dwelling in a host of subsidiary aspects 
(including experience and familiarity with tools) offers an experiential 
background against which controllers can spontaneously categorise situations 
into sorts. By categorising situations into sorts, allows them to respond to 
exigencies, by anticipating which response corresponds to that category. 
Responses (e.g., instructions) have pre-assigned roles with which a controller 
uses to address the anticipated implications. The above is clearly illustrated in 
Mike  ef ec i   h  he ha  i ed e  he ea : The diffe e ce  
i  ha  I a  ca e , I i edia e  k  ha   d , i   ike he  I did  
know what to do - who to call for help, what to use or losing the picture. The 
more inexperienced you are, the more easily you lose the picture. The difference 
is that now I know what to aim for, I can even organize the others. My reaction 
i  a a ic, i  ike BOOM (claps his hands loudly) - i  ha  fa .   
5.4.3 Indwelling and Anticipation as the Basis of Critical Improvisation 
Above it was argued that controllers necessarily enact mundane improvisation 
to accomplish routine tasks by anticipating developments through dwelling in 
experience and their tools (i.e., procedures, phraseology, equipment). The 
anticipation of developments is tied to how situations matter - their meaning. In 
the case of inexperience, controllers are not able to see how situations matter. 
They cannot anticipate developments because they are unfamiliar with their 
equipment and lack experience of similar situations. The lack of anticipation in 
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turn does not allow them to fluidly cope with routine air traffic. In contrast, 
experienced controllers can intuitively respond to the implications of situations 
by spontaneously seeing their implications.  
 Anticipation is not only fundamental to coping with mundane situations, 
but also to coping with critical situations. By drawing on two episodes, it will 
be argued that different levels of experience infuse situations with different 
meaning due to seeing the situation from different angles. The different 
meaning will be argued to be tied to perceiving different implications of the 
same situation. The perception of different implications is tied to both detecting 
abnormality and addressing it.  
 Abnormal situations are critical because severe negative outcomes are 
imminent. Hence, critical situations is understood as critical improvisation. The 
latter is defined as creatively preserving the goods of the practice (more about 
this in the next subsection) by making large deviations from the rules. It should 
be noted that without anticipating abnormality, controllers cannot respond to it. 
The two below episodes describe how two pairs of controllers, one of whom is 
more experienced than the other, anticipate different implications from the same 
situation. Each episode is followed by analysis and theorizing. 
 Episode 2 - Smelling  ha  ome hing i  ong. I  a  T  fi   he 
job training session. The session had very low traffic - one aircraft was 
approaching to land. Throughout the session, Andrew with over 15 years of 
experience served as a safeguard and a mentor. Tom successfully guided the 
aircraft to the final stages of the approach procedure. Upon initiating the final 
stage of the approach, the aircraft can only descend below 3000ft after a certain 
point, due to an overlap with the missed approach procedure [see 50 in 
Glossary] at 2000ft19 (see figure 420). Tom was very aware of this and asks the 
i   e  a i g 3000f . The i  d e   a e . T  a k  he i  
 
19 The altitude of 2000ft, especially when close to the airport is always reserved in case of an aircraft 
being unable to land. By having this altitude free ensures that a conflict with another aircraft which is 
approaching the airport is avoided. 
20 Runway clipart retrieved from https://pixabay.com/vectors/airport-runway-grey-asphalt-travel-
36472/ and  aircraft clipart retrieved from [on 16 Oct. 18] 
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Airplane_silhouette.png 
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agai : e  a i g 3000f . N  a e . T  e c ai  i h f a i  ff 
he adi . A d e  a k  T   ca  d . T  d e   give up - he insists 
f  a hi d i e, e  a i g 3000f . Hi  ice i   ca  a e. He 
sighs loudly (off the radio, pilot could not hear this). At this point, Andrew 
suspects that there must be something wrong with the radio. He checks the radio 
equipment console to see if it is active - all indications suggest that it was in 
ki g de . Mea hi e, T  a   a e i   A d e . He a , e  
a i g 3000f  f  a f h i e a d he  a fif h i e - again no response. After 
a few seconds, he i  fi a  e d : a db . T , ha ed b  hi  
a  e e, e d : R ge  i , b  e  a i g 3000f . U  
hea i g a db , A d e  k e  e hi g a  g. A d e  d T  ha  
he was taking over control. Andrew immediately asked the pilot if he needed 
a i a ce i h e hi g. The i  aid ega i e , b  a e  e ai ed ha  he 
was performing checks because the aircraft system presented an indication of a 




Figure 4 - Position of Non-responsive Pilot and Missed Approach Procedure 
 
 Episode 2 Analysis. In the next paragraphs Episode 2, despite several 
allusions to emotional experience, will be analysed in reference to indwelling 
and anticipation. Emotional experience in this episode will be addressed in the 
next section.  
 Tom is an inexperienced controller. As most novices, his performance is 
characterised by rigidity  cannot adapt to circumstances (Dreyfus, 2017b; 
Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986a, 2005). This is because he is pre-occupied with 
getting his performance correct by paying attention to rules. In his own words: 
I a  ai  c ce ed i h ge i g he eadback [ ee 36 a d 39 i  G a ] 
 ick a  he b e   he ced e c i ed I a  e c ce ed i h 
Andrew telling me that I got everything right, all the required information, the 
eadback, he f igh  e e .  The ea  T  i i  f  a eadback i  h eef d: 
first, Tom is pre-occupied with the rule that states that the pilot must read back 
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every instruction issued. Second, by focusing on getting the procedure correct, 
Tom wanted the readback to move on safely to the next step of the procedure. 
Third, by not completing the first two, Tom thought his performance would not 
merit praise from Andrew. This suggests that Tom saw the meaning of the 
situation as a test of his ability to perform, not as an abnormality. In his own 
d : I k e  I a  aki g e ca  ha  a  e e ie ced c e , a d I 
h gh  ha  he i  a  fed  i h e. Thi  f a ed e, b  I did  hi k 
there was anything wr g.   
  In contrast, Andrew saw the meaning of the situation very differently. 
After the third call, unlike Tom, Andrew was not concerned with the rules (viz. 
the pilot giving a readback). Andrew later explained - I a  ied beca e I 
knew there was something wrong, first I checked that our radio was working. 
Af e  I a  ha  a  k, I ec ed ha  ei he  he i  adi  a  ki g 
or the pilot was pre-occupied with something. As soon as he said standby I 
k e  ha  e hi g a  g. He a  e ding because he was pre-
cc ied . Like  e e , he i  f e ib e  he ci c a ce  (Dreyfus & 
Dreyfus, 2005). Af e  T  hi d ca ,  A d e  i  a  b i  ha  he 
situation was abnormal. Consequently, Andrew and Tom paid attention to 
different aspects the situation. Andrew initially checks to see if there is 
something wrong with the radio-telecommunication equipment. Later, upon 
hearing the pilot say standby, Andrew was sure that the situation was abnormal 
and he immediately takes over to offer help. Both latter aspects were peripheral 
to Tom who instead insisted on formalities. 
 Following the above, although both controllers faced exactly the same 
situation, a different meaning was presented to each. To Andrew it presented 
itself under the category of abnormality. To Tom it presented itself under the 
category of a non-cooperative pilot which made it appear frustrating. A key 
diffe e ce be ee  he  c a  a  ha  b  ca eg i i g he i a i  
differently, controllers anticipated different implications. Tom thought that the 
reason the pilot was not responding to him was because the pilot was tired of 
T  e ce i e ca . Furthermore, he anticipated that this would affect 
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A d e  a ai a  f hi  e f a ce. B h i ica i  f a ed T . A  
hi  a  T  fi   he j b ai i g e i , he had i e e e ie ce  d e l 
in (Polanyi, 1958). As part of simulator training, emphasis is placed on 
assessing the trainees ability to use phraseology, to track and guide aircraft. 
Therefore, he had no similar experience to attend from, to categorise this 
situation as abnormal (Polanyi, 1965). Dwelling in experience infuses situations 
with meaning, because past-experience serves as a tacit background for current-
experience to stand out against as a specific sort (Dreyfus, 1993, p. 31; Polanyi, 
1961, p. 468, 1962a, p. 14; Rietveld, 2012b, p. 124).  
 Tom related the situation to his experiential background of assessment 
and performance. This is the reason Tom insisted on getting the readback. In 
contrast, Andrew filled in the gaps left in the situation differently. By dwelling 
in a different experiential background where he had seen similar situations 
before, a different categorization allowed him to anticipate different 
implications (Polanyi, 1961, p. 465). In particular, by dwelling in his experience 
he a ici a ed he i de e i a e e e ce  f e i e  fai e,  e hi g 
preoccupying the pilot (Ribeiro, 2014, p. 579; see also Schatzki, 2006, p. 1868). 
This is the reason he checks the radio and upon hearing a db  a k  if he 
pilot needs assistance. 
 Talking to Tom a few months after the incident, he reflects on it and felt 
e ba a ed. I j  a  ead   ee i  a  he i e. N  I k  I a  
unprofessional, but I thought the pilot was fed up with me. If that happened now 
I d ea i e e hi g a  g beca e I e dea  i h a  i cide  
since then. Now I can smell trouble without being told. If a i  d e  e  I 
bec e ici  ha  I ca  be hea d,  a igh  cha ge i  a i  ice 
ca  e  e ha  he i  e ed if he i  i  ab , e  e ha  he i  d i g 
e hi g e e . T  gge  ha  hi  e e ie ce a  hi   a ici a e he 
implications of similar situations very differently from his first training session. 
He has learned to categorize situations in which pilots do not respond or respond 
with a different tone of voice, as an abnormal situation which entails technical 
difficulties (see Haugeland, 2013). He no longer has to be explicitly told that a 
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pilot is facing a b e , he ca  e   ee he i de e i a e e e ce f 
ha  hich ha  a ead  e e ie ced  a d he ce i  ab e  a ici a e i e  he 
was unable to before (Ribeiro, 2014, p. 579).  
 Epi ode 3 Hi  e pe ience allo ed him o ee . During the time of this 
episode Norman (an ATCO) had approximately four months of experience. As 
Aircraft #11 was approaching the airport to land, its pilots had reported a 
mechanical issue. Specifically, the co-pilot informed Norman that their flaps 
were not operational. This suggests that the aircraft cannot effectively reduce 
speed upon landing. As per the procedures aircraft #11 eventually requests to 
enter the hold (see 49 in Glossary) over waypoint Bravo (see 25 in Glossary). 
Bravo is located close to the airport, but is positioned in a way that does not 
affect arrivals or departures. With a slightly shaken voice, Norman clears the 
aircraft to go to Bravo. This gives time and space for pilots to perform checks. 
Upon hearing this report, the shift leader (Paul) sits next to Norman to offer 
support. Paul is a very experienced controller with over 15 years of experience. 
De i e e f i g a e ie  f check , #11  i  c d  fi d a i   
the problem and requested a high-speed approach. At the time three aircraft 
were approaching to land and two aircraft were waiting for take-off. Norman 
cleared the first arrival (#12) to land and instructed the others that were further 
away to enter holds. However, for Norman the departing aircraft remained in 
the background. Paul aware of the departing aircraft advises Norman to allow 
them to depart after #12.  
 After the situation was concluded I asked both about this occasion. 
N a  e ai ed ha  beca e f he e e ge c  I a  e ha  #11 
would do, so I decided to allow #12 to land first and then rest of the airborne 
aircrafts to enter the holds. This way I would win some time to see what 
happened next. Paul saw, his experience allowed him to see that we also had 
departures and suggested that I all  he   ea e i  de    de a  he . 
Pa  e ai ed ha : I  high eed a di g  he e i  a ibi i  ha  he 
a  a ac i  be da aged. I e ee  i  bef e, he  e f i g high 
speed landings because of the flaps not working, pilots tend to approach the 
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runway with the nose of the aircraft raised higher than usual. They do so 
because this increases the surface of the aircraft and allows them to slow down. 
After the rear tires touch the ground, the front tires hit the ground (claps his 
hands emphatically) with greater force because it is raised higher than usual. 
This why the tarmac could be damaged and could result in closing the airport 
for a while. Departures would be stuck on the ground for hours. So, I advised 
Norman to let the departures to take- ff.  
 Analysis of Episode 3: Norman offers #11 a priority landing because of 
the abnormality of the situation, while anticipating the movement of all airborne 
aircraft. He knows that without allowing the first to land and delaying the 
he , #11  i i  a di g d be je a di ed. N a  ac i  a d 
Pa  acce a ce f ffe i g a i i  a di g gge  ha  b h c ers 
categorize the situation as an abnormality (see Haugeland, 2013, p.6). However, 
beyond the priority landing, they are solicited to different courses of action. 
This is because they anticipate different implications form the anticipated 
priority landing. Specifically, Norman is drawn to addressing the aircraft in the 
air in response to anticipating what is needed to achieve the priority landing. 
Contrarily, Paul is also drawn to the aircraft on the ground because of 
anticipating implications after the landing.  
  N a  a d Pa  diffe e  a ici a i  ab  he i ica i  f 
the priority landing can be attributed to dwelling in a different experiential 
background. Dwelling in different experiential backgrounds, foregrounded 
different figures (Benner et al., 1999, p. 75; Ribeiro, 2014, p. 562). Specifically, 
beca e f eei g i  bef e , Pa  a ici a ed ha  #11 c d e ia  
damage the tarmac of the runway by landing at high speed. This then would 
delay take- ff  a d a di g . I  a a , Pa  a  c ed  he e e  
(Schatzki, 2006, p. 1868). Norman on the other hand, lacked this experiential 
background. He wanted to win some time to see what happened, because he 
was not sure what to anticipate the implications of a high-speed landing. This 
i  e ide  he  N a  a  ha  I a  e ha  #11 d d .  
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 Therefore, although both had enough experience for the situation to 
present itself as abnormal, due to dwelling in different experiential 
backgrounds, the situation presented Norman and Paul with a different 
anticipation of implications for the high speed landing which in turn made 
different responses to appear relevant. Norman is drawn to just clearing the way 
for #11 to land, because he anticipated a conflict with the other inbound aircraft. 
Paul is drawn: (a) to clearing the way for #11 to land because of the anticipation 
of the landing, and (b) allowing the departures to take off because of the 
anticipation of potential tarmac damage from the high-speed landing. 
5.4.4 Summary 
Situations present themselves differently to controllers depending on the extent 
of their experience. Different experiences form different subsidiary particulars 
i  hich c e  d e  i . The a  f h a  ac i i  i   e hi g ha  
no longer exists, that trails off behind the present, just like the future of activity 
is not something that does not yet exist, that hovers before the present. Past, 
e e , a d f e cc  ge he  (Schatzki, 2006, p. 1871). Indwelling 
grounds the past in the present, as a background against which to anticipate 
future potentialities. In other words, dwelling in experience serves as a 
background which foregrounds the meaning of present circumstances (i.e., how 
the implications of situation matter) (Polanyi, 1961, p. 468). The perceived 
meaning of situations depends on the ability to spontaneously categorise a 
situation into a specific sort based on similar past experiences (Haugeland, 
2013, p. 6). In turn, the categorization permits the anticipation of future 
implications based on past experience (see Tsoukas & Shepherd, 2004). The 
anticipation of implications allows controllers to intuitively respond (Ribeiro, 
2014, p. 578). Hence, controllers do not respond strictly to present events, but 
rather to anticipated events based on present occurrences. 
Anticipation through indwelling, is key to both dealing with normal and 
abnormal situations. Indeed, without anticipating a situation as a specific type, 
it is impossible to respond to it. This is because situations do not have an a priori 
background against which controllers can attend from, in order to foreground 
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refined perceptual categorization (Polanyi, 1961, pp. 466 467). Unlike art, 
which in some cases the painter demarks the background of an object (e.g. 
Ce a e  B e a e  ai i g), ea  c e  d   ha e a  a-priori 
figure/background demarcation (Ribeiro, 2014, p. 568). Therefore, it takes a 
creative leap to see what a situation entails and how to appropriately cope with 
it. Mundane situations require mundane improvisation (i.e., small deviations 
from the rules). Critical situations (i.e., situations that have imminent negative 
implications) require critical improvisation (i.e., large deviations from the 
rules). This is because the rules do not prescribe how to cope with the 
singularities of any situation. 
Categorising a situation into a sort is not always enough to see the full 
extent of implications. Even after categorising a situation as a specific sort, the 
e e  f e  e e ie ia  backg d f a ecific e f i a i  i  a  
a key role in anticipating and responding to its full implications. As illustrated 
in Episode 3, although the situation appeared to both Paul and Norman as 
abnormal, they anticipated different implications. Norman had never dealt with 
a high-speed landing before, whereas Paul had. Because of dwelling in different 
experiential backgrounds, this presented the situation calling for more actions 
for Paul and less for Norman. Having seen this before, Paul anticipated damage 
to the runway. Against this background, letting the departures to take-off prior 
to the emergency landing appeared relevant. Without this background, Norman 
only saw the relevance of clearing the way for the emergency landing. 
 
5.5 Concern  
Above it was argued that dwelling in experience (of similar situations 
and tool use) enables anticipation. Indwe i g a  c e   ha e a a ge 
repertoire of background experiences that enable them to see situations with a 
e a ed i d  (Benner et al., 1999, p. 65). In all the above episodes, the 
anticipated implications evoke responses from the controllers. This suggests 
that what controllers anticipate is not indifferent to them (Tsoukas, 2018b). 
Quite the contrary. By reacting to anticipated implications suggests that 
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controllers are concerned about their anticipations (Lambie & Marcel, 2002, p. 
229).  
Agents do what they do, not because they are stimulus-response 
automata. They act for the sake of something  because they care about their 
ac ice  goods and desire a specific telos (Castoriadis, 2005b; MacIntyre, 
2007). Situations are experienced as normatively and emotionally charged 
(Frijda, 2009; Shotter & Tsoukas, 2014a; Solomon, 2004). As the goods of 
practices are taken for granted, indwelling also entails being concerned about 
h  hi g  a e . The ac ice  g d  ac  a  a ake  f  g a ed backg d 
f  h  i a i  gh   be (MacIntyre, 2007). Dwelling in the 
significations of this background, allows the spontaneous interpretation of 
situations and their implications, as well as a means for motivating reactions. 
Put simply, controllers react to their anticipations because they are concerned 
ab  hei  ac ice  g d  (Dreyfus & Kelly, 2007, p. 53; Frijda, 2009, p. 264, 
2010b, p. 573; Lambie & Marcel, 2002, p. 231). 
Practices at the control room revolve around two goods. Like most high-
reliability organizations, the central good is safety (see Reason, 1995, 2000). 
Safety, refers to minimising the possibility of exposing any aircraft to hazards 
such as terrain obstacles, weather conditions and other aircraft or vehicles. Its 
centrality is illustrated by the fact that procedures for aircraft approach or 
departure are designed in a manner which minimises aircraft exposure to 
danger. Safety, however, as a target is sought to be achieved in conjunction with 
expedition. Expedition relates to ensuring that aircraft are directed in a way that 
enables them to travel to their destinations with as little delay or inconvenience 
as possible (see appx. 2 for additional evidence).  
Both the above goods are sought to be achieved on the basis of the mood 
of attentive calmness. That is, controllers experience emotions under the 
umbrella of the mood of their practice. Attentive calmness is conceptualized as 
an orientation to remain calm and attentive to exigencies under all 
circumstances. This is because the e e gica  c i g  of practices is 
c di a ed i h e i  a d d  ha  a ici a  h d  a  e j  
 180 
(Schatzki, 2002, p. 80). In Heideggerian terms, moods allow agents to 
e c e  e i ie  b  de e i i g h  h e e i ie  i  a e   [ he ]  
(Dreyfus & Wrathall, 2005, p. 5). Mood, thus, is an orientation of engagement 
with encountered situations - a a  f bei g ed i   he hi g  i  he d  
(ibid, p. 5). Specifically, from early on in their careers ATCOs learn that they 
must always be polite, feel calm and have a steady, reassuring and confident 
voice when talking over the radio. Attentive calmness is considered key for 
helping pilots to remain calm so as to  guarantee their cooperation (see appx. 3 
for additional evidence). Both the latter are understood to be fundamental for 
safety and expedition.  
Although the two goods and mood are not visible to the naked eye, their 
presence is manifested in the actions and accounts of participants (Lambie & 
Marcel, 2002, p. 229). Participants would talk about the goods or mood, and as 
shall be seen below, would re-enact them on a daily basis thanks to their concern 
about them (Gehman et al., 2013).  
When any of the above (goods and/or mood) are violated, agents act as 
he ce i  g a dia  f  he adi i  - he  eek  ec  he ac ice  
goods (Haugeland, 2013, p. 13). Hence, the implementation of the three 
aforementioned goods is scrutinized through accountability. Accountability, 
relates to conforming to the rules and values of ATC (see appx. 4 for additional 
evidence). All controllers are aware that they can be held accountable for all 
their actions (or inactions) so they always strive to follow all pre-defined rules 
as closely as possible. This makes them aware that they are responsible for the 
safety of flights. In this way, the two goods and mood are enmeshed in practice 
- they are not separate. Under normal circumstances, controllers cannot seek to 
achieve one good at the expense of the others. All goods are differentially 
illustrated in the above episodes. 
 In Episode 1, as soon as Angelo issues an instruction to change the 
altitude of one aircraft, he spontaneously moves to re-a a ge he he  ai c af  
altitudes. As illustrated above, he issues instructions prior to aircraft completing 
his previous instructions. This suggests that he anticipates not only the future 
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position of aircraft, but also the implications of their anticipated position for the 
safety of the other aircraft. Without issuing instructions in response to his 
previous instructions there would not be adequate spacing between aircraft.  
The higher the proximity between aircraft, the more likely it is for aircraft to 
c ide. Thi  gge  ha  A ge  c a  adj e  seek to avoid risking 
he afe  f he ai c af . Th , A ge  c ce  f  ai c af  afe , e e  a  
key contextual background which foregrounds the necessity to continuously 
issue instructions to pre-emptively separate aircraft. As illustrated in Episode 1, 
there are rules in place which dictate that aircraft must always be separated both 
laterally and vertically with a set distance. Procedures also dictate a minimum 
vertical distance from terrain obstacles.  
By acting according to the rules  (Harré, 2002, p. 116), Angelo creates 
buffer zones between different aircraft and terrain to safeguard against any 
unexpected deviations. Moreover, A ge  i c i  e i  he 
simultaneous execution of procedures by different pilots. This enables multiple 
i   a ach he ai  a  he a e i e. He ce, A ge  i c i   
only ensure safety, but also expedition. In parallel, despite having only seconds 
 i e i c i , A ge  adi  e ec ica i  i  ca  a d ead . 
This manifests the requisite mood of attentive calmness required from 
c e . J  bef e a e i  I a ked A ge  h  he fee  he  i  hi   
 ake e  he e  i i : I e d  fee  igh  e  i    
e i a h gh I a  c fide  i   abi i ie , I  a a  c ce ed i h 
d i g e e hi g afe  a d c ec . I  addi i   he ac i  ake  i  he 
e i de, A ge  ef ec i  a  i dica e  ha  e e i g hi  ac ice  g d , 
is a matter of concern to him (MacIntyre, 2007; Tsoukas, 2018b). This is why 
he feels slightly nervous prior to every session. 
In Episode 2, Tom is concerned with the non-responding pilot. Although 
the aircraft was bound to land, it could not be allowed to descend below 3000ft 
a  ha  i  d e  afe . Thi  i  beca e be  he ai c af  i i  a  he 
time, the altitude of 2000ft was reserved for aircraft that are unable to land. To 
avoid this possibility, he continuously asks the pilot to confirm passing 3000ft 
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because Tom is concerned about the implications of descending below that 
altitude. Thus, Tom insisted on a readback because he knew that he could not 
move on to the next step of the procedure without safeguarding against the 
anticipated possibility of a dangerous conflict at 2000ft. As the pilot did not 
e d  T  ca , he beca e f a ed. T  f a i  ed hi   e 
his attentive calmness, as illustrated by increasing the volume of his voice.  
I ica , T  c ce  ab  afeg a di g he ai c af , ed hi   
overlook that the pilot was already facing a dangerous situation. Despite his 
erroneous judgement, and in addi i   hi  e e , T  e i  
i a e ha  he i  c ce ed ab  hi  ac ice  g d . The i a i  e ked 
an emotional response because Tom felt that the goods of the practice were 
jeopardised (MacIntyre, 2007; Tsoukas, 2018b). T  e i  ab  he e 
developments tempered his responses (see Frijda, 2010b; Solomon, 2004), but 
because he was not in the appropriate mood he behaved inappropriately. Tom 
initially worried about the aircraft not responding, because he cared about its 
safety and his performance evaluation. Worry as a form of stress, argues Weick 
(1990), helps agents focus on the identified source of concern. It underlay 
T  b e i  f e ki g a eadback f  he i . T  a ici a ed ha  a 
readback from the pilot would address his concerns about safety and his 
performance. As the desired response was not offered, Tom became 
increasingly frustrated. This was indicated by raising his voice. As argued by 
Solomon (2007), frustration is a type of anger. When experienced it suggests a 
judgement of being wronged (see also Ekman & Friesen, 2003). Tom felt 
wronged, because he learned that it is the pilot s duty to give readbacks. This 
sense of injustice, led Tom to lose his attentive calmness. 
Andrew on the other hand, anticipated the additional danger because of 
his experience. His concern about the implications of the situation on his 
ac ice  g d  e e ed A d e  eac i . Like i  T  ca e, A d e  
emotional response of worriedness allowed him to focus on the anticipated 
sources of his concern (Weick, 1990). His concern about safety motivated 
Andrew to initially investigate the functionality of the radio and subsequently 
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to take over from Tom (Solomon, 2007). Unlike Tom, however, Andrew 
maintained his attentive calmness and managed the situation appropriately  
ensuring safety and expedition. After the incident, Andrew is aware that the 
radio exchange was recorded. Consequently, Andrew as the shift leader 
recorded the event in the logbook to align the radio records with the logbook 
records. This is standard practice; all non-routine situations are registered to be 
reviewed by the Senior ATCO [superintendent of control tower]. The review, 
permits the Senior ATCO to investigate whether the situation was responded to 
appropriately (i.e., in line with the goods and mood). This illustrates the 
accountability which underlies the actions of controllers. 
Similarly, in Episode 3 Norman is concerned about the safety of the 
aircraft with the flap issue. This was illustrated both in his emotional responses 
and subsequent actions (see Gehman et al., 2013; Solomon, 2007). In response, 
 he i  e  f a ech ica  e , N a  ice becomes slightly shaky 
- this illustrates that Norman was feeling stressed. Moreover, after the incident 
N a  e c a  c fe ed ha  hi  e e ie ce e ded a d  he e f  
ide . The e  i a e  N a   f c   he ide ified ce f c ce  
(Weick, 1990), while remaining in the appropriate mood. He does not let the 
stress overcome him, but instead fights to cope with the situation  after his 
initial responses his voice grows more confident. First, he permits the aircraft 
to go to waypoint Bravo to perform checks. After the pilot informs Norman that 
they could not fix the problem and requests a high-speed landing, Norman 
offers them a priority landing. A priority landing means that the aircraft can 
skip the aircraft sequence to land as soon as possible. They are only offered to 
aircraft that face exceptional circumstances. As a safety precaution, the goal of 
a priority landing is to minimise time spent in the air. To enact the priority 
landing, the controller must anticipate the future positions of all aircraft in 
sequence, in order to find a way to allow the distressed aircraft to land quickly. 
Norman instructs the first aircraft in sequence to land, but also instructs the rest 
of the arrivals to enter the hold. As explained above, by anticipating the future 
movement of the aircraft, Norman makes the adjustments to clear the way for 
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the distressed aircraft. If Norman allowed all aircraft to continue their approach 
without alterations, they would either obstruct or be obstructed by the priority 
landing of the distressed aircraft. As this possibility would endanger the safety 
of all aircraft, Norman seeks to avoid it.  
Although safety was a priority, the high-speed landing raised concerns 
about another good (MacIntyre, 2007; Tsoukas, 2018b) - expedition (i.e., 
avoiding delay to aircraft movement). Thanks to his experience, first Paul and 
later Norman became concerned about the potential implications of the high-
eed a di g. I  Pa  d  a h gh I ha e faced a  e e ge c  
situations over the years I still felt stressed, because they are never the same, 
and I think you should feel stressed because it shows you are concerned about 
the seriousness of the situation... I tried to show Norman that despite his 
emotions he h d be ca  a d he f   he i . A da aged a  c d 
delay the q e e f de a e  f  h . Pa  gge i   a  he 
de a e   ake ff bef e he di e ed ai c af  a di g, a d N a  
acceptance of the suggestion, signify that expedition was also key concern. The 
importance of expedition, motivated their reactions. Because the delay of the 
departures was undesirable, Paul advised Norman to let the departures to take 
ff i   he i i  a di g. The , N a  k Pa  ad ice i  de   
avoid potential delays. After the landing, Paul recorded the key features of the 
incident in the logbook to be reviewed by the SATCO. Again, this signifies the 
accountability that underlies the reactions of controllers. 
5.5.1 Summary 
All the above suggest that controllers respond to situations because they are 
concerned about preserving goods of their practice (i.e., safety, expedition). To 
preserve the goods in an appropriate manner controllers must find a way to 
remain in the mood of attentive calmness. That is, they should not become 
overwhelmed by frustration or stress, but instead should preserve attentive to 
i  eed  a d ca . Failure to preserve the goods or to maintain attentive 
calmness results in being held accountable. For example, Andrew took over 
from Tom. While Tom was excused for violating the mood because he was a 
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trainee, such behaviour on other occasions would be reported and reprimanded. 
Awareness of accountability is a means that assists the conformance of 
controllers with the goods of their practice (for further evidence beyond the 
described episodes, see appx. 4). Concern is manifested both in the emotional 
experience (see Frijda, 2010b; Solomon, 2004) and reactions of the controllers 
to the situations (Gehman et al., 2013). Norman is always concerned about 
d i g hi g  afe  a d c ec . T , A d e  a d N a  fe  ied 
because they were concerned about the safety of the aircraft. Although the 
c e  emotional concerns spontaneously motivate reactions (Frijda, 
2010b; Frijda et al., 2014; Rietveld, 2012b), they do not, with the exception of 
Tom, let them overwhelm them  the mood of attentive calmness predisposes 
them to keep their emotions in check in a way that still keeps them concerned.  
           Despite the spontaneity of emotional reactions, the reactions themselves 
a e  a d . C e  emotional reactions reflect judgements about 
whether the unfolding situation is in line with the goods of the Practice (Dreyfus 
& Kelly, 2007, p. 53). Emotions, through attentive calmness orient controllers 
to respond to their anticipations in a way that safeguards the goods of their 
Practice. Angelo keeps adjusting altitudes of the aircraft to maintain safety and 
expedition. Tom insists on getting a readback because he anticipates that this 
would safeguard the aircraft. Andrew and Norman offer help to distressed pilots 
to ensure their safety. Finally, Paul advises Norman to allow aircraft to take off 
so as not to be delayed. Hence, emotions and mood are manifestations of 
c ce  ab  hei  ac ice  g d  that orient reactions to anticipations. 
 
5.6 Reflection in Response to Breakdowns - The Collapse and 
Restoration of Anticipation  
Dwelling in experience permits controllers to anticipate implications of 
situations. Controllers do not experience the anticipated implications neutrally. 
As controllers care about the consequences of situations, their implications are 
interpreted in reference to the goods of their practice. Thus, concerns about 
anticipated implications serve as a semantic background which spontaneously 
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motivate responses to address implications in line with the goods of practice. 
Insofar as situations diverge from what is typically anticipated, they often result 
i  b eakd  i  age  e f a ce  (Tsoukas, 2011a), bringing engaged 
action to a halt. During such breakdowns, through reflection, agents become 
focally aware of what, during action, they took to be subsidiary elements (i.e., 
the background), in order to reconsider them, and find a new way to continue 
their action in congruence with their practice (Tsoukas, 2009a, 2011a). Below, 
by drawing on Episodes 1 (part 2), 2 and 3 (part 2), I will illustrate in greater 
detail how agents respond to breakdowns. 
Episode 1, Guardian Angel: Part 2, The Collapse and Restoration of 
Anticipation. As an orderly sequence is put in motion with the three first 
aircraft, Angelo adjusts the altitudes of aircraft further behind. He instructs #4 
 de ce d  7000f . A  #4 i  eadi g back A ge  i c i , a  a a  f 
he ai  i e  landing system is clearly audible. The alarm suggests 
that the system is not broadcasting the required signals to align aircraft with the 
runway as they land (see 11 in Glossary). For Angelo the alarm remains in the 
backg d. I  hi   d : I a  e  hich e  he b zzer 
c e ded . I did  a  ch a e i  d e  he k ad . S , A ge , 
moves on to adjust the next domino piece - aircraft #5. While instructing #5 to 
descend to 10000ft, the buzzer goes off for a second time. This suggests the 
instrument landing system is restored, however, again for Angelo this remains 
peripheral. 
Ha i g dea  i h a  d i  iece , A ge  had  e a  he c c e. 
Aircraft #1 was getting closer to the runway, so Angelo gave #1 clearance to 
a d. Pi  #1 e ded ha  ab e, e ha e  d  a 3-60, we lost the [landing 
ig a ] . A 3-60 (pronounced three sixty) means that the aircraft will do a 360 
degree orbit over its position. The pilot wanted to do this to realign with the 
runway. This is highly unusual. This is because when pilots cannot land with 
instruments, according to procedures they have two options: (i) proceed to land 
i a  ( ee 45 i  G a )  (ii) e he g  a d  ced e ( ee 50 i  
G a ). A ge   hea d he d ab e . Thus, as per the procedures, 
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Angelo expected that #1 would use a visual approach instead of the instrument 
a ach. Thi  i  c ea  ee  he  A ge  a k  #1: R ge  d   ha e he 
fie d i  igh ? . #1 e d , ega i e, a  he e .  
This surprises Angelo as he cannot understand what is going on. 
Mea hi e, he ai c af  begi  i  bi   he ef . I  A ge   d : I 
was surprised, I could see from the window that he was angling a bit to his left, 
a d ha  he a  gai i g a itude. I was saying to myself, what is this guy 
d i g? . B  #1 a i g ega i e, A ge  a ed ha  i  a  g i g  f  he 
g  a d ced e b  he did  a  i  hich i  a . D e  hi  i e, 
he directed his gaze from the radar screen to see outside the window towards 
the aircraft. He saw the #1 tilting to its left but assumed that it was because of 
wind instability. However, Angelo could not see the aircraft trying to increase 
its altitude. This further puzzles Angelo so he tries to confirm that the pilot is 
g i g a d. #1  i  e d : e , ( c ea ) d  a he  ef   a d 
c e back agai .  
 With this realisation, Angelo could see something nobody else could 
notice - he anticipated a mid-air collision between aircraft #1 and #2 (see Figure 
521). I  hi   d : A   a  I ea i ed ha  a  g i g , I a icked. 
My heartrate rocketed. For a second I thought I was going to lose it, but then it 
was as if somebody I woke me up with a start. In that instant I said to myself - 
do something now! DO SOMETHING NOW! They are going to crash! Next 
hi g I k , I did he fi  hi g ha  ca e  i d .  
 
 
21 Runway clipart retrieved from https://pixabay.com/vectors/airport-runway-grey-asphalt-travel-




Figure 5 – Positions of #1 and #2 in Episode 1 
 
 Analysis of Episode 1 (Part 2): During part 2, Angelo faces three 
breakdowns. First, he continues sequencing aircraft #4 and #5. While doing so 
a buzzer is heard in the background. Angelo does not pay attention to it because 
the buzzer does not address his concern for sequencing. Having allowed #4 and 
#5 to descend as far as they could, Angelo restarts the cycle of instructions by 
clearing #1 to land. Hence, Angelo anticipated that #1 would land with the 
standard instrument approach. However, after issuing the instruction something 
unantici a ed ha e ed. #1  i  ecified ha  he  e e ab e   a d a d 
were going to do an orbit over their position to re-align with the runway. Angelo 
 hea  ab e . He d e   a ici a e a  bi  beca e i  i   a  f 
procedures. As Angelo only hears the first part, this is not perceived as a major 
problem - it was experienced as a minor breakdown - a malfunction [i.e., simple 
obstruction to current coping - entails switching to next most likely alternative 
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way of coping with the situation (allowing #1 to land)] (Dreyfus, 1991; Yanow 
& Tsoukas, 2009, p. 1351). Thus, Angelo momentarily reflects in action to 
switch to the next most likely way of allowing #1 to land. With the momentary 
reflection, Angelo anticipates that the pilot would use the visual approach. 
Thus, Angelo asks the pilot if he is doing a visual approach. Agai , he i  
e e defie  A ge  e e  a ici a i  - he says they cannot see the 
runway. He reflects again. He is aware that if the aircraft was not landing 
i a , ced e  dic a e a g  a d  - that they must fly over the runway 
and follow a pre-defined airway at 2000ft, which will put them again in the 
e e ce  a d. M  i  e f  a g  a d, a  hi  i   I h gh  
ha  a  ha  #1 a  g i g  d .  
So the lack of visual contact, surprises Angelo and causes a temporary 
breakdown (Dreyfus, 1991). Unlike before, it is not easy for Angelo to 
anticipate what the pilot was going to do. This is because in troublesome 
landings, pilots can switch from an instrument approach, to a visual approach 
and then a go around. A visual requires visual contact with the runway, whereas 
the go around requires the pilot to specify the action. As the pilot specified they 
could not see the runway it meant that they were not performing a visual. In 
a a e , he i  did  a  g i g a d . The ack f fa i ia i  i h he 
i a i  c a e  A ge  a ici a i . A ge  d e   k  h   eac , 
because he does not know what the pilot is going to do (i.e., what sort of 
situation it is) (Haugeland, 2013). In order to react - he needed to restore his 
anticipation of how the situation will unfold - to reflect on action (Yanow & 
Tsoukas, 2009). As anticipation rests on intuitively knowing what sort of 
situation on is facing, during breakdowns agents have difficulties identifying 
the situation with a sort. So, they must consciously seek to categorise the 
situation into a familiar sort.  
Without the restoration of anticipation (i.e., re-sorting the situation), 
Angelo cannot react because he does not know what he is to react to. Thus his 
performance breaks down - he seeks to investigate the pilots actions in order to 
e e hi  a ici a i . T  i e iga e ha  i  g i g , A ge  ga e i  
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diverted from the radar screen, to the position #1 outside the window. Angelo 
notices that the pilot is not behaving as someone who is performing the go 
around procedure, which puzzles him even further. This causes a total 
breakdown - detached and conscious reflection on the circumstances of the 
situation (Dreyfus, 1991; Yanow & Tsoukas, 2009). He asks himself what the 
pilot is doing. So, Angelo continues his reflective investigation by asking the 
pilot if they are performing a go around. The pilot says they are making a left 
turn. The restoration of his anticipation scares him. His performance is so 
disrupted, that he had to reflectively urge himself to respond. 
Analysis of Episode 2: Breakdowns were experienced by both Tom and 
Andrew in Episode 2. Tom initially anticipated that the pilot would respond to 
each of his instructions. Moreover, at that point in time, obtaining a readback 
was a key concern for Tom. At 2000ft (1000f  be  he i  a  e ), 
other aircraft could potentially enact a go around procedure (see 50 in 
Glossary). So, Tom anticipated that without the pilot confirming that the aircraft 
was maintaining 3000ft would endanger safety. In parallel, Tom knew that he 
could not move on to the next step of the procedure. This in turn, made Tom 
concerned about how Andrew would evaluate his performance. The 
combination of the collapse of his initial anticipation plus his concern about the 
implications of the lack of readback, motivated Tom to reflect on a way to move 
forward (Dreyfus, 1991; Haugeland, 2013). To move forward, Tom needed to 
re-establish an anticipation of what the current situation entailed by 
categorizing it into a sort (Haugeland, 2013). By reflecting in action to deal with 
this malfunction (switch to next most likely means of coping), Tom realized 
that he was making more calls compared to experienced controllers (Yanow & 
Tsoukas, 2009). Based on this reflection, Tom anticipated that the pilot was fed 
up of responding to his calls. Thus, Tom reacts to the lack of readbacks by 
insisting on a response.  
Similarly, Andrew anticipates that the pilot would respond to Tom. Like 
for Tom, the lack of responses raised concerns about the safety of the aircraft 
(Frijda, 2010a; Solomon, 2004). The afe  c ce , ha  A d e  i i ia  
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engagement with the situation as an instructor and prompts Andrew to 
consciously reflect about what is occurring (Yanow & Tsoukas, 2009). It causes 
a temporary breakdown while he deliberates on the causes of the situation. To 
respond, Andrew needs to restore the anticipation of what is occurring. His 
momentary reflection helped him remember that in similar cases in the past, 
there was either a problem with the radio-telecommunication system, or that the 
pilot was pre- cc ied i h a ech ica  b e . Th , A d e  ef ec i , 
restores his action readiness by giving him two new anticipations to investigate 
(Dreyfus, 1993, pp. 34 35). First, Andrew checks to see if the radio-
telecommunication system is online. As the radio seemed to work, Andrew 
eliminated the first possibility and anticipated that the pilot was preoccupied 
i h a b e . Wi hi  ec d  he i  a  a db . Thi , ed 
A d e  ec d a ici a i . S , A d e  ake  e  f  T  (A d e  
knows that Tom has not realized what is happening). Although, Andrew 
anticipated that the pilot was facing a problem, he was not sure what type of 
problem it was. To respond, agents require familiarity with situations. Hence, 
Andrew needed an exact understanding of what the pilot was facing (Dreyfus, 
1993, p. 31). Different types of problems require different types of responses 
(Ribeiro, 2013a, 2014; Taylor, 1993). Therefore, to respond Andrew needed to 
categorize the situation into a familiar sort (Haugeland, 2013). Sorting infuses 
he i a i  i h fa i ia i  a d a  age   fi  he ga  ef  e  i  a 
i a i  ag e  a ici a e  i ica i  a d i  (Polanyi, 1961, p. 
465). Andrew seeks facing a collapse of anticipation tries to reestablish an 
anticipation of what is occurring through enquiry (see Frijda et al., 2014). He 
asks the pilot how he could help.  
E i de 3, Hi  e e ie ce a ed hi   ee , Pa  2, C ea i g he 
Way: For the purposes this section, E i de 3  b i d-up to the high-speed 
landing will be further detailed. Norman had 5 incoming aircraft and two 
departures. Aircraft #11 was on the final stretch of the landing procedure at an 
altitude of 1500ft.  Aircraft #12 was allowed to approach the runway from a 
shortcut visually (see 45 in Glossary). As #11 was about to land, the pilot 
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informed Norman that they could not extend their flaps. The pilot then asks 
permission to enter a holding pattern over the airport. When unable to land, 
procedures dictate that #11 would have to hold over waypoint Bravo, not over 
he ai . A h gh, hi  i  a  N a  e i  hi  (a  3000f ): If he 
pilot thinks it is easier for them and it is not interfering with anybody else I have 
 ea   de  hei  e e , I d   a d a d a  g   B a . 
N a  ca ce  #12  i a  a ach a d i c  he   e e  he h d e  
the airport at 4000ft. Seconds after ca ce i g 12  a ach, #11 e e   g  
to Bravo (the designated waypoint for missed approaches. Norman approves 
the request (see Figure 622).  
 
 
Figure 6 - Positions of Arrivals in Episode 3 
 
 
22 Runway clipart retrieved from https://pixabay.com/vectors/airport-runway-grey-asphalt-travel-
36472/ and  aircraft clipart retrieved from [on 16 Oct. 18] 
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Airplane_silhouette.png 
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As the area above the airport would be clear from #11, Norman instructs #12 to 
continue the instrument approach (see 11 and 34 in Glossary) - not the visual 
approach (see 45 in Glossary). #11 reaches Bravo and circles above it to 
perform checks (see figure 7). As #12 is approaching the runway for landing, 
#13 i  ick  ca chi g . N a  ee  hi  a d a k  #13  i   use a longer 
approach route. This would delay #13 and in turn would provide the adequate 
aci g i h #12. #13  i  e d  ha  he  a e ab e . N a  e ai  
 #13  i  ha   a e e  igh  i h #12 . Af e  hi  N a  a k  13  
i , ab e  ake 360 igh   bi    i i ? . The i  ag ee . 
This allowed #12 and #13 to land (see figure 723).  
 
 
Figure 7 – Improvisations in Episode 3 
  
Analysis of Episode 3 (Part 2). Norman faces four breakdowns of different 
magnitudes during part 2. Norman is initially taken by surprise when #11 
 
23 Runway clipart retrieved from https://pixabay.com/vectors/airport-runway-grey-asphalt-travel-
36472/ and  aircraft clipart retrieved from [on 16 Oct. 18] 
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Airplane_silhouette.png 
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requested to enter the hold above the airport. It is counter to normal procedures 
which dictate that aircraft should make their way to waypoint Bravo. The 
e e  i ica i  ai e afe  c ce  hich  N a   ef ec  i  
action about how to respond. In other words, it creates a temporary breakdown, 
wherein Norman deliberates on how to react (Yanow & Tsoukas, 2009). In 
N a   d : I did  k  ha  a  g i g  ha e  af e  #11 
entered the hold. The detail that worried me, was that #11 and #12 would cross 
levels and ha  d e  ff hei  c i i  a i g e . N a  did  
know what to anticipate from #11 when in the hold. He was unsure whether 
#11, which lacked functional flaps, could perform orbits normally. Moreover, 
he was not sure if #11 would require a priority landing shortly after entering the 
hold. What he was sure of, was that based on the current flightpaths, without an 
intervention, the minimum separations between #11 and #12 would be infringed 
(see 26 in Glossary). In turn, this would trigger the ai c af  c i i  a i g 
systems (see 22 in Glossary). Norman anticipates two potential consequences. 
First the trigger would automatically change the altitude of the aircraft (without 
N a  i c i   he i  i e i ). Thi  c d e  in further 
unanticipated consequences. Second, a full investigation always follows such 
triggers. Investigators would consider why Norman jeopardised aircraft safety 
by allowing the minimum separations to be violated. Through reflection he is 
aware of all he ab e a d i  hi   d   a id a  i k  I i c ed #12 
 ca ce  a ach  (claps hands to show end of story). 
 Sh  af e  ca ce i g #12  a ach, #11 e e   g   a i  
Bravo (designated point). Norman permits this. The change prompts a 
momentary breakdown (in the form of a malfunction -  he switches to the next 
 ike  ea  f dea i g i h he i a i ) a  i  cha ged N a  a e  
a ici a i . #11  e e  d c ea  he a h f  #12  a ach he 
runway. With this realisation, Norman instructs #12 that they are clear to 
approach the runway through the instrument approach (see 34 in Glossary). A 
few minutes later, Norman notices that #13 was closing the distance from #12. 
He anticipates that the minimum separation between the two aircraft would be 
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violated - this causes a malfunction (momentarily shifting his focal object to the 
next most likely tool that will help him). This anticipation prompts Norman to 
momentarily reflect on how to react to his concern. In response to the safety 
concern, Norman asks whether #13 could take a longer route to approach the 
runway. This would open the distance between the two aircraft. The pilot 
specifies that they were unable to do so. This then triggers another momentary 
breakdown - a temporary breakdown (deprived of the normal way of dealing 
with such an issue, Norman consciously thinks of how to deal with concern). 
Norman had to switch to a different means of slowing down #13. In response, 
he instructs #13 to make a 360 orbit over he i i . #13  i  ag ee . Thi  
allows Norman to address his safety concern. 
5.6.1 Summary 
When situations unfold in a normal way, controllers tend to respond non-
reflectively by anticipating the most likely sequence of the situation. Insofar as 
situations unfold in unusual manners, the anticipation of controllers collapses 
(i.e., cannot immediately anticipate how situations are likely to develop). The 
uncertainty evokes concerns about the goods of the practice. Depending on how 
unusual a situation is, minor (viz., malfunctions), temporary and total 
breakdowns interrupt the responses of controllers. During breakdowns 
controllers consciously reflect in or on the situation (duration depends on the 
type of breakdown), in order to restore their anticipation about what is likely to 
follow. Restoring anticipation is necessary for action because one must 
understand what they are reacting to.   
 
5.7 Appraisal, Solicitations and Circumspection 
In this section, I will try to illustrate that the processes (i.e., indwelling, 
anticipation, concern and reflection) already described above and the two to be 
illustrated in this section (i.e., appraisal and solicitations) are all interrelated (as 
circumspection - more about this below) and contribute to how controllers 
improvise in response to exigencies of situations through relevant affordances. 
U de a di g e ce i  i  ke   de a di g ac i , a  e ce i  i  
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gea ed  ac i  a d   c ci  ide if i g he e cei ed bjec  
(Frijda, 2009, p. 266). Above, I argued that indwelling enables agents to attend 
from their experience of similar situations and tool use, to anticipate un-
actualised possibilities (Benner et al., 1999, Chapter 3; Frijda et al., 2014, p. 6; 
Hutchins, 2010, p. 431; Ribeiro, 2014, p. 579; Rietveld, 2012b, p. 109; Rietveld 
& Brouwers, 2017, p. 547; Rietveld & Kiverstein, 2014, p. 348; Wrathall, 2000, 
p. 113). The anticipation of the implications of situations in relation to concern 
about their ac ice  g d  a e  i f e  i a i  i h ea i g a d 
motivates action (Dreyfus, 1993, p. 24; Dreyfus & Kelly, 2007, p. 53; Frijda et 
al., 2014, p. 3; Rietveld, 2012b, p. 108).  
5.7.1 Appraisal and Solicitations 
Si a i  a e c a  i  he ce  f bec i g . He ce, he 
anticipation of possibilities is subject to the changing dynamics of 
circumstances (Benner et al., 1999, pp. 10 11; Colombetti, 2010, p. 156; 
Tsoukas & Chia, 2002). That is, although an agent may seek to remedy a 
situation in one way, the results of their intervention may bring about other 
previously un-a ici a ed ibi i ie . The e-evaluation what the task might 
be is not something that happens every now and then, for instance when a task 
is finished, but is a continuous (non-reflective) process that puts whatever one 
i  d i g igh   i  e ec i e  (Rietveld, 2012b, p. 125).  
Consequently, after each reaction, controllers need to re-evaluate and re-
react based on new anticipations and evoked concerns about their implications. 
P  i , age  a e e i e  ig ifica ce  (Rietveld, 2012b, p. 118). 
Controllers seek to avoid/forestall or attain the implications of their 
anticipation. To avoid or attain anticipations, relies on appraisal of how 
situational aspects relate to the goods of their practice. The process of 
appraising situational aspects and in turn forestalling or attaining anticipated 
implications, will be illustrated below through Episodes 1 (part 3), 2 and 3 (part 
3). 
 Episode 1, Guardian Angel - Part 3. Prior to his response and after 
restoring his anticipation, A ge  e eb  a e ai ed a d hi  e e  ide . He 
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immediately stands up, exclaims with frustration and throws his pen. It should 
be noted that Angelo does not sit down after the realisation, nor does he note 
aircraft altitudes as usual on the flight progress strips (see 9 in Glossary). 
A ge  i e  he f i g i c i : #2 ,eee  #1 continue on present 
headi g a d de ce d  1000f  i edia e .  The i c i   de ce d  
1000ft breaks the minimum altitude regulations. As #1 had already started the 
bi , he ai c af  headi g a  i  he i e di ec i  e a i e  he a . 
As Angelo instructed #1 to maintain its direction, it moved towards the opposite 
direction and at the same time was descending from 1500ft to 1000ft (see figure 
824). I  A ge  d  hi  d ee  i  c ea  f  he he  ai c af  a  
least add a bit  hei  aci g .  
 
 
Figure 8 - #1 and #2 on Collision Course in Episode 1 
 
 Another 13 seconds go by where Angelo is transfixed looking outside 
the window. He is still standing, staring at #1 to see if they can dive in time to 
 
24 Runway clipart retrieved from https://pixabay.com/vectors/airport-runway-grey-asphalt-travel-
36472/ and  aircraft clipart retrieved from [on 16 Oct. 18] 
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Airplane_silhouette.png 
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avoid #2. Number #2 is flying at an altitude of 1800ft - just 300ft above #1 and 
is still descending. During this time, Angelo notices that #2 has realised what 
happened, reduced its rate of descent and started to orbit to the right without 
instruction. Without any verbal communication, Angelo anticipates that the 
new direction of #2 created another potential c i i . A ge  f a i  i  
evident as he rolls his hands in frustration. Although both aircraft started to 
move in parallel to each other, the lateral distance between their trajectories was 
closing fast. To ensure that the collision is averted, Angelo instructs #2 to climb 
to 3000ft (see figure 925). I  hi   d :  fi  c ce  a   e a a e 
them with altitude. I had to re-establish the 1000ft vertical separation. With their 
headings, they would fly in parallel for a while and allow them to gain time so 
he e ica  e a a i  c d kick i .  H e e , b  di ec i g he ai c af  i  he 
opposite direction, was counter to procedures. Their heading is used for aircraft 
coming towards the airport, not away. 
 
Figure 9 - Positions of Aircrafts After Initial Response in Episode 1 
 
 
25 Runway clipart retrieved from https://pixabay.com/vectors/airport-runway-grey-asphalt-travel-
36472/ and aircraft clipart retrieved from [on 16 Oct. 18] 
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Airplane_silhouette.png 
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 Ha i g i c ed #2, i hi  5 ec d  A ge  i c  #3  ai ai  
4000f . A ge  i e  hi  i c i   e e ha  a e ia  c f ic  
between #2 and #3 is avoided. After this instruction, Angelo sees that the 
vertical separation between #1 and #2 kicks in. He then instructs #1 and #2 to 
move towards waypoint Romeo and enter the hold. Waypoint Romeo is a point 
on the eastern arrival procedure used. He instructs #2 to climb to 4000ft. Angelo 
receives a call from #4 that they have reached 7000ft. Angelo overlooks this. 
Next, he instructs #3 (at 4000ft) to descend to circuit altitude (1500ft) so they 
could land first. Next, Angelo instructs #1 climb to 2000ft and then to 3000ft. 
This is because Angelo wants to move #1 above the minimum altitude and 
prepare it to enter the hold at waypoint Romeo, 1000ft below #2. He then 
instructs #4 and #5 to enter the hold over the airport at 5000ft and 6000ft 
respectively. Angelo then informs #1 and #2 in turn, that they may use the 
eastern approach procedure to try to come in to land again. Both agree. #3 lands 
first. Then Angelo instructs #1 to approach first, followed by #2. After #2, #4 
and #5 are also instructed to come in. The aircraft at the lowest altitude is given 
priority (see figure 1026 for aircraft positions). When it was all over, Alice 
(ATCA) aid  a e ie ed b  i  e e A ge ,   a e a guardian 
a ge . 
 
Figure 10 - Aircraft Positions (Episode 1 -continued) 
 
26 Runway clipart retrieved from https://pixabay.com/vectors/airport-runway-grey-asphalt-travel-
36472/ and  aircraft clipart retrieved from [on 16 Oct. 18] 
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Airplane_silhouette.png 
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 Analysis Episode 1. Episode 1 presents the appraisal of shifting 
anticipations. I  ake  e e a  ec d   e e A ge  a ici a i . He c d 
now see that #1 and #2 were on a collision course. His new anticipation shocks, 
scares and stresses him. This is made evident by his body language. His face is 
drained of colour and he experiences an elevated heart rate. Both are associated 
with being scared (Ekman & Friesen, 2003, Chapter 5). Raised eyebrows and 
widened eyes are associated with surprise (Ekman & Friesen, 2003, Chapter 4). 
Standing up, throwing his pen, not taking notes and exclaiming suggests 
feelings of intense tension (Ekman & Friesen, 2003, Chapter 7). Notice that 
A ge  i i ia  e i a  e e a   a e ia  e e  ha  had  
occurred yet. His emotional experience corresponds to the normative concern 
controllers have about safety.  
 Concern about safety is so taken for granted, that anticipating a deviation 
from this norm, results in spontaneous negative emotional experience (see 
Frijda, 2010a). In line, with the negative character of the emotional experience, 
Angelo spontaneously knows that this is a negative situation - a potential 
i a i   be a ided. A ge  e i   he a ici a ed i a i  i  
manifested not only in his emotional response, but also in his subsequent 
reactions (Frijda, 2010b).  
 The above suggests that by Angelo being concerned about the goods of 
his practice, he spontaneously appraises his anticipation of the situation in 
relation to them. In response, to his negative appraisal of his anticipation, he 
immediately (yet shakily) issues an avoiding action - an alteration to the path 
of #1. This also signifies the manifestation of the mood of attentive calmness - 
Angelo attempts to control his emotions and find a way to be calm and attentive 
so as to safeguard safety. 
 In parallel, the appraisal of anticipation based on concern about goods, 
also entails attraction to relevant affordances. A ge  e ce i  a d ac i  
are entwined with the affordances offered by and through his sociomaterial 
surroundings (see Rietveld & Brouwers, 2017). Affordances are action 
possibilities presented against the backdrop of a  age  e e ie ce i  
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sociomaterial distinctions (i.e., equipment, rules, procedures, 
language/terminology). Affordances can be manipulated to assist in addressing 
age  c ce  (Rietveld, 2012b, p. 106). The restoration of his anticipation 
allows Angelo to see that #1 and #2 afforded danger to each other. In other 
words, by according with separation rules and being concerned about goods 
(i.e., safety) - Angelo can see that #2 obstructs #1 safety, and vice-versa. Thus, 
the aircraft appear as repulsive to each other. To address his concern, Angelo 
must ensure that the aircraft do not collide. Hence, Angelo is intuitively ( fi  
hi g ha  ca e  i d ) ie ed  the specific affordances that were relevant 
to avoiding the potential collision. Intuitive orientation to relevant affordances 
based on the concernful appraisal of anticipations are experienced as a 
solicitation . Put otherwise, to be solicited is to be non-reflectively attracted 
to certain possibilities of action offered by relevant affordances (Dreyfus & 
Kelly, 2007).  
 Angelo is solicited to the following affordances: aircraft #1, the altitude 
f 1000f  a d #1  headi g a  he i e. A  i a ed i  a  1 a d 2, A ge  
uses adjustments to altitude levels and designated airways as tools to fulfil tasks 
(e.g., sequencing to land and separation). By instructing #1 in this way, Angelo 
uses the altitude of 1000ft because it is vacant from the other aircraft and is 
clear from any obstacles (over the water). He could not instruct #1 to climb, as 
#2 was above. In othe  d , 1000f  a ea  a ac i e beca e #2  a i de f 
1800ft appears repulsive. By instructing #1 to descend enables Angelo to open 
the vertical distance between #1 and #2. In addition, Angelo instructs #1 to 
maintain its current heading to open the lateral distance from #2 and because 
there were no inbound flights from that heading at the time (eastwards). This 
eac i  i  i  i e  A ge  beha i  i   hi  i a i  ( a  1 a d 2) - 
Angelo never allows an aircraft to be within 1000ft of another vertically, nor 8 
miles laterally. However, to achieve the separation, in this occasion Angelo 
infringed the minimum altitude of 2200ft and in addition, by instructing #1 to 
head eastwards, #1 was heading counter to the eastern air route for aircraft to 
a d. I  A ge  d : I k e  ha  I a  i a i g he i i , b  I had 
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to do something to avert the crash. I also knew that at that point #1 was over the 
water,  he e d be  b e . 
5.7.2 Circumspection 
 All the above entail circumspection. As can be seen by the unexpected 
occurrence, nothing in the sociomaterial field objectively ordains separation, 
safety or expedition - the controller must constantly issue adaptive instructions. 
The latter depends on a series of skills. Namely, the skill to anticipate, to be 
concerned, to appraise anticipation, reflect on breakdowns, see the implications 
of affordances and be solicited towards relevant affordances. All these skills 
depend on the controller dwelling in experience.  
 Philosophers of expertise refer to the perception of non-observational 
elements as circumspection (see Dreyfus, 1993; Haugeland, 2013). 
Circumspection is non-observational awareness (i.e., perception of elements 
that are not objectively part of perceptual scenes) that is developed through 
socialisation in practice and practical experience (Haugeland, 2013, p. 103). 
Indwelling, anticipation, reflection (in abnormal situations), concern, appraisal 
and solicitation are all part of non-observational awareness (i.e., phenomenal 
scene). This is why in previous sections, experienced and inexperienced 
controllers perceived different implications by looking at seemingly the same 
situation. Due to this non-observational perception, the meaning each agent saw 
was different. In turn, this made agents concerned about different aspects that 
as a result solicited them to towards different possibilities for action (Rietveld, 
2012b; Wrathall, 2000, p. 113).  
 The relevance of affordances changes dynamically and relationally 
depending on the concerns and appraisals evoked by the anticipation of 
situational implications (Frijda et al., 2014; Rietveld, 2012b, p. 128). All the 
aforementioned depend on dwelling in past experience. A few seconds prior to 
his new realisation, Angelo was attracted to the go around procedure to 
expeditiously re-sequence the approaching aircraft. After restoring his 
anticipation, Angelo could see the situation from a different gestalt. Seeing that 
#1 a   a  i i e  c i i  a h i h #2, he g  a d ced e beca e 
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irrelevant. Priority was shifted from re-sequencing, to preserving the safety of 
#1 and #2. Thus, Angelo was attracted to an altitude below the minimum and a 
direction that was opposite to arrivals. These two unconventional instructions 
depart from pre-established procedures that do not permit aircrafts flying below 
2200ft and that direction based on the wind direction at the time. As such, within 
a matter of seconds Angelo commits two acts of improvisation.  
 In addition, this suggests that the perception and utilisation of 
solicitations are the means through which controllers respond to situations. By 
dwelling in experience, affordances are spontaneously perceived as attractive, 
repulsive or indifferent depending on the aims of an agent (Dreyfus & Kelly, 
2007, p. 52; Frijda, 2009, p. 267; Koffka, 1936, p. 345). I  Rie e d  d , 
solicitations ha e a  affec i e a e  (2012b, p. 108). Thi  i  beca e age  
emotions in correspondence with the mood of attentive calmness spontaneously 
inform them about the meaning of the perceptual field (Solomon, 2007). When 
concerned, agents are spontaneously (Frijda, 2009, p. 267) solicited towards 
affordances that can relieve their emotional tension in line with the mood of the 
Practice. As it was explained to me in my first visits, controllers perceive a 
cylindrical field around aircraft which is 1000ft tall and 5 to 10 miles wide 
(depending on procedure) in which no two aircraft can be within at the same 
time (see image 11 from Allignol, Barnier, & Gondran, 2012, p. 3). To Angelo 
and other controllers, the cylindrical field around aircraft (under normal 
ci c a ce ) a ea  a  e i e   he  ai c af  (Koffka, 1936, p. 392).  
 
 
Figure 11 - Aircraft Separation Field27 
 
27 Image retrieved from Allignol et al. (2013, p.3) 
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 As illustrated throughout Episode 1, Angelo constantly seeks to repel 
aircraft from crossing the boundaries of this field, by issuing instructions 
depending on his anticipation of where an aircraft ought to be (Rietveld, 2012b, 
p. 109). Due to safety and accountability, altitudes below the dictated minima 
or within the repulsive field of aircraft usually appear repulsive. Altitudes which 
facilitate the task of the controller (e.g., to sequence aircraft to land) and are 
free of the minima or the fields of aircraft, appear attractive. Altitudes which do 
not facilitate the goal of the controller appear as indifferent. Notice, that the 
gh e  f he ai c af  i i  (i.e., outside the field) is normatively 
appraised. The rules of ATC deem that aircraft ought to be separated in a 
a e  i  hich   ai c af  a e i hi  he fie d  f he he . A  i a ed 
in part 3, when the cylindrical field was violated, Angelo experienced a holistic 
response - anticipation of the imminent implications, negative emotional 
experience to the implications, negative appraisal of implications and the urge 
to forestall. All these responses are to dimensions of the situation that are not 
physically present (i.e., unobservable).  
 The process of circumspection (i.e., indwelling, anticipation, concern, 
appraisal, reflection and solicitation) is constantly and dynamically re-
experienced as new developments in part 3 unfold. By seeking to address a 
concern which in turn will relieve tension of the appraisal, Angelo anticipates 
the implications of affordances by dwelling in experience in terms of 
attractiveness, repulsiveness and indifference (Koffka, 1936, p. 493). This 
complements Dreyfus (1993, p. 37) point, that the skill to deal with different 
situations and by extension aff da ce  i e    ac i g b  a   
ac i g . Being solicited towards certain affordances, entails being repulsed or 
indifferent to others.  
 To be solicited by relevant affordances is not inherent in the 
ci a e ia  fie d,  d e  i  e ai  ab e. Thi  fie d i  ade  f a fig e-
affordance we are currently directed at and responding to, and a multiplicity of 
more marginally present ground-aff da ce  ha  ici   a  e  (Rietveld, 
2012b, p. 108). The perceived sociomaterial field of solicitations is re-organized 
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depending on what an agent seeks to address in relation to the most recent 
developments and perceived anticipations (ibid.). A change in concern will 
present a different figure against the background of the sociomaterial field 
(Dreyfus, 1993, p. 35). Therefore, the perception of affordances occurs 
dynamically and relationally.  
 Returning to part 3, through circumspection Angelo is able to perform 
eight acts of improvisation. The third and fourth improvisations became 
apparent against the background of the first and second improvisations. 
Although #1 is set on a new trajectory and altitude, #2 changes their flight path 
without instruction. As signified by the time elapsed, Angelo engaged in 
reflection in action. During the reflection, a new anticipation emerges. Namely, 
that #2 would likely meet #1 again. The new anticipation of a new repulsive 
affordance is also negatively emotionally charged - it frustrates and worries 
Angelo. This is evident by his exclamation and shaking of hand. His new 
concern becomes the background against which his perceptual field once again 
changes. He is attracted to increasing the altitude of #2. Angelo is attracted to 
this because of the repulsiveness of his anticipation as well as the repulsiveness 
of #1 to #2. #1 could not descend any further and at the same time #1 was 
repulsive to #2, and vice-versa. #2 could climb without being an obstacle to #3, 
who was at 4000ft. So, he is solicited towards instructing #2 to climb to 3000ft, 
while also heading in the direction that was pre-assigned for arrivals. As he later 
e ai ed, I a ed  i c ea e he e ica  e a a i  a  fa  a  ib e 
beca e i  a   a e f  a e a  e a a i , ha  h  I aid 3000f  a d  
2000f .  #2  i c i  a ea  i diffe e  a  i  d e  not address his concern 
ab  afe . A ge  a e  ecified ha  he did  e i a d #1 a d #2 
beca e he e a   i , I a ed he   be a  c e a i e a  ib e I 
k e  I had  kee   c . Thi  i a e  ha  A ge  reacted in line with 
attentive calmness by trying to remain calm (at least over the radio) and help 
the pilots. 
 The inception of the fifth and sixth improvisations depended on the 
previous actions. Specifically, as #1 and #2 were both moving in the same 
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direction - eastwards, opposite from the airport - Angelo had to ensure they 
could come back to land safely. During emergencies, the distressed aircraft are 
always given priority so as to assist pilots who might be experiencing stress 
which in turn could make them more likely to make mistakes. His concern that 
both aircraft do not stray too far away and to bring them back makes new 
affordances attractive. The waypoint Romeo, the holding pattern (see 49 in 
Glossary) and the altitudes of 3000ft and 4000ft. This waypoint appeared 
attractive because it lied just ahead of the trajectory of the aircraft. Thus, it 
would be easy for the pilots to reach. Moreover, the holding pattern appeared 
attractive because aircraft engage in orbits over a fixed position. By orbiting 
over waypoint Romeo, both aircraft could change their direction and could head 
for the airport again. In addition, waypoint Romeo was on the eastern approach 
procedure. This meant that pilots could use an instrument approach if they 
wished. This was important because instrument approaches lighten the 
workload of pilots. However, to be able to use the eastern approach, the 
minimum altitude was 4000ft. So, both aircraft had to be slightly higher than 
their altitudes at the time (especially #1 which was below the minimum 
altitude). Thus, the altitudes of 4000ft and 3000ft for #2 and #1 became 
attractive.  
 Notice, that to Angelo the fact that #1 was going to be 1000ft below the 
minimum for the eastern procedure did not appear repulsive because of the 
ci c a ce . #2 a  f i g a  4000f ,  he e i  f he ai c af  fie d 
ade i c ea i g #1  a i de a  a ractive option. In combination with time 
pressure and the maritime terrain being flat drew Angelo towards instructing #1 
to approach to land. He did not find it attractive to instruct #2 to land first, 
because of the repulsion of #1 at 1000ft below it. As a safety precaution, 
controllers prefer to allow the lowest aircraft to land first. As a result of these 
actions the safe landing of all 5 aircraft was accomplished. 
 T  be ab e  e he ea e  a ach a d h  add e  A ge  
concern of assisting the distressed aircraft to land with priority, made aircraft 
#3, #4 and #5 appear as repulsive. Thus, Angelo was attracted towards 
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instructing #3 to land first (seventh improvisation). In this way, it cleared the 
eastern approach path for #1 and #2. Angelo anticipated that #4 and #5 would 
block the eastern approach route if allowed to continue their approach. Thus, 
he e i e e  f A ge  a ici a i  a ac ed hi   he h di g a e , 
he ai  a i  a d he a i de  f 5000 a d 6000f . The combination 
of the four affordances would put #4 and #5 in a holding pattern over the 
waypoint which did not interfere with the eastern approach. In this way, #4 and 
#5 anticipated trajectories would be delayed until #1 and #2 had safely landed 
(eighth improvisation). 
5.7.3 Illustration of Appraisal, Solicitation and Circumspection in Episodes 
2 & 3 
 Like Episode 1, Episodes 2 and 3 can also be used to illustrate how 
appraisal and solicitations in relation to indwelling, anticipation, concern and 
reflection, allow controllers to circumspect.  
Analysis of Episode 2 - S e i g  ha  e hi g i  g. After 
reflecting on the situation, Tom anticipated that the pilot was tired of responding 
to his high number of calls. He appraised the anticipated implications of the 
non-responding pilot in relation to his concern. He was concerned about safety 
(safeguarding the procedure at 2000ft) and about the assessment of his 
performance. He assumed that the pilot was just being uncooperative. On the 
background of these concerns, Tom felt frustrated. To remedy his frustration, 
the affordances of the microphone and the pilot appeared attractive and 
relevant. Tom was solicited towards insisting to get a read back even after 
trying 4 times and the pilot responding i h a db .  
In contrast, Andrew became increasingly reflective that there was 
something technically wrong. Andrew, concerned about potential safety 
implications of a technical malfunction (e.g., radio not working) negatively 
appraises the situation. Thus, he is solicited towards the radio-
telecommunication equipment. Miscommunication between aircraft and 
controllers may result in severe accidents. After establishing that the radio was 
in working order, Andrew turned his attention to the pilot. Upon hearing the 
pilot saying standby , Andrew in contrast to Tom, anticipated that the pilot 
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was facing technical problems. In that instance, Tom is solicited to take over 
control from Tom and to offer assistance to the pilot.  
Thus, Andrew engaged in two instances of improvisation. He deviates 
from the normal flow of a training session by initially paying attention to the 
equipment and later interrupting the session. Second, Andrew does not insist on 
following the procedures like Tom had done so far. He complies with the pilot 
not offering a readback. By finding different affordances attractive and 
anticipating different implications from seemingly the same situation, 
illustrates the manifestation of circumspection. By dwelling in different 
particulars (e.g., experience), the controllers were focally aware of different 
unobservable aspects of the situation. Their differing anticipations, concerns, 
reflections and appraisals painted the sociomaterial canvas in a different manner 
- they revealed different solicitations. 
E i de 3, Hi  e e ie ce a ed hi   ee , Pa  3: #14 is very close 
to landing. Meanwhile, #11 specifies that they could not correct flap problem 
so a high-speed approach was requested. Norman complies. Paul who was 
i i g e   N a , a  b i g #14 i  a d ge  id f a e  de a i g i  
case of damage  a  b  high eed a ach . F i g Pa  ad ice, 
Norman instructs #15 and #16 to enter the hold, and instructs the two departures 
to take off after #14 landed. Norman asks the ground controller to ensure that 
no other aircraft are allowed to taxi for departure and that there are no vehicles 
on any taxiways. This is done to prevent collisions in the event that #11 loses 
control. The above actions clear the path for #11 to approach. In addition, Paul 
asks the ATCA to notify the fire service to follow #11 after landing. The reason 
i     a  e ia  fi e . I  Pa  d , he b eak  f he ai c af  c d 
b  i  f a e , beca e he  d be de  e e  ha  a . Pa  
 he a  edge igh   f  b igh e . I  hi   d , f c e 
there was daylight, but this was important. I wanted to give the pilot as much 
information as possible. When aircraft are landing, they can see the aiming 
point and they land with the rear of the aircraft. The pilot would not have much 
time to judge their position relative to the runway. #11 was going to come in 
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with the nose high, at a higher speed and then at the last minute the nose would 
hi  he a  ike a b ick.   
 The aircraft behaved in the way Paul had described. It was very tense 
and it did feel like it was taking a long time. Everyone was standing - eyes 
transfixed on the aircraft and the runway. For a few seconds, the control room 
was void of the normal chatter. The pilot managed to stop the aircraft within the 
limits of he a . De i e  f ke f  he ai c af  b eak , he e a  
no fire.  
 Analysis of Episode 3 (part 3): N a  c ce  and appraisal of his 
anticipation about the safety implications for #11, solicits him to offer a priority 
landing. On the background of his concern about expedition, Norman was also 
solicited to instructing #14 to land prior to #11 arriving. This did not conflict 
with the priority landing because #14 was very close to the airport. However, 
there were two more aircrafts approaching which appeared repulsive because 
Norman had to clear the way for #11 to land. The concern and negative 
appraisal about #14  afe  a d b  extension the intent to offer priority landing 
forms the background against which Norman is solicited to instructing #15 and 
#16 to enter the hold. Norman anticipates that #15 and #16 would reach the 
ai  a i a e  a  he a e i e a  #11. The f e  d b c  #11  
i i  a di g. A  he i ica i  f N a  a ici a i  e e c e   
his concern about #11, the hold over the airport appeared attractive. By 
instructing #15 and #16 to enter the hold, #11 would be able to approach the 
runway without interruption.   
Norman does not engage with the two aircrafts waiting to depart. Paul, 
on the other hand, advises Norman to allow them to take off prior to #11 
arriving. Paul is solicited to the departing aircrafts because of anticipating that 
 a di g #11 c d da age he a  a ac. Thi  c d de a  he 
departures for hours. Thus, on the basis f Pa  c ce  and appraisal about 
the implications of a damaged runway and by extension the expedition of the 
departing aircrafts; allowing them to depart was perceived as attractive. After 
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Pa  ec e da i  a d a  N a  a e  he a e a i e g d , 
N a  ee  he a e ce f Pa  gge i  a d i c  he   ake-off. 
Norman is solicited to informing the ground controller to stop any 
ehic e  e e i g he a i a . The a ac i  f he g d c e  
interpersonal affordance derived from their role. As their role suggests, they 
had the authority to stop anyone entering the taxiways. The reason this was 
attractive to Norman was because he anticipated that #11 may not be able to 
remain on the runway. In case of this possibility, #11 could further endanger 
itself or other vehicles, which entailed a negative appraisal of this anticipation. 
Paul is also solicited to two different affordances on the basis of his 
concerns and appraisal about anticipated implications. His experience of similar 
i a i  he  hi  a ici a e ha  #11  b eak  d be de  e e  
than usual . Thi  i c ea ed he ibi i  f a fi e. T  e e afe  a d a id 
a potential fire, Paul is attracted the interpersonal affordance of the ATCA. The 
ATCA a ea ed a ac i e beca e f he e e ie ced i e e e. I  Pa  
d , e had  e a e as soon as possible, the aircraft would arrive very 
h .  The ATCA c d if  he fi e e ice f  Pa , hi e Pa  dea  i h 
he a  edge igh . The a e  e e a ac i e  Pa , beca e he 
anticipated that they could assist the pilot. Their attractiveness was perceived 
on the basis of how Paul anticipated that #11 would land. As #11 would not 
have the usual contact with the runway upon landing, the high intensity of the 
edge lights could afford the pilot orientation to stay aligned with the runway. 
The actions of  both Norman and Paul entailed responses to phenomenal 
elements which are non-observational (e.g., anticipation, concern, appraisal, 
attraction to solicitations). Hence, all their responses manifested 
circumspection. 
5.7.4 Summary 
Through appraisal, achieving or forestalling anticipations is facilitated by 
agents being spontaneously attracted to solicitations (Benner et al., 1999, 
Chapter 3; Dreyfus, 1993; Dreyfus & Kelly, 2007). As established above, 
solicitations are situationally relevant affordances (Rietveld & Brouwers, 
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2017). S ici a i  a ea  i h affec i e a e  de e di g on perceived 
normative concerns (Frijda et al., 2014; Rietveld, 2012b), manifested on the 
background of the Prac ice  d. Thus, their valence (or allure) is not 
inherent in affordances. It fluctuates depending on whether affordances are 
a ici a ed  he  f e a   faci i a e a  age  c ce  ab  hei  
anticipations. Hence, the ongoing appraisal of situational anticipations on the 
basis of concerns continuously creates instinctive gestalt shifts, wherein the 
agent is solicited to affordances that are likely to reduce the tension triggered 
by the deviations from the normatively optimal state (Dreyfus & Kelly, 2007, 
p. 53; Frijda et al., 2014; Rietveld, 2012b). As the created gestalt in which 
agents dwell in, in order to attend to situations is non-observational (i.e. is not 
part of the physical world) the processes of indwelling, anticipation, concern, 
reflection, appraisal and solicitation constitute circumspection (i.e., having non-
observational awareness). The upshot of being solicited to relevant affordances, 
thanks to the experience of circumspection, is the enaction of practices to 
respond to the arising circumstances. 
 
5.8 Practices of Improvisation 
In the previous sections, by gradually showing the interrelation of indwelling, 
anticipation, concern, reflection, appraisal and solicitation though 
circumspection, I attempted to illustrate how improvisation is experienced. In 
this section I will focus on how circumspection is tied to enacting improvisation 
by using four practices of improvisation. In some cases, controllers deviated 
from established procedures to introduce new features. At other times, 
controllers changed the pre-assigned roles of the tools at their disposal. While 
in other cases, controllers would disregard deviations from procedures. Lastly 
on other occasions, would engage in timing adjustment by selectively 
prioritising the execution of procedures by certain aircraft over others. It should 
be noted that although I refer to each practice of improvisation separately, 
controllers usually used a combination of these practices when responding to a 
situation. Each of the four identified practices of improvisation will be 
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discussed below by drawing on the three illustrated episodes and four other 
incidents not discussed above.  
5.8.1 Introduction of New Elements 
Some situations triggered controllers to respond in novel ways. By novel ways, 
I mean responses that introduce a new element to predefined rules. Controllers 
respond in this manner by imaginatively extending pre-established procedures 
to address the exigencies of situations. Two instances of introduction were 
identified in Episode 3. Specifically, Norman introduces a new element to the 
approach procedure when he instructed #13 to orbit over its position in order to 
di a ce i  f  #12. I  hi   d : a 360 i   a b i hed h di g 
pattern, but as long as the pilot can see the ground or sea, there is no danger of 
disorientation. I could have allowed #13 to continue their approach, but later 
ask them to perform a go around. This would just add another aircraft over 
Bravo. So I simply instructed #13 to perform an orbit to ensure that they land 
i h  a  b e . Sec d, Pa  i c ea ed he i e i  f he a  
lights (in broad daylight) to offer better guidance to #11. This adjustment was 
not part of any official rules related to high-speed landings. 
Another situation that clearly illustrates this practice is an episode that 
occurred beyond the three described episodes. Specifically, taxiway Alpha was 
closed for a week for maintenance. Alpha was routinely used for lining-up 
medium to large aircrafts to take off when runway 27 was in use (see figure 12). 
Insofar as this occurred, small aircrafts were lined up for take-off on Bravo. A 
key reason for keeping the two aircraft types separate was because the engines 
of medium and large aircraft create vortices that can potentially endanger small 
aircrafts behind them. Due to the closure of Alpha, controllers had to use Bravo 
to line up all aircrafts when runway 27 was in use. This posed negative 
implications for both safety and expedition. Light aircrafts could not go directly 
behind larger aircrafts in case they were damaged, while larger aircrafts, upon 
entering the runway had to backtrack from Bravo to the beginning of the runway 
in order to take off. During the first days, the controllers would usually prioritise 
larger aircrafts for take-off. Light aircrafts were allowed to take-off only after 
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medium or larger aircrafts had taken-off. This created large delays for smaller 
aircrafts. To add to these delays, usually, when a medium or large aircraft would 
take off, smaller aircrafts had to wait at least two minutes before they were 
cleared to take-off so as to ensure they would not encounter vortices.  
On the third day after the maintenance had begun, Cecilia improvised a 
solution to the delays. She asked the ground controller to alternate the sequence 
of aircrafts taxiing to take off from Bravo, in a way in which a large or medium 
aircraft is followed by a light aircraft. Upon arriving at Bravo, Cecilia would 
ask the large or medium aircraft to enter the runway and backtrack (see figure 
1228, top). While doing so, for safety reasons, Cecilia also instructed the light 
aircraft to wait on taxiway Charlie until the preceding aircraft was on the 
runway. As soon as the larger aircraft was on the runway, Cecilia would instruct 
the light aircraft to line up on the runway and take-off. Smaller aircrafts do not 
need the whole runway to take off. In this way, lighter aircrafts took off 
approximately at the time as the larger aircrafts were turning around to line up 
(see figure 12, bottom). Upon take-off, Cecilia instructed light aircrafts to break 
to the left or right to make way for the take-off of the larger aircrafts. As soon 
as Cecilia would see that the light aircraft was clear of the take-off path, she 
would clear the larger aircraft for take-off. As a result of this new practice, 




28 Maintenance/repair clipart and small red aircraft clipart were designed by Vexels.com. Big aircraft 




















5.8.2 Role Change 
As discussed in Chapter 3, like humans who fulfil social functions (e.g., judge, 
controller etc.) (see Bechky & Okhuysen, 2011), equipment/tools also have 
predefined roles (Haugeland, 2013). During role change, controllers would use 
equipment/tools in ways that are beyond their conventional roles. Several 
instances of this practice are evident in Episodes 1 and 2. In Episode 1 (part 3) 
Angelo instructed aircrafts #1 and #2 to fly towards the opposite direction from 
the runway. In parallel, the specific direction was reserved for aircrafts 
approaching the airport. Angelo changed the purpose of the specific direction, 
from being used for arrivals to being used for avoiding a mid-air collision. In 
addition, after Angelo ensured the separation between #1 and #2, he instructed 
them to hold over waypoint Romeo. Holding patterns are traditionally used to 
delay or to allow aircrafts to perform system checks (see 49 in Glossary). In this 
Figure 12 - Closure of Alpha and Improvised Response 
 215 
instance, apart from delaying the aircrafts Angelo also used the holding pattern 
to change the direction of the aircrafts (so they could re-approach the airport).  
Another episode that clearly suggests an instance of role change was 
during an aircraft evacuation on Whiskey. This resulted in blocking taxiways 
Charlie and Lima (see figure 13). When runway 27 is in use, these taxiways are 
used to allow aircrafts to taxi from Apron 1, towards Alpha in order to take-off. 
The evacuation interrupted the arrivals and departures of aircrafts - this created 
major delays. As soon as the evacuation was completed, controllers were 
increasingly concerned about allowing aircrafts to continue their schedules. At 
the time (see figure 1329) one aircraft (orange), which was parked in apron 1, 
was next in line for take-off. As Lima and Charlie were blocked by the 
evacuated aircraft (yellow) the controllers had to find an alternative route to get 
the aircraft to the beginning of runway 27. The standard taxi route was Lima, 
Zulu, Charlie and then Alpha (the designated alternative to the aforementioned 
route was Victor, Charlie and then Alpha). Aaron, the tower controller at the 
time, suggested the following to Hannah, the ground controller. He suggested 
that the departing aircraft could enter the runway from the end and taxi to the 
beginning (through Victor, Hotel, runway 09 and then backtrack to line up on 
runway 27). Thus, the introduced novelty in this instance was using runway 09 
as a taxiway to line up on runway 27 (see dashed orange line). 
 
 




Figure 13 - Improvised Response to Closure of Whiskey 
 
5.8.3 Disregard 
In certain situations, controllers would overlook aspects of pre-defined 
proced e  beca e he  d c adic  i h ha  a  j dged  be a g d  
in a given circumstance (see MacIntyre, 2007; Tsoukas, 2018b). In Episode 1, 
Angelo engaged in three instances of disregard. First, the controller instructed 
#1 to descend to 1000ft. This instruction is below the minimum altitude 
prescribed by procedures. Angelo chose to deviate from the prescriptions in 
order to forestall an anticipated mid-air collision with #2. Second, Angelo is 
aware that #1 and #2 broke the rules by changing direction without permission. 
Angelo overlooks the discrepancy and does not insist on following the 
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procedures (e.g., like Tom did in Episode 2). Instead, he focuses on how to deal 
with the discrepancies in a way that maximised safety. As Angelo explained, 
he did not think that reprimanding the pilots at the time would have improved 
the situation. Thirdly, Angelo allows #1 to re-approach the airport from Romeo 
at 3000ft. The Romeo-approach procedure prescribes that approaches from the 
specific point should start from at least 4000ft. Angelo could not allow #1 to 
a  he ecific a ach f  4000f  beca e he a i de  ab e #1  a i de 
were occupied by other aircraft. In Episode 2, Andrew engages in two instances 
of disregard. First, he overlooks that Tom was in a training session and takes 
over control. Second, Andrew does not insist on the pilot offering a readback. 
Andrew was drawn to both courses of action so as to offer assistance to the 
pilot, who was facing a technical problem. In Episode 3, Norman accepted to 
use the waypoint over the airport as an alternative to using the designated 
a i  B a  f  #11  g -around. He overlooked the requested change to 
the go-around procedure because he assumed that it would be more helpful to 
the pilot. 
Disregard was also identified in a situation wherein an aircraft requested 
an emergency landing due to smoke in the cockpit. This type of incident is one 
of the worst emergencies that aircraft crews and controllers can face. Smoke 
could poison the pilots, obstruct their visibility or even suggest fire which could 
render an aircraft unnavigable. Thus, in such situations the priority is to ground 
and evacuate the aircraft as soon as possible. Prior to landing, the airport 
operator instructed the controllers that they had designated a stand that was in 
apron 2. The operator had also instructed stair case trucks and ambulances to 
the stand they had assigned. However, apron 2 was on the opposite side of the 
usual vacation points of runway 27 (e.g. Echo). So, the distressed aircraft would 
have to taxi an additional 5 to 7 minutes to get to the stand that the operator had 
assigned. Apron 1, on the other hand, was only 1 to 2 minutes away from the 
usual vacation points of 27 (e.g., Ech ). The c e  e ed he e a  
decision to no avail.  
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Harry, the tower controller at the time, decided to disregard the 
e a  i c i  a d e-established procedures. Specifically, as soon as 
the distressed aircraft landed, Harry gave the pilot the freedom to stop the 
aircraft wherever they chose - even on the runway itself. This went against the 
dic  f he c a  e f he a . Wi h  he a , no aircrafts 
would be able to arrive or leave. In the end, the pilot chose to stop on Whiskey. 
Thi  b cked acce   e e a  a i a  a d e  agai  he e a  a d 
assignment. Upon stopping on Whiskey, Harry offered the pilot further 
freedoms - he gave the pilot the choice to use the evacuation slides (because it 
would take 3-5 minutes for the stair trucks to reach the aircraft from Apron 2). 
If he i  c ied i h Ha  gge i , he h  d ha e bee  
several people on the runway. A situation which under normal circumstances is 
unthinkable for safety reasons. In the end, the pilot chose to wait for the stair 
trucks. Everybody was eventually evacuated safely. Thus, in this situation 
Harry chose to disregard several procedures to safeguard the safety of the crew 
and passengers on the distressed aircraft. 
5.8.4 Timing Adjustment  
In some situations, controllers would attempt to adjust the timing for the 
execution of aspects of procedures. That is, in some cases controllers would 
attempt to expedite or delay the execution of procedural aspects depending on 
the exigencies of situations. In Episode 1, Angelo engaged in two instances of 
timing adjustment by re-ordering the landing sequence. He allowed #3 to land 
first (was initially third in sequence), while #1 and #2 were heading to waypoint 
Romeo. In addition, Angelo instructed aircraft #4 and #5 to enter the hold over 
the airport. All three timing adjustment actions ensured that the two distressed 
aircraft (#1 and #2) could have a clear approach path. In Episode 3, Norman 
engaged in 5 instances of timing adjustment. U  #11  g  a d e e , (1) 
N a  ca ce ed #12  a ach a d i   e e ed that the aircraft entered 
the hold over the airport. After #11 requested to hold over waypoint Bravo, #12 
was allowed to re-start their approach. However, as #13 was getting closer to 
#12, Norman (2) introduced an unpublished holding pattern to ensure 
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appr ia e di a ci g be ee  he ai c af . Af e  Pa  ec e da i , (3) 
Norman allowed two departures to leave prior to #11 landing to avoid any 
delays caused by potential damage to the runway. (4) Norman requested that all 
approaching aircrafts enter the h d i  he c e e ce  f #11  a di g 
were known. Finally, (5) Norman liaised with the ground controller to ensure 
ha   ai c af   he  ehic e  c d a i i  af e  #11  a di g. 
Beyond the described Episodes, Pauline faced a situation which called 
for several instances of timing adjustment. In particular, three aircrafts were 
approaching to land. The second aircraft was getting closer to the first. Initially, 
Pauline requested that the second aircraft continued their approach with 
minimum speed. The pilot, however, did not comply and continued to remain 
close to the first aircraft. Thus, Pauline requested that the second aircraft orbited 
to their right in order to increase spacing. The pilot refused to comply with 
Pa i e  gge i  b  a i g ha  ch a ea e a  ece a . Th , 
Pauline cleared the second aircraft to approach visually and to maintain its own 
separation from the first aircraft. Pauline anticipated that the two aircrafts were 
still too close to each other. Thus, Pauline instructed the third aircraft to enter 
the hold in order to be ready for her anticipation that the second aircraft would 
ha e  g  a d . I deed, he fi  ai c af  a aged  a d, h e e , i  c d 
not vacate the runway in time for the second aircraft to land. Thus, Pauline 
i c ed he ec d ai c af   g  a d . He ce, Pa i e ke  he hi d 
aircraft in the hold until the second aircraft went around to re-approach the 
airport. 
 
5.9 Findings Summary 
Improvising in response to unfolding situations is tied to circumspection. 
Specifically, circumspection depends on indwelling, anticipation, concern, 
reflection, appraisal and solicitation. The first process, indwelling, entails 
perceiving current situations on the background of past experience. 
Anticipation, the second process, refers to the notion that controllers can foresee 
imminent situational developments by dwelling in both their past-experience 
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and ability to use the tools of their trade (e.g., terminology, procedures, 
equipment). Dwelling in past-experience permits controllers to identify 
situations as specific sorts, which in turn allows them to extrapolate similarities 
from previous experiences to the present. What controllers anticipate is not 
indifferent to controllers - it is tied to the third process, concern. Controllers are 
concerned about anticipated implications by dwelling in what is assumed to be 
good in their practice (i.e., safety and expedition in alignment with the mood of 
attentive calmness). Thus, anticipated situations are spontaneously weighed in 
relation to taken-for-granted normatively defined goods. Their concerns about 
goods evoke emotional reactions which motivate responses to intervene. The 
fourth process alludes to reflection; cca i  he ei  he c e  
anticipation collapses because they encounter situations which are unexpected. 
Without an anticipation, controllers are uncertain about how to react. When 
such situations arise, controllers reflect in or on action, in order to restore their 
anticipation. The fifth process refers to the moment at which controllers 
intuitively appraise whether their anticipation should be attained or forestalled, 
on the background of their concern about the goods of their practice. Depending 
on whether their anticipation is appraised to be attractive or repulsive, 
controllers spontaneously solicit them to affordances that are situationally 
relevant to their goal.  
The combination of the aforementioned processes allude to 
circumspection - the ability of controllers to have a non-observational 
awareness of situations and their implications. Indwelling, anticipation, 
concern, reflection, appraisal and solicitations are all non-observational 
experiential phenomena. Despite its non-observable nature, circumspection 
enables the identification of relevant affordances which are subsequently drawn 
on in order to enact improvisation practices. That is, controllers typically 
engage in four types of improvisational practices - introduction, role change, 
disregard and timing adjustment.  
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CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION - TOWARDS A NEW THEORY OF 
IMPROVISATION AND BEYOND 
 
the enactment of even stable routines or 
a  i e  e ha  e e i i   
Cunha et al. (2017, p. 560) 
 
he e i  a  i i ic i de e i ac  
when organizational members interact 
with the world  hence the need for them 
to fill in the phronetic gap by 
imaginatively extending a category 
be d ica  ca e  





In the present chapter I will summarise the study, discuss the findings in relation 
 he i e a e  i i a i  a d gge  he a e  i ica i  f  f e 
research and practice. The goal is to build on the findings of the preceding 
chapter and the theoretical constructs discussed in Chapter 3 in order to offer 
an advanced phenomenological understanding of improvisation and the 
enactment of improvisation practices. Like most process studies, the insights 
generated from this dissertation may raise questions of generalizability (viz. 
whether they apply across organizations) and boundary conditions. Hence, I 
will discuss how the generated insights about improvisation may generalize to 
organizational settings beyond ATC. Finally, I will discuss the implications of 
this study in relation to future research. 
 
6.2 Summary of the Study 
The purpose of this study, as stated in the initial research question, is to capture 
how agents enact and experience improvisation. As argued in Chapter 2, lived 
experience of improvisation has been overlooked (Fisher & Barrett, 2019). 
F he  e a i a i  f hi  fea e i  i a  beca e ea  i e e e ie ce 
 ac i  i  he defi i g cha ac e i ic f i i a i  (Miner et al., 2001, p. 
316). Despite this admission, with very few exceptions, most studies on 
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improvisation offer retrospective accounts (Cunha et al., 2006, p. 326) that tend 
to marginalize the experience of agents by focusing on functionalist 
characteristics (see also Shotter, 2017). By the latter I mean that scholars have 
tended to discuss improvisation in terms of its outcomes (e.g., actions taken, 
novelty of actions), but have overlooked the processes by which agents are able 
to perceive the improvised actions in the first place.  
A central claim of this study is that achieving improvisational outcomes 
is tied to percep i  f he g d  f ac ice  (MacIntyre, 2007; Moore, 
2017; Tsoukas, 2018b), emotional reactions to situations (Damasio, 1994; 
Frijda, 2010b; Solomon, 2004, 2007) and tacit knowledge (Ribeiro, 2014). In 
Chapter 3, through a synthesis of practice theory, phenomenology and strands 
of ecological psychology I attempt develop a theoretical framework that is 
amenable to capturing both the lived experience of agents improvising, as well 
as the enaction of improvisation itself. Capturing the experience of agents while 
improvising can shed light on how agents accomplish improvisation on a daily 
basis. This is because agents in parallel to attending to current occurrences, also 
attend to how the latter will affect future occurrences by dwelling in their 
experiential background. Thus, improvisation, in many cases, is about attaining 
or forestalling occurrences that have yet to materialise. As outlined in Chapters 
4 and 5, to this end I studied an ATC unit located at a European international 
airport by spending approximately 530 hours in situ and conducting numerous 
interviews with participants of differing levels of experience. This setting was 
ideal for studying improvisation because it hosts a complex activity in which 
unexpected situations need to be addressed in a matter of seconds - otherwise 
they could result in severe negative consequences. 
 
6.3 Theoretical Contributions to Organizational Improvisation 
The findings of the study shed light on the broader research question of how 
agents enact and experience improvisation, through addressing two sub-
questions:  
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(1.1) How do agents perceive relevant affordances for the enaction of 
improvisation? 
 (1.2) How does the use of affordances influence the enation of 
improvisation practices? 
 
In answering the above, this study contributes to the literature on organizational 
improvisation by offering a new theoretical framework that has a strong-process 
view through which to understand the enaction as well as the experience of 
enacting improvisation. The framework introduces and synthesizes existing 
conceptual distinctions in a novel way to explain improvisation. In the next 
paragraphs I will outline the framework and its contributions by relating this 
d  fi di g  i h he e i i g i e a e.  
 Thi  d  framework for understanding organizational improvisation 
suggests that circumspection is fundamental to perceiving relevant affordances 
that allow agents to improvise (see figure 14). Specifically, circumspection 
alludes to agents being able to focally perceive a phenomenal field (i.e., aspects 
of situations that are unobservable) around a perceptual scene (i.e., what can be 
observed), which in turn draws them to improvise. Circumspection is theorised 
to manifest indwelling, anticipation, concern, appraisal and solicitation in 
mundane situations. In abnormal situations (i.e., breakdowns), circumspection 
is theorized to also include reflection. The result of circumspection is the agent 
been drawn to either mundane improvisation (i.e., responding to normal 
exigencies) or critical improvisation (i.e., responding to abnormal exigencies) 
through the use of a relevant affordance (i.e., solicitation). Both types of 
improvisation may be enacted through an improvisation practice (i.e., 
introduction, role change, disregard or timing adjustment). All aspects of the 
framework will be elaborated and discussed in relation to the literature below. 
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Figure 14 - Enacting and Experiencing Improvisation  
 
Before discussing the framework, I would like to highlight that it is novel 
for three reasons: (i) it highlights the role of indwelling in relation to 
improvisation, which has not been hitherto clearly explained (e.g., see Yanow 
& Tsoukas, 2009, pp. 1349 1350), while at the same time circumspection has 
been broadly neglected in management to such an extent that the relationship 
between the two processes has not been previously established; (ii) by using 
ongoing processes to explain improvisation introduces a strong conjunctive 
process theorization of improvisation that captures the enactment and lived 
experience of improvisation; and (iii) by analysing circumspection in terms of 
its constituent processes allows the introduction of anticipation, concern, 
appraisal, reflection and solicitations to the theorization of improvisation. All 
the latter concepts have neither been used for the explanation of circumspection 
and improvisation (with the exception of reflection), nor interrelated between 
them in the management literature. In parallel, concern and appraisal allude to 
the hitherto marginalised role of emotions, moods and goods in improvisation 
and thus help overcome rationalist-cum-functionalist understandings of the 
phenomenon. Moreover, this study introduces a new phenomenological 
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interpretation of reflection (as restoring anticipation) and breakdowns (as the 
collapse of anticipation) that helps to better grasp the lived experience of 
unexpected situations.  
In the next subsections I will explain the interrelationship between the 
processes that give rise to circumspection, as well as how they are all tied to 
experiencing and enacting organizational improvisation. 
6.3.1 Circumspection 
Perceiving the exigencies unfolding developments, in Heideggerian 
terms, is referred to as circumspection and is an indication of a high level of 
expertise  (Dreyfus, 1991, p. 66; Haugeland, 2013, p. 103). What is meant by 
this term? A  D e f  (1991, . 66)  i , i  i  a ca e f -thematic, non-
self-referential a a e e , or as Heidegger (1982, p. 163) puts it i  i  i  he 
view in which the equipmental nexus stands at first, completely unobtrusive and 
h gh , hich acc di g  Ha ge a d (2013, . 103) gi e  i e  -
b e a i a  a a e e . Put otherwise, if we had a camera on top of an 
agent s head that captured all their movements, including exactly where the 
agent looked while performing an action, it would not be sufficient to capture 
what the agent perceived. This is because an agent s perception is characterised 
by circumspection; perception manifests non-observational/phenomenal 
elements that orient their attention.  
The phenomenal elements pertain to perceiving the situation from a 
gestalt (on the background of dwelling in their past experience) that enables 
agents to anticipate, be concerned, appraise and be solicited to certain 
affordances depending on the situation. All the aforementioned concepts are 
considered to manifest circumspection since they are not visible to the eye of 
an unskilled observer, but nevertheless their integration transforms the 
perceptual scene presented to agents.  Each of the constituents of 




As established in Chapter 3, indwelling, the basis of tacit knowledge, is 
a perceptual process through which one is able to be focally aware of an object 
of perception by attending from subsidiary awareness (Polanyi, 1966; Tsoukas 
2011). Socialization in Practice enables practitioners to dwell in an inarticulate 
background (e.g., past experience) against which they perceive unfolding 
developments (Polanyi, 1961; Ribeiro, 2014). The latter was illustrated in 
Chapter 5 by showing that as ATCOs accumulated experience they were 
increasingly able to spontaneously respond to situational exigencies by being 
subsidiarily aware of their past experience. For example, novices showed 
difficulties responding to situations because they tended not to know which 
response was relevant, as they were not sure about the implications of 
situations. Experienced ATCOs, in contrast, were intuitively drawn to 
responses by being better able to see the implications of situations. As such, 
dwelling in practical experience permits agents to perceive the exigencies of 
unfolding developments. 
 Dwelling in experience cultures a practical sensitivity that enables agents 
to simultaneously: (i) perceive contextual nuances and (ii) which aspects of 
hei  ac ice  e i e a  e  are relevant to address exigencies. As each 
situation has its idiosyncrasies, which can neither be predicted nor captured in 
rules, perceiving contextual nuances and finding ways to cope with their 
exigencies inevitably leads to improvisation.  
Agents are not automata that blindly follow rules. As Ryle (1949) and 
Wittgenstein (1986, §54) have illustrated, justifying the application of a rule 
leads to infinite regress  one would require a rule for each rule they choose to 
use, ad infinitum (see also Harré, 2002, pp. 115 116). Although during training 
controllers learn idealized forms of procedures and related phraseology in the 
form of rules, neither are sufficient for coping with unfolding situations; both 
a e e e  a  aid i  eachi g  he ac ice (Wittgenstein, 1986, §54). Rules 
e e  e e a  g ide i e . The ab ac e  f rules cannot stretch itself to 
cover the complexity and uniqueness of concrete practice - small differences 
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across situations (e.g., weather, aircraft type, pilot, airline policy). In parallel, 
situations do not come with a priori labels, which pre-specify that a given 
situation is a case of X which should be responded to by doing Y (Tsoukas, 
2018a, p. 9).  
To overcome the aforementioned hurdles, agents must constantly strive 
to cover the chinks left exposed by the rules through improvisation. This 
requires indwelling (i.e., attending from past experience in Practice). Through 
indwelling, agents fill he ga  ef  e  i  a i a i  (Polanyi,1961, p. 465) 
to perceive which rule/procedure is relevant as well as when and how to use it. 
The use of rules/procedures, however, requires adaptions to fit the 
idiosyncrasies of the situation. This is consistent with the view that 
i i a i  i e  e deg ee f i a i  beca e [i ] i e  he 
c ea i  f ac i  ide c e  a  a d i e  (Moorman & Miner, 
1998a, p. 4).  
Indwelling is tied to circumspection because it entails viewing unfolding 
situations on the background of a non-observational gestalt (i.e., past experience 
in Practice). However, as will be illustrated below, indwelling is also important 
for the other underlying processes of circumspection: anticipation, concern, 
appraisal and solicitations, and if facing an unusual situation, reflection in 
response to breakdowns.  
6.3.3 Anticipation 
 Seeing that a situation is of a specific sort (see Haugeland, 2013) is 
tantamount to being aware of what immanent situations imply (i.e., their 
practical significance/immanent consequences). By this I mean, that perceiving 
a situation as a case of a specific sort that requires a specific response, implies 
that agents spontaneously anticipate the implications of situations based on 
dwelling in past experience  (Polanyi, 1961; Ribeiro, 2014). Hence, controllers 
are drawn towards the response that will allow them to address the possible 
eventualities of arising situations. This occurs spontaneously because situations 
present themselves to skilled agents from a gestalt - agents attend from their 
past experience of dealing with similar situations to attend to current situational 
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exigencies. The latter suggests that having different levels of experience 
changes what one anticipates in a given situation. Thus, when two agents with 
different levels of experience face exactly the same perceptual scene, they are 
likely to have different anticipations (e.g., as in Episode 2). 
It should be highlighted that anticipation does not entail that situations 
are dealt with in exactly the same manner, or exactly as the rules prescribe. 
Rather, because each situation has unique characteristics, agents, over time, 
develop the ability to be subsidiarily aware (Polanyi, 1966b; Taylor, 1995, 
Chapter 5) f he fa i  e e b a ce  (Wittgenstein, 1986, §67) across 
situations and in turn can creatively cope with the situation through 
improvisation  (more about this later) (Taylor, 1993, p. 57; Tsoukas, 2011b, p. 
xiii). Put otherwise, their past experience serves as an indwelling - an 
inarticulate background (i.e., gestalt) against which family resemblances and 
relevant responses are revealed. How? As Dreyfus (2013, p. 35) explains, with 
experience agents see he e  f h d ed  h a d  f ac i . Th gh 
the latter, the agent develops a sensitivity to subtler and subtler similarities and 
differences of perceptual patterns. Thus, learning changes, not the [age ] 
mind, but his world  (ibid.). This phenomenological interpretation offers an 
alternative account to the dominant information processing approach to 
improvisation. The benefit of this account over cognitivism is that unlike the 
latter, the former can explain how agents deal with current situations that are 
not identical to past situations (and thus cannot be retrieved from memory) (see 
Bingham & Eisenhardt, 2011; Kyriakopoulos, 2011; Moorman & Miner, 
1998b). To be able to make the improvised adjustment necessarily relies on 
anticipation because otherwise agents would not know what a situation calls 
for.  
Anticipation is a concept that has sometimes been mentioned in passing 
in relation to situated action (e.g., Benner et al., 1999; Hutchins, 2010), but has 
been broadly neglected in explanations of improvisation. Moreover, it has been 
more popularly used under the guise of the cognitivist framework by referring 
to it as expectation (or expectancy frameworks) to discuss the phenomenon of 
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sense making (e.g. Gioia, 2006; Patriotta & Gruber, 2015; Weick, 1988, 1993b; 
Weick & Sutcliffe, 2015). According to Weick (1988, p. 307), expectations are 
if-then asserti  ba ed  e i  b e ed c e , hich ha e bee  
a i ed i e a  b  i di id a , a d ha  a e a cia ed i h c e  f  
current situations  (see also Maitlis & Sonenshein, 2010, p. 564). Consequently, 
Weick (1988, p. 307) maintai  ha  he ga i a i  a d he e i e  a e 
i  he i d f he ac  a d ha  ac i  ecede  c g i i .   
Thi  d  conception of anticipation builds on phenomenological 
research to overcome the dominant retrospective focus found in cognitivist 
accounts describing perception (Holt & Cornelissen, 2014; Sandberg & 
Tsoukas, 2015) and by extension improvisation, by capturing the 
prospectiveness of situated responses. In contrast to Weick  (1988) i  f 
expectation, I gge  ha  a ici a i  ecede  age  ac i  and is possible 
due to perceiving situations through gestalts. In mundane i a i  age  
anticipation simultaneously adjusts to developments and precedes their actions 
because they are already attending from their past experience. For example, in 
the beginning of the Guardian Angel Episode, Angelo was giving instructions 
to aircrafts to descend based on his anticipation of how the aircrafts would 
descend. Anticipation came first and the response followed. In non-routine 
situations, anticipation may change several times due to uncertainty, but 
nevertheless anticipation needs to be restored through reflection before action 
(more about reflection later). For example, later on in the Guardian Angel 
E i de, A ge  a ici a i  ab  ha  ai c af  #1 was doing had collapsed 
and was restored several times before he could improvise in relation to the 
situational exigencies. Thus to enact an improvisation, one must be polarized 
from their anticipation (which depends on dwelling in past experience), thus 
improvisation does not precede anticipation. 
A study that has engaged substantively with anticipation, albeit in the 
context of sensemaking, is Goia and colleagues (2002, p. 625). The authors 
(ibid.) defi e a ici a i  a  he abi i   ee a  i e a d head i  ff b  
looking to the future and solving your future problem by manipulating the 
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f e e ce i  f he e e  a d he a . De i e he face i i a i   
my explanation of anticipation there are substantive differences. In their study 
the authors focus on the malleability of organizational history and identity. 
Thus, notice that in their definition they mention that a future problem is solved 
by the manipulation of future perception. This suggests that they see 
a ici a i  a  a  f he di c i e ac ice f i i g  ie  (ibid. . 627). 
A  e a e he  ffe  i  ha  f a i e i  fficia  h  ecified ha  if you 
tell people that your vision is that, in five, ten, or 15 years they will be seen as 
g ad a e  f a g ea  i e i , he  i  b  i  i  (ibid., . 627). Thi  
illustrates that, unlike this study, Gioia et al. (2002) do not examine anticipation 
beyond spinning stories. Hence, this study adds by showing how agents 
spontaneously attend to anticipated future problems in the midst of ongoing 
action. 
Similarly, anticipation may bear affinity to Cunha and colleague s (2012, 
p. 265) metaphorical presentation of i i a i  a  ea  i e f e igh  f  
strategizing. The authors highlight that organizational environments constantly 
change unpredictably (see also Mintzberg, 1994). This in turn, often makes 
established strategies redundant. Hence, Cunha and colleagues (2012) argue 
that organizations may benefit by foregoing emphasis on planning. Instead, 
organizations must try to intentionally detect weak signals and improvise in 
response to them.  
While these insights are largely aligned with the findings of the thesis, 
he ai  diffe e ce f f e igh  i  e a i   a ici a i  i  f d. Fi , 
in the context of this study anticipation unlike foresight, is not seen as a 
metaphor, but as a skill that is developed on the basis of immersion in practice. 
Second, foresight, in the context of strategizing, and especially in trying to 
detect weak signals, alludes to conscious reflection. As established by past 
studies (Dreyfus, 1991; Yanow & Tsoukas, 2009), conscious reflection is 
enacted in response to unusual situations. The latter, in the context of Cunha et 
a .  (2012) d , can be conceptualized to be tantamount to seeking and 
responding to weak signals. In contrast, anticipation, in the context of this 
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thesis, is argued to manifest itself in non-reflective action. Therefore, this 
d  c ce a i a i  f a ici a i  i c e e a  add  ha  i  ca  be a 
feature of non-reflective action, and at the same time underlines that it has been 
a hitherto unnoticed, skill (not only a metaphor) that agents rely on and hone on 
a daily basis.  
6.3.4 Concern and Appraisal  
Appraisal is a concept that has not been previously related to 
improvisation. Appraisal helps understand how anticipation is directed to an 
improvised response. To understand appraisal, however, one must first bear in 
mind that it is intimately tied to concern  about the internal goods of the 
practice (Moore, 2017, p. 67). Thus, I will first explain concern  and then 
gradually show its interrelation with appraisal. Both allow this study to usher in 
and show the importance of emotions and moods to organizational 
improvisation, which have both been marginalized. Emotions are understood to 
be judgements about the world and thus directly relate to aspects of a  age  
world (e.g., something appears to be stressful, shocking) (Solomon, 2007, p. 
204), whereas moods are understood as an orientation of engagement with 
encountered situations - a a  f bei g ed i   he hi g  i  he d  
(Dreyfus & Wrathall, 2005, p. 5). For example, stress or shock should not be 
allowed to such a degree that would paralyze an agent, but should be 
experienced up to a degree that will allow them to preserve hei  P ac ice  
internal goods. 
Through socialization in practice agents become concerned about their 
ac ice  i e a  g d  (MacIntyre, 2007; Moore, 2017; Tsoukas, 2018b). For 
example, in ATC the agents were taught from the very beginning of their 
training to care about two internal goods - safety and expedition. Both are 
extremely important, to the extent that controllers are held accountable for their 
preservation. The notion of concern as a concept can be traced to Heidegger 
(2013, p. 458): Da ei  e i  a  a  e i  f  hich, i  i  Bei g, ha  Bei g i  
i e f a  i e . I  he  d , age  a e a a  c ce ed ab  he a  i  
which they are engaged in the world (see also Benner et al., 1999; Benner, 
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Tanner, & Chelsa, 2009), because they always attend to their experiences by 
attending from the background of their concerns. 
Through socialization in practice, over time these goods are taken for 
granted by all agents to such a degree that they dwell in them. That is, agents 
spontaneously see unfolding situations in terms of h di g hei  ac ice  
goods. For example, if one is a controller they will see situations in terms of 
whether safety and expedition are upheld. Indeed, agents care so much about 
hei  ac ice  goods, that when jeopardized strong emotional responses are 
evoked (e.g., worry and shock Angelo experienced when he anticipated the 
aircraft collision). While only referred to in passing, emotions in studies of 
improvisation are viewed as resources  people draw upon to improvise (Cunha 
et al., 1999, p. 302). For example, feeling that one can trust their teammates has 
been associated with a positive relationship between improvisation and 
innovation (Vera & Crossan, 2005). Focusing on emotions qua resources and 
researching as variables in interaction with other variables, suggests that how 
emotions are experienced and directly affect improvisation has been overlooked 
(Cunha et al., 2017, p. 567).  
Thus my account explores how emotions are experienced in response to 
developments and in turn how they affect improvisation. I find that emotions 
are a form of appraisal about situational developments based on their concerns 
- attending from internal goods makes agents perceive whether they are upheld. 
When they are upheld agents remain poised, but when they are jeopardised 
agents experience negative emotions. Concern solicits agents towards 
appraising developments and orienting their attention to responses that would 
afeg a d hei  ac ice  i e a  g d . As such, different appraisals change 
the gestalt from which agents perceive the situation and thus change which 
responses are perceived as relevant. Attending from positive or negative 
emotions to the situations changes the quality of how a situation is experienced. 
The quality of the experience (i.e., positive, or negative) is a manifestation of 
the appraisal of a situation in relation to whether a P ac ice  internal goods are 
upheld or jeopardised. Preserving the internal goods offers the emotional 
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motivation to react to situations. Thus emotions are a judgement about whether 
situations are developing in accordance to normative significations (i.e., 
internal goods).   
Responses to situations, however, while emotionally charged (Solomon, 
2007) depend on already being immersed in the mood of the Practice (e.g., if 
you are a controller the mood of attentive calmness). The P ac ice  d i  
learned through participation (see appx. 3). Mood, from a phenomenological 
angle, is an orientation of engagement with encountered situations (Dreyfus & 
Wrathall, 2005, p. 5) and c i e[s] the range of ways in which things are 
able to matter to us  (Ratcliffe, 2013, p. 159). Hence, the major difference 
between emotions and mood is that, the former is directed to something (e.g., 
e hi g a ea  e f ), hi e he a e  i   di ec ed a  e hi g 
i hi  he d   (e.g., attentive calmness prescribes an orientation to react in 
a specific way) (ibid., p. 159). For example, controllers learn that they must not 
allow stress to overcome them, nor show their stress to pilots; they must be calm 
and attentive to the needs of pilots. The main reason for this is to preserve the 
cooperation of the pilot and thus uphold safety.  
The mood of attentive calmness may bear some resemblance to the 
notion of emotional labour (Hochschild, 2003; Holman et al., 2008). However, 
the difference with attentive calmness is that as a mood, it is more primordial 
than organizational directives that make emotional labour salient (e.g., airlines 
instructing/training flight attendants to smile at all times). To enact 
organizational directive requires being skilful in a Practice, which presupposes 
being in a mood wherein a P ac ice  internal goods matter. For example, 
Angelo did not let his shock and panic overwhelm him when he realised that 
the aircrafts were going to crash so he could preserve safety. Instead by being 
in the mood of attentive calmness, he tried to keep calm and give clear 
instructions to the pilots so as to ensure they avoided the collision.  
Holt and Cornellissen (2014) argue for a Heideggerian conception of 
mood. However, the authors (2014, p. 534) implicitly equate emotions with 
moods (e.g., he fea  fe  a  Ma  G ch, f  e a e, i  a d ). Moreover, 
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a d...d e   add e i a  c   e-gi e  bjec  f e e ie ce  
(Ratcliffe, 2013, p. 159). Moods, as specified above, constitute an orientation 
of engagement to situations (Dreyfus & Wrathall, 2005, p. 5). Hence, this study 
adds that emotions are experienced and reacted to in response to exigencies on 
the background of the broader mood of a Practice and its internal goods.  
While this study is not the first to distinguish emotions from moods (e.g., 
Beedie, Terry, & Lane, 2005; Gray & Watson, 2001), it contributes to the 
improvisation literature by introducing a phenomenological distinction between 
the two and showing the role of both in relation to improvisation. That is, 
emotions signify an engagement and judgement about the world (e.g., 
something appears as stressful) on the background of being concerned about the 
practices of internal goods. Mood, on the other hand, is a disposition that allows 
agents to have a sense about the appropriate (in relation to the internal goods) 
range of responses to occurrences. For instance, while an imminent collision 
can make a controller feel fear and stress, the mood of attentive calmness helps 
the agent balance these emotions in a manner that enables them to improvise in 
response to the situation in a way that safeguards the internal goods of their 
Practice. For example, Angelo (Episode 1) facing a similar situation was not 
paralyzed by fear or stress, nor did he run away or hide under the desk. He told 
hi e f  d  e hi g  a d he did in a manner that was consistent with his 
concern about the goods of the practice. 
 Concern  may bear affi i   c i e  (i.e., the reasons given 
f  age  beha i ) (Weick, 1988, p. 310). According to Maitlis and 
Soneshein (2010, p. 562), c i e  e e  a  a f da i  f  
sensemaking. This is because individuals often generate explanations 
retrospecti e   j if  ac i   hich he  ha e c i ed . A h gh, hi  
may be true in certain occasions, I argue that the internal goods of a practice 
(MacIntyre, 2007; Moore, 2017; Tsoukas, 2018b) predispose agents  concerns 
(Dreyfus, 1991, p. 238; Heidegger, 2013, p. 238). That is, in the case of ATC, 
by dwelling in safety and expedition and enacting them through the mood of 
attentive calmness, ATCOs appear to be predisposed to engage with a situation 
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in a way that will preserve the goods. This illustrates that, when engaged in 
practices, the reasons for doing things are far from bei g i e e i g   
retrospectively created (Weick, 1988, p. 310), people are always pre-concerned 
about situational developments (Heidegger, 2013, p. 238), beca e ac ice  
 ac i e e e he  ga i ed a d a  e d  bjec  (Nicolini & 
Monteiro, 2017, p. 112). 
  To summarise the above, dwelling in concern about the internal goods 
of a practice serves as a background against which to appraise e  
anticipation of developments. That is, with every action taken, the anticipation 
and appraisal of its implications spontaneously generate emotional reactions 
(that are experienced through broader moods) that enable agents to perceive 
whether the anticipated outcome of the situation is positive or not. As suggested 
above, this creates a gestalt that presents the salient features of situations. The 
interrelation of anticipation with concern and appraisal is an ongoing process, 
akin to a loosely orchestrated choreography in which every reaction to a 
situation is simultaneously followed by an anticipation, concern, an affective 
appraisal of the anticipation and a subsequent re-reaction through available 
equipment (more about this below). 
 The appraisal of the anticipation each reaction evokes, intuitively makes 
the engaged agent to perceive it under a positive (viz., attractive) or a negative 
(viz., repulsive) light (Koffka, 1936; Morris, 2012). That is, a positive gestalt is 
perceived when and if the anticipation of the implications of a situation is 
a ig ed i h he g d  f e  ac ice. A ega i e gestalt, is perceived when 
and if the anticipation of the implications of a situation is not aligned with the 
g d  f e  ac ice. Whe  i i e, agents seek to attain the anticipated 
implications. When negative, agents seek to avoid the anticipated implications. 
Appraising implications and seeking to either attain or avoid anticipated 
implications are entwined with relevant affordances (viz., solicitations). This is 
because actions are enabled insofar as at they are carried out through the 
relevant affordances.  
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6.3.5 Solicitations  
The use of affordances is malleable. Although their use may be governed 
by normative conventions (Haugeland, 2013), they may, under certain 
situations, be used unconventionally. Unconventional use of materials is 
something that studies on bricolage have implied (Baker & Nelson, 2005). 
However, the difference of my conceptualization to the aforementioned studies 
i  ha  I e be d he f c i a i  f b ic age die  (Visscher et al., 
2018) and introduce the notion of solicitations (i.e., situationally relevant 
affordances - more about this below) to understanding improvisation.  
This is useful because it shows that relevant affordances are only 
perceivable on the basis of experiences in value-laden background of practice. 
I also show that unconventional use of affordances, is tied to the internal goods 
of practices and appraisal. Unconventional use, entails that an action is not done 
for the sake of the action itself, but for the sake of an outcome. Outcomes are 
desired, as discussed in Chapter 3, on the background/horizon of goods valued 
by practices (see Taylor, 1995). Thus, to use something unconventionally, 
without being held accountable (and thus punished) for the deviation, must be 
underpinned by the preservation of the internal goods of the practice. 
Thus, agents on the basis of concern and appraisal are non-reflectively 
attracted towards the affordances which are relevant to attaining or avoiding 
e  a ici a i  by attending from their concern about their ac ice  i e a  
goods. This suggests another element of perception  that specific affordances 
intuitively stand-out as relevant, useful and thus attractive on the background 
of anticipation, concern and appraisal.  
Situationally relevant and (by extension, attractive) affordances are 
referred to as solicitations (Dreyfus, 2002; Dreyfus & Kelly, 2007; Rietveld & 
Brouwers, 2017). Like the sirens in the Odyssey (Homer, 1999) that beckoned 
ai   hei  ide , ici a i  ie d a  affec i e a e  (Rietveld, 2013, p. 
25) that is intuitively perceived on the backg d f age  i a i a  
concerns and experience. The affective allure of solicitations is entwined with 
the emotional reactions anticipations evoke  engaged agents are concerned 
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about appropriately coping with situations and as such, are drawn to 
solicitations. Their emotional reactions orient them towards solicitations, 
insofar as they dwell in the mood and significations of their practices. Agents 
are always in the process of perceiving and responding to solicitations on the 
basis of appraising anticipations. Consequently, this permits an understanding 
f he e a  age  a e i  i  d a   i  he id  f ac i , hich i   
allows one to come closer to being inside the moment of improvisation. 
6.3.6 Reflection in Response to Breakdowns 
When agents do not know what to anticipate, they experience a 
breakdown and as such, engage in reflection. Reflection in response to 
breakdowns will be explained in the next paragraphs.  
Insofar as situations deviate from what is typically anticipated, agents 
often experience a breakdown in their performance. Breakdowns have tended 
to be interpreted as a cognitive collapse of meaning or sense (Cunha et al., 2006, 
p. 324; Weick, 1993b) in which, some scholars argue that information from 
long-term memory need longer to be associated with short-term memory 
(Moorman & Miner, 1998b). My study aligns closely with the 
phenomenological view of breakdown, in which scholars have tended to 
highlight that there are degrees of breakdown that cause agents to reflect in or 
on action (Dreyfus, 1991; Haugeland, 2013; Yanow & Tsoukas, 2009).  
Drawing on the data, I build on the phenomenological interpretation of 
breakdowns (Yanow & Tsoukas, 2009), to illustrate a new point. Breakdowns 
do not entail the absence of meaning, as Weick (1993b) has argued (cf. Colville 
et al., 2013, p. 1217). Rather, breakdowns are perceived as an absence of what 
is normally anticipated - a collapse of anticipation. This is because responses 
are based on what is anticipated (Ribeiro, 2014). In more severe instances of 
breakdowns (e.g., total), the latter is followed by a reflective investigation. That 
is, the agent tries to understand what to anticipate (e.g., Angelo looked outside 
the window, asked the pilot). Without knowing what to anticipate, responses 
are postponed until an anticipation is restored though reflection. During the 
breakdown, motivation to restore the anticipation is fed on the background of 
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a  age  c ce  ab  he ac ice  g d . Unlike cognitive interpretations 
I try to show that restoring anticipation through reflection necessarily relies on 
already indwelling and thus caring about the significations of practice (e.g., 
internal goods, terminological distinctions, tool use)  without the latter (i.e., if 
meaning was lost) (cf. Weick, 1993b; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2015), restoring 
anticipation and thus improvisation would be impossible.  
6.3.7 Improvisation Practices  
During my fieldwork two qualitatively different types of improvisation 
were documented  mundane and critical improvisation. The former suggests 
that to deal with mundane situations agents must make minor adjustments to 
procedures to cope with exigencies ( efe ed  a  ba e i e i i a i  b  
Cunha et al., 2017, p. 561). The latter suggests that agents must make major 
adjustments to procedures to cope with exigencies. This finding is consistent 
with other studies that have highlighted different levels (e.g., from minor  to 
major) of improvisation (Cunha et al., 2006, pp. 323 324; Moorman & Miner, 
1998a, p. 12; Orlikowski, 1996).  
Thus, like past studies I highlight that the type of improvisation depends 
on both the perceived degree of deviation a situation has from mundane 
enactments, but unlike past studies, I suggest that the desideratum of both types 
of improvisation is to preserve the goods of the practice. The closer a situation 
is perceived to be in relation to preserving the goods of a practice the more 
likely it is that mundane improvisation will be enacted. The further away 
situations are perceived to be from preserving the goods of a practice, the more 
likely it is that critical improvisation will be enacted in order to preserve the 
goods.  
Improvising is tied to solicitations. As already explained, being drawn to 
solicitations (i.e., relevant affordances) stems from circumspection. 
Solicitations are perceived spontaneously when agents engage in mundane 
improvisation, or after reflection when agents engage in critical improvisation 
(because the latter is usually accompanied with a breakdown). While 
responding to different solicitations under different circumstances influences 
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what type of improvisation is enacted (mundane or critical), it simultaneously 
influences which improvisation practices are enacted. This section will focus 
on explaining how responding to different solicitations entails different 
practices of enacting improvisation. 
Four types of improvisation practices were identified: (i) introduction of 
new elements, (ii) role change, (iii) disregard and (iv) timing adjustment. The 
interesting aspect of identifying different practices is that even though agents 
may respond to a seemingly identical affordance, the manner and circumstances 
under which the latter is responded to, may constitute an entirely different 
improvisation practice. As it was shown in the previous chapter, as a situation 
unfolds agents continuously need to respond to the results of their previous 
employment of an improvisation practice through a different improvisation 
practice. In this section, however, each identified practice will be explained and 
discussed separately in relation to the types of improvisation practices already 
identified in the literature. 
(i) Introducing new features refers to controllers enacting responses to 
situations that are not already prescribed in the rules. To do so entails using a 
relevant affordance in an unprecedented manner in order to add to a predefined 
procedure depending on the exigencies of situations for the sake of the 
ac ice  g d . O he  ch a  ha e d c e ed i i a  i a ce  f 
improvisation, although they have not labelled them as constituting a specific 
i i a i a  ac ice. S ecifica , hi e  Weick  (1993b) description of 
D dge  i i ed e e  he Ma  G ch di a e  a d B ad  (2011) 
acc  f Ge e a  Ch ik  i i ed ba e ac ic  d i g he ba e f 
Stalingrad, illustrate that their responses were novel for their time  they refer 
to both with the generic label improvisation. Other researchers highlighting 
highly novel improvisations maintain that agents abrogate past conventions to 
do so (Baker & Nelson, 2005; Moorman & Miner, 1998a). Given that practices 
constitute the horizon of meaning (i.e., what is good or bad, how a tool is 
conventionally used), there is no parthenogenesis. While this may be the case, 
this does not imply that agents simply recycle sociomaterial responses from 
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their organizational structure (Bechky & Okhuysen, 2011). Rather, by drawing 
on existing meanings agents are often able to create new responses that are 
consistent with the underlying goods of their practices. 
(ii) Role change refers to controllers enacting responses to situations by 
using their equipment unconventionally. To do so entailed using a relevant 
affordance in a way that does not conform to its traditionally assigned role so 
a   e e he ac ice  g d . U ike Bechk  a d Okh e  (2011, . 246) 
h  c fi e e cha ge (i  hei   d  e  hif i g )  i a ce  i  
which people swap pre-conceptualized organizational roles (e.g., conventional 
camera person substitutes the absent aerial camera person), I argue for a broader 
conceptualization. In particular, I argue that role changes can entail enacting a 
role that has not necessarily been organizationally pre-defined, and that role 
changes can also encompass changes to the traditional usage roles of 
equipment. While the latter form of improvisation practice bears affinity to the 
concept of bricolage used in studies focusing on resource improvisation -  
i.e., aki g d  b  a i g c bi a i  f he e ce  a  ha d  e  
b e  a d i ie  (Baker & Nelson, 2005, p. 333)  there are 
significant differences. Traditionally improvisation through bricolage is 
conceptualized through a functionalist prism. Tha  i , a  a a i a  e e  
e i e a  c ai  (Visscher et al., 2018, p. 356). As illustrate above, 
I conceptualize role change (viz., the unconventional use of affordances) as a 
value-laden response to exigencies (Castoriadis, 2005b) in order to preserve the 
internal goods of practices (MacIntyre, 2007; Moore, 2017). 
(iii) Disregard entails intentionally overlooking aspects of the pre-
defined rule / ced e  i  de   c e e a g d  f hei  ac ice. I  
terms of affordances this practice encompasses intentionally overlooking the 
use of a pre-scribed affordance. One study that mentions a similar phenomenon 
ca ed ig i g  (Lok & De Rond, 2013, p. 198), defi e  i  a  a f  f 
reflexive normalization work through which unusual or unexpected behaviour 
is accounted for in terms of a common stock of knowledge through which this 
behaviour is made understandable and explainable, and h  a i ed . I  
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addition to the latter only being used in reference to institution theory, not 
improvisation, the other significant difference to my conceptualization is that 
disregard can be both reflexive or spontaneous and is directly related to the 
i e a  g d  f a  age  ac ice.  
Disregard, as a finding, serves as a link between creative deviance and 
organizational improvisation. Creative deviance is defined as overlooking the 
directions of management to work on a new idea (Mainemelis, 2010). Creative 
deviance has been studied mostly in the context of innovation studies, where 
idea  a e fi  ed   a age e , b  a e f e  ejec ed beca e he  
a e e cei ed a  ei d  (ibid., .558). Th , c ea i e de ia ce has not been 
studied as it has been in this study; as a spontaneous improvisation to arising 
contingencies. Disregard suggests that creative deviance can arise instantly due 
to pressing situational exigencies and as a result, the agent may not have time 
to propose their idea to management. Moreover, the creative deviance literature, 
f c e    he i di id a  (ibid., . 559), he ea  I f c   he age  
embedded in practice. Thus, I show that creative deviance, in the form of 
disregard, is not tied to an individual in a vacuum, but tied to embedded agents 
who are concerned about the internal goods of their practices.  
(iv) Timing adjustment refers to the practice of tweaking the timing of 
the execution of pre-scribed phases of procedures. In terms of affordances this 
practice entails intentionally manipulating the timing at which an affordance is 
ed i  de   e e e he ac ice  g d . Thi  bea  e i i a i   
Bechk  a d Okh e  (2011, pp. 246 249) i  f e ga i i g 
i e  a d e de i g he k . The f e  e a e   e ga i ing the 
execution of routines based on a learned repertoire, whereas the latter relates to 
changing the order in which their work is fulfilled. The difference of both to 
timing adjustment is that it does not only entail changing the timing the 
execution of whole routines/procedures, but only aspects of procedures. 
Moreover, instead of adopting a functionalist-cum-structuralist view of 
organizations, in which improvisation is seen as a pure response to achieve a 
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pre-specified goal (Visscher et al., 2018, p. 356), I suggest that timing 
adjustment is, again a response to preserve the internal goods of practice. 
6.3.8 Summary of Theoretical Implications for Organizational Improvisation 
In this subsection, I will first summarize the improvisation framework 
(figure 14) and then highlight the major contributions of my thesis. Coping with 
contingencies is achieved through circumspection (i.e., non-observational 
awareness). The latter depends on dwelling in an experiential background 
against wherein agents are concerned about their anticipation of situational 
developments. They appraise the implications of their anticipation through the 
experience of emotions (e ked i  e a i   he ac ice  g d ) and moods, 
and improvise in response to their appraisal through solicitations (i.e., relevant 
affordances). In abnormal cases, the cycle is interrupted because agent  have 
difficulty anticipating what is occurring. Consequently, they need to reflect on 
the situation so as to restore their anticipation, and thus be drawn to a 
solicitation. Utilising solicitations depending on the circumstances can result in 
mundane or critical improvisation. Mundane and critical improvisation can be 
achieved through the practices of introducing new features, role change, 
disregard and timing adjustment. The improvisation enacted starts a new cycle 
which needs to be responded to. 
The above framework contributes to the improvisation literature in a 
number of ways. First, it clarifies the role of tacit knowledge (as indwelling) in 
improvisation. Specifically, it shows that tacit knowledge is a gestalt that agents 
dwell in so as to attend to the meaning of situations. This is tied to the second 
contribution; introducing circumspection to the explanation of improvisation. 
The latter illustrates that perceiving meaning of situations affects how 
improvisation will be experienced and enacted through solicitations. 
Circumspection is non-observational and draws upon dwelling in past 
experience, as well as the other entwined processes of anticipation, concern, 
appraisal and solicitations (i.e., the relevant affordances used to improvise).  
Each process introduces new elements to the theory of improvisation. 
Anticipation, enables one to capture the prospectiveness of perception. So far, 
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most research has had a retrospective focus (Cunha et al., 2006, p. 326; 
Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2015; Shotter, 2017). Concern in conjunction with 
appraisal permit a phenomenological understanding of emotions (Solomon, 
2007) and moods (Ratcliffe, 2013), as well as a MacIntyrian (MacIntyre, 2007) 
understanding of internal goods in the process of improvisation. Past 
improvisation research has marginalised emotions, has not delineated between 
moods and emotions (Holt & Cornelissen, 2014) and has viewed improvisation 
as a simple rational/functional response to situations (Visscher et al., 2018, p. 
356). Solicitations e i  a  de a di g f he e a  age  a e i  i  
drawn to during improvisation, which in turn permits one to come closer to the 
lived experience of improvisation. The latter has also been greatly overlooked 
(see Fisher & Barrett, 2019, p. 149). Reflection and breakdowns are a given a 
new phenomenological interpretation. Breakdown is understood as the 
absence/collapse of anticipation, instead of the complete collapse of sense 
(Weick, 1993b). Reflection is understood as the processes through which 
anticipation is restored.  
Additionally, four types of improvisation practices are seen to result 
from circumspection depending on the use of affordances as solicitations. These 
being: introducing new features; role change; disregard; and timing adjustment. 
It should be noted that once an improvisation is enacted, another will be 
required in response. Above, I have argued that each type of improvisation 
practice adds a dimension that has been overlooked in organizational research.  
Finally, the framework shows that improvisation is an ongoing 
accomplishment that depends on the entwinement of several underlying 
processes. Consequently, it offers a strong process understanding of 
improvisation. Moreover, the framework shows that the improvisation depends 
on the enmeshment of several processes. This in turn, permits a conjunctive 
(Tsoukas, 2017) view of improvisation. 
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6.4 Implications for the Theory of Affordances in Management 
The above interpretation of affordances, has implications about how the 
concept is currently used in management studies. First, by drawing on 
phenomenology (Dreyfus, 2002; Dreyfus & Kelly, 2007; Rietveld, 2012b; 
Rietveld & Kiverstein, 2014), strands of ecological psychology (see Gibson, 
2015a), and weaving the insights of both the latter with practice theory (mainly 
Heideggerian-Wittgensteinian and neo-Aristotelian) (see Nicolini, 2012), I try 
to illustrate the process through which affordances are prospectively 
perceivable in engaged action. In management, this has not been previously 
explained. 
Management scholars understand affordances as possibilities for action 
that arise from an object or an environment (see Fayard & Weeks, 2007, 2014; 
Leonardi, 2011). However, I suggest that the notion of affordances requires 
further refinement, because agents are always surrounded by a plethora of 
affordances. This raises the question of how agents are drawn to specific 
affordances? I argue that affordances stand out to agents insofar as affordances 
exert a non-observational, affective allure over agents (see also, Rietveld, 
2012b). The term solicitations captures the experienced attraction of relevant 
affordances (i.e., he e a  age  a e i  i  ie ed ). But it should be 
noted that to be solicited by an affordance prerequires that an agent is skilled 
and that the affordance in question is relevant to addressing situational concerns 
(which are based on the goods of their practice).  
Second, through the notion of solicitations, it becomes clearer that  
perceiving relevant affordances is tied to emotions (Frijda et al., 2014), moods 
(Ratcliffe, 2013) and internal goods. How? As already explained above, agents 
d e  i  hei  ac ice  i e a  g d . Thi  gge  ha  age  ca e ab  he 
way they perform their practices. Thus, to see the relevance of an affordance is 
tied experiencing emotions through a mood. Experiencing emotions is a type of 
concernful appraisal that informs agents about whether situations are 
developing in line with the goods of their practice. If a situation is not, the 
perceptual field of the agents is repolarized by emotions and mood - attention 
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is beckoned towards the affordances that will help them remedy the situation. 
The understanding of affordances being tied to emotions, moods and the goods 
of practices has not previously featured in management. It permits a richer 
understanding of lived experience.  
 
6.5 Implications for Practice Theory and Phenomenology 
The use of circumspection in relation to indwelling, anticipation, 
concern, reflection, appraisal, and solicitations contributes to the literature as a 
first attempt to bridge practice theory with phenomenology and strands of 
ecological psychology in management studies. While Neo-Aristotelian practice 
theory (e.g., MacIntyre, 2007) highlights the importance of goods to motivating 
the behaviour of agents, and Heideggerian-Wittgensteinian practice theory 
(e.g., Haugeland, 2013; Taylor, 1995) highlights the importance of practices for 
the creation of a horizon of significance (Nicolini, 2012), no study (as far as I 
am aware) has previously explained how both strands of practice theory are 
related as well as enacted and experienced by agents. In this study, I argue that 
internal goods (from Neo-Aristotelian practice theory) are entwined with the 
horizon of significance of practices (from Heideggerian-Wittgensteinian 
practice theory) by learning to dwell in them as subsidiary particulars. 
At the same time ecological psychology pays more attention to 
perception (Gibson, 2015a), while phenomenology pays more attention to the 
experience of the agent (e.g., Dreyfus, 1991). Neither ecological psychology 
nor phenomenology, focus extensively on how practices affect the experience, 
or perception of agents (e.g., see Ribeiro, 2017). In this study, I pay attention to 
both elements and I show, I hope, that dwelling in experience of practice makes 
agents care about normative significations (which include internal goods and 
conventions) by taking for granted their importance. What is taken for granted 
is implied to be the horizon of significance.  
Like others (e.g., Ingold, 2002), I illustrate that situational developments 
are experienced, perceived and responded to on the background of the horizon 
of significance. Unlike others, I show that the latter is entwined with indwelling, 
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anticipation, concern, appraisal and solicitations (from phenomenology and 
ecological psychology) through the process of circumspection (from 
phenomenology). Therefore, I suggest that the perceptual field of agents is non-
observational (i.e., agents circumspect) because of dwelling in the significations 
and experience of practices. Circumspection allows agents to focus their 
attention on aspects that are critical to preserving their practice on the 
background of their previous experiences. The synthesis permits to have richer 
understanding of agent responses by simultaneously taking into account their 
e ce a  a d e i a  e e ie ce i  e a i   hei  ac ice  i ternal 
goods. Thus, I hope to have illustrated that Neo-Aristotelian and Heideggerian-
Wittgensteinian practice theory, in conjunction with phenomenology and 
ecological psychology can be combined to offer an interpretation for both the 
enaction and experience of agent behaviour. 
In addition to the above, my conceptualization of circumspection also 
seems to validate recent observations about temporality in management studies 
and contribute to the temporality of enacting practices. Specifically, Schatzki 
(2006) and Hernes (2014) suggest that the present entails both the past and the 
future. While my study, especially through the notion of anticipation (how 
agents perceive in the present how current situations will unfold in the future 
based on dwelling in their past experience), implies the same, it takes an 
additional step. The framework of circumspection, can be used as a plausible 
explanation as to how temporality is experienced by agents. This is because, 
circumspection is conceptualized to be the bridge between the past and the 
future. How? Agents gain practical experience through participating in practice 
and over time they begin to dwell in significations. Experience serves as a 
gestalt, which in turn allows them to become more skilled in discriminating 
between situational nuances. Thus, I have shown that when agents encounter a 
situation and have the requisite experience (developed in the past) to anticipate 
how present situation developments will unfold in the future. This is a matter 
of concern and is spontaneously appraised on the basis of normative 
significations learned and taken for granted in the past, and solicitations are 
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presented to them based on how they would like their future to be. For example, 
in Episode 1, inexperienced Tom did not anticipate that the pilot was facing 
problems, whereas experienced Andrew could. Both had different levels of 
experience that allowed them to anticipate and be responsive to different 
affordances. 
 
6.6  Methodological Implications 
This study has some methodological implications. It has been previously 
highlighted that it is difficult to identify and thus study both improvisation 
(Cunha et al., 2017, p. 567) and tacit knowledge (Gourlay, 2006). The 
methodological design used by this study could prove helpful in qualitatively 
researching both aforementioned phenomena in the future.  
S ecifica , i  ega d   i i a i  i  ha  bee  ecified ha  e 
cannot deduce from the content of particular performance how much in what 
way it involved improvisation proces e  (Cunha et al., 2017, p. 567). In the 
context of this study its findings rested on the ability to disambiguate 
improvisational processes. To achieve this it relied on a two-step process. First, 
the researcher had to become immersed in the written/official rules of the 
practice under examination. This is important because it allows the researcher 
to have an intimate understanding of what is instituted, on paper at least, as a 
non-improvisational performance. Second, the researcher has to compare actual 
performances with the written rules. Any discrepancies identified between the 
two can be argued to be improvisational. In case, that there are no written 
accounts of rules, then one must consult with members of the practice. During 
the consultation the researcher would have to establish what procedures are 
necessary for the enaction of a procedure. Then, for each procedure the research 
should establish what is considered to be a normal performance. After this, s/he 
can then compare discrepancies between actual performances with the oral 
account offered by members of the practice. 
 In regards to tacit knowledge a combination of observation and 
interviews were used to recognize its manifestations. It should be noted that 
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identifying its manifestations does not foster the ability of the researcher to 
actually perform what they research. First, the researcher must observe work 
performances of agents. During this time the researcher must take very detailed 
notes on the series of actions agent enacts (i.e., actions, facial expressions, body 
posture, terminology and equipment used) or ideally, if they have authorization, 
to video record. Particular attention must be paid to instances of breakdown 
beca e he  e ea  he taken-for-granted distinctions practitioners cannot 
a ic a e hi e ab bed i  ac ice  (Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2011, p. 351). 
Second, a short period after the performance (ideally exactly after, or at 
most three to four days later so they do not forget) the researcher should ask the 
participant questions about the recorded performance. Due to circumspection it 
is important to understand what the agent perceived. The researcher, being 
unskilled suggests that s/he perceives the situation from different gestalt and as 
such cannot perceive the shared perceptual scene in the same way their skilled 
participant does. As such, I would tend to refer to the date and time of the 
observed performance and ask the participant to offer an overview of what they 
were doing. This allows to establish a common reference point for the rest of 
the interview. After this by drawing on the notes (or video if one can), I would 
refer or show each discrete action and I ask the participant to explain what they 
perceived. After this I would ask them how what they saw made them feel. 
Feelings are spontaneous emotional judgements about the world (Solomon, 
2007). Identifying them enables one to understand whether a situation is tacitly 
considered to be good or bad. After this I would ask them to explain the actions 
they took and why they did so. Both the latter allow one to understand what is 
a common sensical response to situations. Finally, I would ask them if they 
considered any alternative actions prior to enacting their response. The latter, 
allows one to identify whether a breakdown (and thus reflection) occurred and 
to identify any other common-sensical responses that could have been used. 
This process would be repeated for other similar activities and when different 
people were enacting them. 
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Third, I compared the performance of similar actions performed by 
experienced and novice participants. By comparing the results of the two 
aforementioned steps collected from different participants, can help the 
researcher become aware of the differences between performances and 
perception, based on the different experiential gestalts the two groups attend 
from. The assumption behind the last claim is that more experience changes the 
way situations are perceived (for example see Ribeiro, 2014). 
 
6.7 Practical Implications 
A key finding of this study is that improvising depends on dwelling in an often 
tacit gestalt of past experience that informs perception. Orwell (1946) once 
e a ked  ee ha  i  i  f  f e  e eed  a c a  gg e . As 
such, this study has practical implications for management by attempting to 
b i g  he f e ha  e d   be igh  i  f  f ac i i e  e  he  he  
improvise, but usually struggle to notice. As phenomenology implies, careful 
reflection on everyday experience can assist in becoming aware of the often 
unnoticed sides of organizing, and can enable management to make more 
conscious decisions about the tacit dimensions of organizations. 
Rules, general as they are, cannot guarantee a correct result because 
they contain what a person ought to do, but not h  (Nussbaum, 2009, p. 339; 
see also Harré, 2002, pp. 115 116). As illustrated in this study, even mundane 
situations require agents to find an appropriate response by creatively extending 
conventional responses to the exigencies of the situations. Given that there is 
always an element of improvisation in action (see also Crossan & Sorrenti, 
2002, p. 46; Tsoukas & Chia, 2002), management should be mindful that while 
e  a  g ide ac i i e  a e i   e a ec , hei  a ia e e 
during action requires practice. This was also illustrated in another study 
wherein the lack of practical experience with a procedure led to dire results (see 
Colville et al., 2013). This suggests that instituting new rules, although helpful 
is not enough to achieve results. Staff need to become familiar with them so as 
to develop the know-how that will enable them to accord appropriately with the 
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rule (Harré, 2002, p. 116). Use of simulations, if possible, should be especially 
encouraged as they may increase e  experience in according with rules.  
Following from the above, when reviewing critical incidents deviations 
from rules/procedures should not always be seen simply as a reprimandable 
violation (Weick, 1998). Prior to judging whether the response was appropriate 
or not, requires a careful consideration of the unique situational characteristics 
which may have led a member of staff to choose a seemingly idiosyncratic 
response. Tolerance and consideration of improvised responses are important 
to avoid rigidity. Rigidity, especially in critical situations may prove to be 
counter-productive (see Barrett, 1998, pp. 619 620; Weick, 1993b; Weick & 
Sutcliffe, 2015, p. 14).  
In many cases, improvised responses can prove to be useful source of 
learning  either as examples worth mimicking or avoiding (see Barrett, 1998, 
pp. 610 611; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2015, pp. 12 14). In addition, as improvisation 
may entail using equipment that is not routinely used it may uncover areas of 
weakness that require improvement through upgrading material equipment or 
the need for further training in immaterial equipment (such as phraseology and 
procedures). In parallel, it is also important that material equipment (even if 
seldomly used) is well maintained and can be accessed from their designated 
space. In regards to immaterial equipment, it is important for staff to be well 
versed in the latter even in aspects that are less frequently enacted.  
Furthermore, while technical proficiency is vital, so is emotional 
attunement (e.g. Damasio, 1994). This is because emotions are spontaneous and 
engaged judgements about the appropriateness of situations which are 
experienced on the background of moods, both of which are developed through 
socialization (Solomon, 2007). To improvise appropriately necessarily entails 
both an emotional appraisal about whether developments are desirable or not 
(Frijda et al., 2014), and at the same time, it must be enacted though a suitable 
mood. Both the latter are shaped by what is assumed to be the internal good of 
a practice (MacIntyre, 2007; Moore, 2017). Therefore, management could 
cultivate self-awareness about the meaning of emotions, in order to avoid 
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feeling overwhelmed by emotions during critical situations. Also, management 
must pay attention to cultivating appropriate emotional responses to situations 
through practice, as well as through explaining the importance of responding in 
an emotionally appropriate manner (e.g., attentive calmness). This is because 
staff may have developed habits of emotional responses prior to joining the 
organization that may be incompatible with its objectives. 
 
6.8 Boundary Conditions and Limitations 
Some may consider the fact that this study, like most process studies, does not 
seek to offer a theory that can be generalized across all organizational settings 
as a limitation. However, this is not necessarily a limitation, but a boundary 
condition. For process studies seek to offer complex accounts that highlight the 
importance of the ecology  the unfolding of particular circumstances in 
specific loci at a specific time (Shotter & Tsoukas, 2011; Tsoukas & Dooley, 
2011).  
By analysing specific cases, process scholars seek to identify family 
e e b a ce  be ee  a ic a  ca e  a d add e  he c e i e f h  he 
a ic a  a d he ge e a  a e e a ed  (Tsoukas, 2009b, p. 286). Due to the 
singularity of particular cases, process studies necessarily need to draw new 
distinctions or recombine already established distinctions so as to elaborate on 
ha  i  a ead  k . N ice, ha  hi  i  a c ea i e ce  beca e c ce  
a e e i ica  de e i ed  (ibid, . 286)  the same situations can be 
interpreted in a plurality of ways depending on both onto-epistemological 
assumptions (Dreyfus & Taylor, 2015), and which aspects of the relationship 
between the particular and general are focused on. The goal of process studies, 
then, is not generalization, but analytical finesse. Although not necessary, 
analytical finesse can complement the insights of large-scale quantitative 
studies (Tsoukas, 2009b, p. 286). Hence, it would be undesirable for process 
studies to imitate the logic of large-scale studies.  
Nevertheless the insights of this study need to be appropriately theorized 
in the light of radically different organizational settings. In other words, the 
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findings about the investigated ATC unit have certain idiosyncrasies that need 
to be taken into consideration on the occasion that the advocated theoretical 
framework is used to interpret other settings. The studied setting is heavily 
regulated. All activities are tied to written guidelines. Knowledge of the latter 
makes it clear when the staff engages in improvisation. The latter may not be 
so easy to identify in settings which do not have formalized rules. In addition, 
due to the narrow time-frames in which the organization operates, there is 
increased pressure for its staff to deal with exigencies within seconds of arising. 
This may not often be the case in more bureaucratic organizational settings, 
which in turn may give rise to other practices of improvisation. 
Despite the idiosyncrasies of the theoretical framework, with its 
emphasis on concern about internal goods and skilfulness, has features that may 
hold across a wide number of settings. If we assume that all settings house 
practices, then we can assume that they are underlain by internal goods that 
guide their activities. While the internal goods are not likely to be the same 
across practices, they nevertheless should form the basis of what is of concern 
(MacIntyre, 2007; Moore, 2017; Nicolini & Monteiro, 2017; Schatzki, 1997). 
By extension, learning to be concerned about something is likely to cultivate 
emotional reactions to situations that offer motivation for crafting responses 
(Dreyfus, 1991; Frijda et al., 2014; Solomon, 2007). However, the intensity of 
emotional reactions may vary depending on the nature of the setting. Moreover, 
if we assume that the execution of all activities require the development of skill 
(Dreyfus, 2017b; Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 2005; Ribeiro, 2014, 2017; Ribeiro & 
Lima, 2016; Tsoukas, 2011a), then circumspection is also likely to be observed 
across settings. The differences will be in the object of anticipation, the 
particulars in which practitioners dwell in and the elements the agents find 
unusual. What is increasingly likely to be different, is that there are additional 
improvisation practices in other settings. 
Past research has highlighted that organizational improvisation does not 
always entail positive outcomes (Giustiniano et al., 2016). Thus, it must be 
e ha i ed ha  hi  d  ha   e ed he da k ide  f ga i a i a  
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improvisation (ibid.). The main reason for the latter is because this study had a 
different focus. In particular, this study sought to contribute to the literature by 
offering an explanation of how improvisation is enacted and experienced, rather 
than judging the outcomes of improvisation. The latter, like many other aspects 
that this study has not focused on, such as the relationship between 
improvisation with narratives and artificial intelligence, need to be addressed in 
future research. 
 
6.9 Directions for Future Research  
While the present study has attempted to push the frontiers of 
understanding improvisation, by focusing on the experience of improvisation 
and its enaction, there are aspects of the phenomenon that this study has not 
addressed and still require further research. In the next paragraphs questions 
remaining broadly unanswered will be outlined. 
Previous improvisations are often narrated as war stories between 
age . Na a i e  f e  c ib e  age  ide i ie  a d i c a e a e  
(see A. D. Brown, Gabriel, & Gherardi, 2009; Gabriel, 1995; Tsoukas & Hatch, 
2001). Thus, how do narratives of past improvisations affect the identity of 
agents? Which types of improvisation are more frequently narrated and how 
does that affect the propensity of further improvisations? How are narratives of 
improvisation tied to the values of organizations (see Cunha et al., 2015, p. 
524)?  
Moreover, during the last decade many aspects of organizations are 
being automated through the introduction of artificial intelligence (AI) (see von 
Krogh, 2018). AI offers agents a new set of affordances, while perhaps making 
existing affordances redundant (e.g., Beane & Orlikowski, 2015). Therefore, 
how agents perceive ways to improvise is changing. This suggests that AI may 
have opened up new improvisation practices, but also closed existing ones. 
Despite technological changes to the workplace we know very little about how 
AI is affecting improvisation in organizations. Hence questions that could be 
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addressed in the future are: how is AI affecting improvisation practices? How 
does AI facilitate improvisation? How does AI impede improvisation? Is AI 
more suitable for specific practices of improvisation rather than others? How 
does AI change the perception of solicitations? 
In addition, it has been highlighted that improvisation does not 
inherently entail positive outcomes; there are instances in which it has negative 
outcomes, especially when it involves deviations from organizational 
procedures (e.g., Costa Concordia) (Giustiniano et al., 2016). Hence, 
understanding the antecedents and the processes that give rise to improvisation 
having negative outcomes needs to be better understood. For example, is a 
negative outcome of improvisation more likely to occur when agents are 
inexperienced (e.g., like when Tom, in Episode 2, could not anticipate that the 
pilot was experiencing problems)? Are negative outcomes of improvisation 
more likely to occur in practices that have many competing internal goods 
(because agents may not be able to hierarchise which good takes priority)?  
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
 
All try their hands at miming, at 
repeating, and at re-creating the reality 
that is theirs. We always end up by 
ha i g he a ea a ce f  h .   
Albert Camus (1979, p. 87)  
 
O e ca  e  ice i  he a e 
river, for the water into which you first 
e ed ha  f ed   
Heraclitus (in Davenport, 1995, §21) 
 
 
Organizations are created on the basis of coordinating the labours of individuals 
through conventions (viz., rules, procedures, routines) (Gkeredakis, 2014). 
With immersion in organizational practices, agents learn to tacitly dwell in 
normative distinctions (e.g., concepts, terminology, goods/values). Over time 
agents take the latter for granted to such an extent, that it becomes a gestalt 
against which they concernfuly appraise their anticipations of unfolding 
developments. However, insofar as conventions draw upon Practices, they are 
necessarily forged out of past experience, but must be extrapolated to new 
circumstances. Thus, conventions constantly need adjustment to fit anticipated 
contingencies. This is because the social world is an open-ended system, 
wherein encountered situations are unlikely to be identical (Hadjimichael, 
2017).  
Following from the above, agents are called to attempt to re-align 
situational exigencies with what is conventionally held to be good (see 
MacIntyre, 2007; Moore, 2017). This study has attempted to complement the 
existing literature on organizational improvisation by paying particular 
attention to how improvisation is experienced and enacted. Specifically, I have 
argued that improvisation is achieved by being drawn to improvisation practices 
through circumspection. By doing so I hoped to illustrate that coping with the 
sociomaterial world is a complex phenomenon that is tempered by skills as well 
as emotional predispositions that are developed on the background of 
experience in Practices.  
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In parallel, I hoped to show that organizational improvisation is an ever-
unfolding process. This is because the novelty of situations create a recurring 
loop wherein agents are habitually predisposed to appraise their anticipation of 
developments by attending from their concerns and past experience. Appraisal 
solicits agents to respond through relevant affordances that address their 
concerns. If agents lack an anticipation due to unfamiliarity, they reflect in or 
on the situation to restore their anticipation. The latter restarts the cycle of 
circumspection. It follows, that every response evokes new anticipations, 
concerns and appraisals, and hence, new solicitations to responses ad infinitum. 
Because this loop is ever-unfolding, improvisation is and will be an inherent 
feature of organizations. 
I  he M h f Si h , Camus (1979, p. 87) aptly noted that a   
their hands at miming, at repeating, and at re-creating the reality that is theirs. 
We a a  e d  b  ha i g he a ea a ce f  h . If I may interpret 
Ca  a age through the lens of this study, it implies that agents learn to 
enact Practices by imitating and repeating the actions of their peers. This entails 
an implicit attempt to constantly re-create the sociomaterial reality they have 
learned to value. However, much like how Heraclitus (in Davenport, 1995, §21) 
ai ai  ha  a e  ca  step twice into he a e i e , i a i a  
uniqueness never allows agents to enter the same situation twice. Hence, as 
Sisyphus, who was condemned by the gods to eternally push a rock up a steep 
hill; he  i a i  f d i  a  ha  d   c c  i h he gh e  of 
Practice (Schatzki, 1996, p. 101), agents are condemned, if they value them, to 
attempt to re-align them through improvisation. While the temptation to 
continue to push the rock uphill unreflectively may be great, it is not the only 
way to enact our Fate. Careful reflection on our experience may not free us from 
our Fate, but at least it may assist in understanding the means and the meaning 
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A. Equipment in Air Traffic Control 
 
A vast range of equipment is used by the ATC team at the aerodrome. A brief 
explanation of each is offered: 
1. Aircraft Stands: Designated area of an apron (see 2) where an aircraft 
can park. 
2. Airport Apron: Where aircrafts are parked, unloaded, loaded, refuelled, 
boarded or disembarked. 
3. Airway: Pre-defined route that connects two locations at specific 
altitudes. The route is specified in reference to pre-specified points (viz. 
waypoints - see 25) that can be identified by GPS (see 18) or from ground 
beacons such as the VOR (see 24). 
4. Area Navigation (RNAV):  Instead of aircraft navigating directly from 
beacon to beacon (see 24), RNAV allows to choose any heading (see 33) 
between beacons. At the aerodrome studied it was used transition to the 
final approach to the runway (see 17) (Nolan, 2011, p. 75; D. Smith, 
2015, p. 49). 
5. Automatic Terminal Information Service (ATIS): Broadcasts from 
airports with most recent information regarding the weather, the active 
runway (see 17), the available approaches or Notice to Airmen 
(NOTAM) (see 12) (Nolan, 2011, p. 249). 
6. Disconnection Points: Set points on taxi lanes (see 19) where tow trucks 
and aircrafts are disconnected from each other. 
7. Distance Measuring Equipment (DME): Radio navigation system, 
usually collocated with VOR (see 24). Allows pilots and controllers 
know the distance of an aircraft from a ground beacon. The combination 
of VOR (see 24) and DME provide an accurate position fix for an aircraft 
(Nolan, 2011, pp. 70 72; D. Smith, 2015, p. 44). 
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8. Flight Plans: Standardised method for providing ATC units with 
information about the routing of flights. It is transmitted via worldwide 
system of aeronautical network (Nolan, 2011, p. 418). 
9. Flight Progress Strips:  Small narrow rectangular strips of paper. Used 
as representation of a flight and assist in keeping track of it. Carries 
i f a i  ab  a  ai c af  f igh  a  ( ee 8), ca  ig  ( ee 29), e, 
flight level (see 27), route, destination, true air speed and has space for 
ATCOs to make annotations (D. Smith, 2015, p. 52). Annotations are 
vital as they serve as a means of remembering the instructions issued to 
each aircraft e.g. flight level given (see 27), taxi instructions (see 20) 
(Nolan, 2011, p. 280). Each strip is placed in a coloured plastic strip 
holder which is then placed on the strip-holder board. The colour of the 
strip and its position on the strip-holder offer information about aircraft 
position. Blue represents west-bound flights and yellow represents east-
bound flights. Flight progress strips are considered to be official 
documents and can be used for investigations (Nolan, 2011, p. 286). The 
layout of the strip-holder varies depending on the role of the person 
sitting in each work station (see figure).   
10. Frequency Assignments: Pilots and controllers use one specific 
frequency to communicate with each other. Based on international 
agreements only certain radio frequencies are used for aviation 
communications. Specifically, very high (VHF) and ultra-high (UHF) 
frequency bands are used because they are suitable for communication 
over large distances and follow the curvature of the earth. The following 
blocks of frequencies are used by ATC: 118.000 - 121.400, 123.675-
128.800 and 132.025 -136.975. 
11. Instrument Landing System (ILS): Radio navigation system, usually 
collocated with VOR (see 24) and DME (see 7) systems. Used by pilots 
immediately before and during landing, to continually determine the 
position of their aircraft relative to the runway (see 17) in order to be 
aligned with its centreline (Nolan, 2011, p. 102; D. Smith, 2015, p. 45). 
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12. Notice to Airmen (NOTAM): Notice broadcasted via 
telecommunications which shares information about service conditions 
or hazards that are essential knowledge for anyone engaged in flight 
operations. It specifies a physical location and duration of a restriction. 
It is updated by ACTAs (Nolan, 2011, p. 185). 
13. Pushback: When an aircraft is parked on a stand, it needs to be pushed 
back from the stand (see 1) to the taxi lane (see 19) by using a tow truck. 
14. Radar: In combination with computer technology, by sending and 
receiving signals to aircrafts this system allows to produce a picture of 
the aircraft moving in the airspace. It produces a radar position symbol 
(aka b i )  a i .  Ne   each b i , he i  di a  ca -
sign (see 29), flight level (see 27) and direction of aircraft (Nolan, 2011, 
p. 360; D. Smith, 2015, p. 54). 
15. Radio-telecommunication: Communication over radio frequencies is 
predominantly used for ATC. Each active controller is assigned at least 
one frequency(see 10) to communicate with pilots. In addition to the 
radio, each controller has access to a landline telephone to communicate 
with other services. Communication channels are integrated to allow 
seamless communication. A switching panel is used to choose with 
whom to communicate. Controllers were equipped with a headset and a 
boom microphone (for back-up) from which they could talk on the phone 
or the radio (Nolan, 2011, pp. 194 195).  
16. Runway Lighting: Edge lighting, threshold lighting and runway end 
lighting define the extent of the runway (see 17) and are necessary for 
night use. Stop way lighting is used in a similar manner to traffic lights 
at important junctions [e.g. taxiway (see 21) to runway (see 17)]. When 
they are red no aircrafts can traverse beyond them, when green they can 
 their colour is adjusted by the Approach/Tower ATCOs. Intensity for 
all can be adjusted by the Approach/Tower ATCOs (Nolan, 2011, pp. 
123 136). 
17. Runway: Rectangular area used for aircraft landing or take off. 
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18. Satellite Navigation (GPS): Geo-spatial positioning system by using 
satellites. They are the most accurate location systems. Gradually being 
introduced to aviation to help determine aircraft positions (Nolan, 2011, 
pp. 84 86; D. Smith, 2015, p. 47). 
19. Taxi lane: Taxiway that offers access to aircraft stands (see 1). 
20. Taxi: Movement of aircraft on the ground to and from the runway (see 
17). 
21. Taxiway: Route used to travel to and from the runway (see 17). 
22. Traffic Alert Collision Avoidance System (TCAS): Reacts to 
transponders (see 23) of aircrafts to reduce air collisions between 
aircrafts. Offers warning to pilots and controllers, independently from 
ATC (Nolan, 2011, pp. 358 359). If TCAS are activated, an 
investigation by ATCOs is mandatory to find the reason for why aircraft 
separation (see 26) was violated. TCAS alerts are not issued when flying 
at low altitudes (see 27) (D. Smith, 2015, p. 19). 
23. Transponder: Transmitter on aircraft that receives radar signals (see 14) 
and broadcasts information in reply (D. Smith, 2015, p. 50). 
24. VHF Omni Directional Range (VOR): Radio navigation system for 
aircraft that operates from fixed ground radio beacons which gives 
accurate directional information. It broadcasts differentiated signals to 
allow pilots and controllers, to decipher aircraft direction in relation to 
the beacons (Nolan, 2011, pp. 60 72; D. Smith, 2015, p. 44).  
25. Waypoint: Pre-specified points in the air that are part of an airway (see 
3), are referred to as waypoints. An airway (see 3) has several waypoints. 
Waypoints are named with five letter words which are easy to 
pronounce, used to standardise coordination with pilots.   
B. Air Traffic Control Rules and Terminology 
To ensure safety and expedition, ATC depends on the strict implementation of 
rules and the use of standardised terminology to do so. Definitions of key terms 
will be provided in this section. 
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26. Aircraft Separation: Aircraft separation refers to keeping aircrafts at a 
safe distance from each other. The minimum distance between IFR 
aircrafts (see 35) allowed at the studied unit was approximately 5 to 8 
miles laterally and 1000ft vertically (up to flight level 290, above this 
level vertical separation is doubled to 2000ft with certain exceptions). 
For VFR (see 46) aircrafts separations are approximately 1 mile 
horizontally and 1000ft vertically. 
27. Altitude Vs Flight Level: Altitude is how high the plane is flying from 
mean sea level by taking into consideration QNH (local pressure), 
whereas flight level is how high the plane is flying from mean sea level 
by considering QNE (pressure altitude). Altitude is used for low levels 
whereas flight level is used for high levels (Nolan, 2011, p. 199).  
28. Approaches: When aircrafts were flying in the FIR, the controllers of the 
latter would instruct aircrafts to contact the control tower approximately 
40 miles from the airport to receive approach clearance. Under normal 
conditions, pilots cannot begin their approach to the airport if they do 
not receive clearance to approach (see 30) from the control tower.  
Depending on the direction an aircraft is coming from (West, East, North 
or South), there are pre-specified airways (see 3) which they must follow 
to approach the airport. The airways (see 3) pre-specify the route from 
which an aircraft can approach and the minimum altitude (see 27) an 
aircraft can reach at the waypoints (see 25) of the route by taking into 
consideration the terrain and other airways.  
29. Call sign: Unique alias of a transmitting agent. Permits unambiguous 
identification of sender and receiver of message (see also 36). 
30. Clearance: Authorisation issued by an ATCO to a pilot to proceed to 
certain point. Clearances are issued in different phases of a flight. They 
include clearance to taxi (see 20), to take off, land, to use an instrument 
approach procedure (see 34), to proceed to an airport or navigational fix 
(see 25) (Nolan, 2011, Chapter 205; D. Smith, 2015, pp. 33 35). 
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31. Departure Clearance: All departing aircrafts are issued with an initial 
route which leads to the airway that takes the aircraft to its new 
destination (see also 3). ATCOs would instruct aircrafts to contact the 
FIR approximately 10 miles out from the airport. 
32. Flying height assignment: All aircrafts are assigned a specific altitude or 
flight level at which they must fly. IFR pilots (see 35) must maintain and 
request permission to change, whereas VFR (see 46) pilots may deviate 
to maintain visual contact with landmarks although they must inform the 
ATCO. 
33. Headings: Aircraft direction in reference to the magnetic north (Nolan, 
2011, p. 201). 
34. Instrument Approaches: After following the approach (see 28), around 
16 nautical miles from the airport, aircrafts must get further clearance 
(see 30) to use the instrument approach. An instrument approach is a 
predetermined route an aircraft must follow to land and is aided by 
instruments such as the ILS (see 11), VOR (see 24) or GPS (see 18). 
Depending on the direction from which the aircraft is approaching there 
are different instrument approaches that can be chosen from. 
35. Instrument Flight Rules (IFR): Set of rules when aircrafts navigated with 
reference to instrument indications. 
36. Message Format: To minimise miscommunication between pilots or 
controllers, a standardised message format procedure is specified. Each 
message follows the below structure (Nolan, 2011, p. 195): 
a. Sender identification of Receiver: Agent making contact must 
specify the identity of who they are contacting (usually the call 
sign - see 29) to prepare the receiver that a transmission is to be 
made. 
b. Sender Self-identification: Agent making contact must then 
specify their identity (usually the call sign - see 29) to inform 
receiver who is trying to contact them. 
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c. Message: Message content specified in relation to aviation 
terminology and pronunciation (see 38). 
d. Termination: When terminating a message, operating initials 
(usually the call sign - see 29) should be specified at the end of 
the transmission. 
 
37. Minimum Altitude: For VFR (see 46), over inhabited areas 1000ft over 
ground/terrain or highest obstacle but elsewhere 500ft over ground/water 
or highest obstacle. For IFR (see 35), over inhabited areas 1500ft, but 
elsewhere 1000ft over highest obstacle or minimum specified by the 
procedure used each time. 
38. Pronunciation of Alphabet and Numbers: Communication between ATC 
and aircrafts is heavily reliant on radio-telecommunications. To 
minimise misunderstandings international agreements dictate that 
aviation professionals use a standard phonetic alphabet. Pronunciation 
of letters is stipulated in Table 9 (Nolan, 2011, p. 196):   
 
TABLE 9 
Phonetic Alphabet in use in Aviation 
A - Alpha  J - Juliet S - Sierra 
B - Bravo K - Kilo T - Tango 
C - Charlie L - Lima U - Uniform 
D - Delta M - Mike V - Victor 
E - Echo N - November W - Whiskey 
F - Foxtrot O - Oscar X - X-Ray 
G - Golf P - Papa Y - Yankee 
H - Hotel Q - Quebec Z - Zulu 
I - India R - Romeo  
 
For the same reasons, the pronunciation of numbers is standardised. 
Each number should be pronounced individually see Table 10  (Nolan, 
2011, pp. 195 196; D. Smith, 2015, p. 25).  
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TABLE 10 
Number Transmission in Aviation 
0 - Zero 6 - Six 
1 - Wun 7 - Seven 
2 - Too 8 - Ait 
3 - Tree 9 - Niner 
4 - Fower 10 - Wun Zero 
5 - Fife 569 - Fife Six Niner 
 
When pronouncing altitudes (see 27), thousands must be pronounced 
separately from hundreds. E.g., altitude of 5100 is supposed to be 
pronounced as fife tousand, wun hundred.  
39. Read back: When an ATCO issues a pilot with an instruction, the pilot 
must repeat the instruction. This is a way to ensure that the pilot has 
understood the instruction. In cases that the pilot erroneously reads back, 
the ATCO repeats the correct instruction and the pilot is again required 
to repeat. This process continues until the pilot correctly repeats the 
instructions. 
40. Reports: An ATCO may request that a pilot reports their position, 
altitude or flight level (see 27), speed and intentions. 
41. Runway Numbers: Runways (see 17) are numbered in reference to their 
relation to the magnetic north heading e.g. in the observed airport the 
runway names were 27 and 09 (Nolan, 2011, p. 201). 
42. Speed: Aircraft speeds are measured in knots. 
43. Squawk: aircraft transponders are assigned a four-digit code by ATCOs, 
to broadcast in response to radars. It is a secondary way of identifying 
a  ai c af  ide i   he ada  ( ee 14). 
44. Time: To ensure safety and coordination, it was specified with 
international agreements that ATC systems should not use local time. 
Instead, it was agreed that all ATC stations must use UTC - local time in 
Greenwich, England (Nolan, 2011, p. 198). 
 303 
45. Visual Approaches: Like instrument approaches (see 34), when close to 
the aerodrome a pilot may request a visual approach. A visual approach 
d e   e   i e   a d, b   a i  abi i   ceed 
to the runway (see 17) with visual reference. They are usually chosen by 
experienced pilots, or pilots that are very familiar with the airport. The 
benefit of visual approaches is that they usually reduce approach time 
for pilots and therefore, can help ATCOs to increase the expedition of 
traffic flow. 
46. Visual Flight Rules (VFR): Set of rules when aircrafts navigated with 
reference to visual landmarks. Specifically, VFR minimum requirements 
for flight approval are: (i) 8km visibility, (ii) no clouds below 1000ft and 
(iii) no warning or expectation of weather below aforementioned 
minima. A VFR is limited to reach a maximum height of 8000ft. 
 
C. Air Traffic Control Contingency Procedures 
47. Altitude Change: Depending on the circumstances an ATCO can request 
that an aircraft changes its altitude (see 27).  
48. Flight Regulation: ATCOs at the aerodrome may request that the FIR 
region caps the number of flights to approach the airport to a maximum 
of 12 per hour in order to cope with traffic. 
49. H di g I c i  (aka h d ): Depending on the circumstances an 
ATCO can request that an aircraft enter a holding pattern. A holding 
pattern specifies that an aircraft must enter a predefined oval pattern over 
the specified waypoint (see 25) at a specified altitude. Usually used to 
delay an aircraft. The standard hold is based on right-hand and usually 
takes 4 minutes to complete (1 minute for each side of the oval). 
However, more ad-hoc holds may be requested by ATCOs - these are 
referred to as 360 degree orbits. They are not required to be over a 
waypoint (see 25) and usually only take 2 minutes to complete - the only 
requirement is for the pilot to have visual reference with the ground. 
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50. Mi ed A ach P ced e (aka G  a d ): In case a safe landing 
ca  be c e ed, he ATCO ca  e e  ha  a i  g e  a d  
or the pilot can initia e a g  a d  af e  i f i g he ATCO. I  he 
case of a go around, the aircraft must follow a pre-specified route at 
2000ft (and altitude - see 27) that leads to a waypoint (see 25) that can 
be used to re-initiate the approach. The altitude (see 27) used is separated 
from other routes so as to ensure safety. 
51. Speed Adjustment: Depending on the circumstances an ATCO can 
request that an aircraft increase or decrease their speed in order to 
maintain appropriate spacing with other aircraft (see 26). 
52. Touch and go: When an aircraft lands and immediately after takes off. 
Usually used as a way for pilots to gain experience in take-off and 
landings. However, can be used in emergencies too. In the latter case, 




Appendix 1: Further Examples of Improvisation 
Mundane Instances of Improvisation 
 
1) Constant adjustments to aircraft speed, altitude and approach method were 
observed constantly. The higher the traffic, the more likely the control was to 
tinker with all three. I would witness this hundreds of times each day. 
 
2) A controller instructed an aircraft to deviate from the normal procedure while 
departing the airport in order to offer a shortcut by avoiding two inbound aircrafts. 
This type of improvisation was frequent, but tended to be used by experienced 
controllers when dealing with high levels of traffic. I would witness this about 
three times a day. 
 
3) A controller instructs an aircraft to perform an ad-hoc orbit to their right in order 
to delay its arrival due to being too close to a preceding aircraft. While this 
response is not preferred, I had witnessed its use 44 times. 
 
4) A controller instructs an aircraft to use an unconventional taxi route to save time 
after a navigating mistake by the pilot. This type was used whenever a pilot would 
make a mistake. On average I would witness this thrice a week. 
 
5) A controller instructs an aircraft to use an alternative to the designated taxi route 
from the aprons to the runway. This tended to happen during low levels of traffic 
to save the aircraft some time. I would witness this dozens of times a day. 
 
Critical Instances of Improvisation 
 
1) An inexperienced ATCO froze in panic upon noticing that a pilot was mistakenly 
taking off. The reason for panic was due to another smaller aircraft also being on 
the runway at the time. A collision was imminent. An experienced controller, who 
was on a lunchbreak, noticed this and immediately took over control. He asked the 
pilot, who had mistakenly started to take off to hold their position immediately. 
 
2) An aircraft was hijacked and the hijacker requested to land at the airport. The 
controllers on duty had to contact the authorities and adjust flight schedules. No 
other aircrafts were allowed to land or depart until the incident was dealt with. The 
controllers had to then collaborate with the negotiation team. 
 
3) During a break an air traffic controller notices smoke coming from a parked 
aircraft. Immediately notifies colleagues, who in turn notify the police service and 
ensure no other aircraft are allowed to park near it until the incident is resolved. 
 
4) Light aircraft told to hold short of taxiway Charlie, because airliner was taxiing 
towards holding point Alpha. The pilot of the former did not comply and entered 
Charlie. Controller spontaneously instructs the airliner pilot to hold position, 
because they tend to be more reliable. 
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5) As aircraft was approaching to land, it reported a bird strike. The controller in 
charge had to put other inbound aircrafts in holds, while delaying departures until 
runway was inspected. 
 
Appendix 2: Additional Evidence for Internal Goods 
Safety 
 
1) Mike: When something goes wrong the only concern you have at that time is to 
avoid the collision, to save lives. You become focused on two things, the distressed 
parties and the others - aircrafts are separated in your mind into these two 
ca eg ie  ike BAMB  hen you realise the imminent danger you act erm 
i i c i e  a d af e  i  dea  i h, he  i  ge  , ha  he   ge  e 
stressed and you ask yourself what just happened...Safety is everything, safety is 
number one, safety is tied to everything. When you are being safe you are being 
e  a   k a d he  a ca e  c e  a d e e hi g fee  h  
 
2) Chris:  [Recounting reaction upon realising that a pilot made a mistake and was on 
a collision course with another aircraft]: he  I ea i ed what had happened, it 
was excruciating, like an electric shock. Immediately, erm in inverted commas, I 
beca e f  a e  a d b cked e e hi g e e , a d i  a  a  if he he  did  
exist (aircrafts not in danger), theoretically so to speak. I immediately told the first 
ai c af   a   a  I had di e a g ed he i a i  I fe  e ie ed, i  a  a  if 
a weight from my shoulders was removed - but until it was over and dealt with it 
a  e ib e, I a  e b i g af e  ha  I a  ch e ca ef , I try not to rush 
into things - i  d e  a e  if i   e edi i , afe  i  he i i  beca e 
i  d  a a  f   i c i , i  be e   be afe ha  . 
 
3) Harry: ATC is about safety above all. Safety is first and expedition is second - 
these are the key objectives of ATC. Both objectives have their unique qualities. 
But when something goes wrong, expedition is pushed aside because safety is 
above all. When the difficult time comes only one thing matters  SAFETY  
(emphatically). 
 
4) Observations: Annually the SATCO arranges two full-days of training sessions on 
safety. It is mandatory for all personnel to attend. Throughout the event, speakers 
are invited to talk about matters related to safely executing their job. In his opening 
speech, he asserted:  en ing he afe  of fligh  i  he ai on d e e of o  




1) Leonard: [on training] The i c  ied  ake  f c ed  bei g a 
controller by listening and writing at the same time and looking outside the 
window. They used specific scenarios which pressured you, especially in the first 
sessions, to learn the basic operations of the controller - multifunctioning and 
bei g e edi i  b  c a  i g he a . 
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2) Norman : [During training] e did i e hi g  ike ha i g e   a i a  
and a departure. To be safe, I allowed both aircrafts to land before allowing the 
departure to leave. After the session, the trainer reprimanded for not ensuring the 
expedition of all flights. You see, I could have allowed the departure to leave but 
I did .  
 
3) Andrew: instructed an aircraft to deviate from the normal procedure while 
depar i g he ai  i  de   be c ea  f  a i a . He e ai ed ha : i  a  
just instinct, I felt that instead of making 10 different calls to separate them and 
not to mention increasing the risk of an error, I managed to handle the situation 
expeditiously -  i c i  a ed i e f  he de a e a d did  i e fe e 
i h a e  afe .   
 
4) Observations: A frequent occurrence when ATCOs were fulfilling the ground 
control position, was to help aircrafts taxi to the runway 27 from apron 1 quicker 
than usual by deviating from their handbooks normal taxi routine (Lima - Zulu - 
Charlie to Alpha). When they were sure no arrivals were imminently at hand they 
would instruct, aircrafts leaving from taxi lanes Lima Alpha or Lima Bravo to taxi 
to Alpha via Victor - Charlie or when from taxi lane Lima Charlie to taxi to Alpha 
via Whiskey then Charlie. As several controllers explained to me, it is easier and 
faster for pilots this way because the extra turn at Zulu is alleviated with these 
instructions. Experienced ATCOs would reprimand unexperienced ATCOs for 
incon eniencing he pilo  if they forced aircrafts to taxi the long route when 




Appendix 3: Additional Evidence for Mood  
Attentive calmness 
 
1) Paul: The e e ie ced e e   he  he e bie  - to give them their 
knowledge about how to deal with emergencies and pilots in distress: for example, 
how to talk on the radio - let the pilots relax, talk to them slowly, say your 
instruction again if you . Pa  a e i   he e f  ice,  h d  
demand things; you should be thoughtful, for example to say to the pilot: when 
 a e ead  e  e h  a  e e a e  b a d, h  ch f e  e c.  
 
2) Constance: from training, we were taught to be professionals -  ha  i  be e   
reply in the politest manner and keep a low profile even in cases in which pilots 
a  ke  We a e he e  c e a e i h he i , fi  f  afe  a d 
then for expedition...our job is to help airplanes, to facilitate them for safety so we 
h d  ge  a g  or stressed  I  ca e f a  e e ge c , he  he i  b  
making as little calls as possible during an emergency. Ask them if they need help, 
if he  a   j  kee  a  e e  he  b  d  badge  hem. You must remember 
to keep your voice calm - you are not the one in danger, the pilot is. 
 
3) Leonard: O ce he  e   k  ha  he  a e i  b e, I  ge  e ed. 
M  ice  b eak, i  h d  h  ig  f e b i g beca e I k  ha  I 
am not the one in danger. It really matters that you listen to the pilot, you can 
understand that they are under pressure, sometimes you can hear the other pilot 
h i g. If hei  ice i  c acki g  e e  if he  d  dec a e a  e e ge c , 
you should gi e he  i i  ada   a  a d  ice ake i  e 
comforting and reassuring. Although I said earlier you have to be firm with pilots, 
if  ea i e ha  he i  i   e ,  h d  be ic  i h he . I i  a k 
to him sweetly, slowly slowly and try to make them understand that I am are there 
f  he . E e  if he  a e  eadi g back e e hi g,  h d  ha e a fi  
a d a  de a di g hi g ,  ha e  fi d a he  a .  
 
4) Harry: no one can have a heart of stone, but whatever you are feeling, you must 
be professional and sound as if you are calm. You may be feeling negative 
emotions; your heartrate may be skyrocketing because you are thinking about the 
worst-case scenario - losing 200 lives -  b   ca  e  ha  e e  you; you 






Appendix 4: Additional Evidence for Conforming through 
Accountability 
 
1) Paul: Y  fee  a h ge e ibi i ,  ca  d  e hi g j  beca e  
want to, you can either do it the way it should be done, or you should prepare to 
a e  f  ... i   e hi g e ake igh , e a e i  cha ge f aki g ca e 
of hundreds of i e  a d i i  f e Y  ea  he e a e e , b  he  a  
aircraft says mayday, mayday you can bend the rules. But when you go to court 
  ha e a ea  g d ea   be d he e . Y  ca  be d he e  
without a reason. A good reason  be d he  i  beca e  did  ha e a he  
choice. But you must prove that with real evidence. One of the reasons a pilot 
gives you a mayday is to give you this flexibility. You can do things such as 
interrupt routine procedures or sequencing just because a pilot said mayday. But 
a a  e e be  ha  he i a ce c a ie   e   ge  a a  i h i  - 
he e i ed ai i e  f  h d ed  f i i  a d he  d  a   e a 
e ,   h d g  b  he b k a  ch a  ib e.  
 
2) Mike: The responsibility can take a tall on you if you let it. In the beginning or 
whenever I used to make a mistake I got scared, scared I would think I have three 
a e   ( igh ) 700 e e if i  a j b  900 e e a d I ed  kee  
hi ki g ab  i b   ca  kee  hi ki g ab  hi ,  ca  d   k 
ike ha I had a c eag e ha  beca e b e ed b  he e e f e ibi i  
she felt after a near miss. She had made a mistake and the aircrafts were saved 
thanks to luck. After that, each time she did a session she would have her phone 
next to her and record what she said and heard, so she could go back and listen to 
what happened and understand what went wrong. Even when nothing went wrong 
she would still listen to the recordings. You can become paranoid, it can wear you 
down, wear you down. I know you see us joking and laughing but we always have 
hi  i  he back a  he back f  head.  
 
3) Pauline remembers that she felt responsible for asking a pilot to use the missed 
approach procedure at the last minute. In fact, she felt so bad that she went to talk 
 he i   a  ha  he would understand if they wanted to file a report.  
 
4) Observations 
a) Daily logbooks kept by the shift leader mention all unusual incidents. These 
are always reviewed by the Senior ATCO who in turn may investigate each 
occasion if deemed necessary. 
 
b) For all unexpected incidents controllers are required to fill a report for the 
safety department to investigate. Even unidentified reports are encouraged 
when a controller feels that there is a problem that is potentially dangerous. 
 
 
